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Abstract 
In the last decade, individuals such as Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden 
have arguably dominated public debate on leaked information. The terms 
‘whistleblower’ and ‘leaker’ are often used interchangeably in the media to 
describe such individuals. Broadly, they have made an unauthorised 
disclosure of classified information. However, this does not represent a full 
picture of the enormous complexity that past cases have constituted. 
Utilising the dominant cases in the US that have been reported in the media 
between 1970 and 2017, this thesis aims to explore the impact of 
whistleblowers and leakers, both on the changes in legislation or policy they 
may have affected and also on their own lives. In order to achieve this 
objective, the terms whistleblower and leaker in the context of revealing 
classified information will be examined. Accordingly, the main body of this 
thesis analyses how legal definitions have been distorted in the public 
narrative, both by the state and the media and resulted in a variety of 
interpretations with potentially life altering consequences.  
 
In exploring the path taken by a whistleblower or leaker, the thesis deploys a 
new agency-structure model that offers a linear typology of the three stages 
potential whistleblowers will pass through when exposing wrongdoing. I have 
termed these three stages – (1) potential whistleblower, (2) the disclosure 
and (3) the aftermath. This framework has been adopted in order to 
illuminate the moral and practical issues that are faced by potential 
whistleblower, as well as the potential consequences that they face. Drawing 
on different disciplines to gain an insight into the personal burden and 
choices made in each case, this thesis investigates the possibility that western 
governments have sought to securitise the leaker. By portraying them as the 
enemy of the state, the integrity of the disclosure is more readily questioned. 
Finally, the thesis seeks to provide normative conclusions with suggestions 
for an improved approach to national security whistleblowers and leakers. 
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Introduction 
Democracy, freedom, egalitarianism and justice, some of the most valued 
American principles, are enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and 
the Bill of Rights.2 Often signalled by the umbrella term ‘open society’, these 
ideals stand in conflict with the concept of secret intelligence and the 
operation of opaque organisations of a democratic society. The intelligence 
sector, unlike other areas of government, is marked by its inherent and often 
ironic culture of secrecy.3 This most elusive branch of the state, its secretive 
element, has been referred to as ‘the missing dimension of most diplomatic 
history’.4 The tension between the purported need to preserve national 
security through secret-keeping and an individual’s right to privacy has rarely 
been more pronounced than today. There have never been more secrets, 
presided over by a veritable empire of classification. Yet through 
technological advances, including the Internet, western civilisation in 
particular has access to mass media and increasingly Big Data, and this has 
made the landscape of secrecy more accessible and paradoxically more open. 
 
Accordingly, there is much greater awareness of the presence and the 
activities of the security services, which has placed them under increased 
scrutiny. Arguably, this process has been developing over a period of more 
than half a century. The era of ‘exposure’ was triggered in 1960 by the 
infamous shoot-down of Gary Powers and his U-2 surveillance aircraft 
followed in short order by the Bay of Pigs. Vietnam, the Watergate Scandal 
                                                        
2 Access to full texts: US History, ‘The Declaration of Independence’, US History 
Organization: Declaration, 4 July 1776, available at: 
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/; and The Bill of Rights Institute, ‘The Bill 
of Rights of the United States of America’, Bill of Rights Institute Organization: Founding 
Documents, 15 December 1791, available at: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-
documents/bill-of-rights/. 
3 See Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2015), 
p.1; Michael Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence’, Studies in Intelligence, 46:3 
(2002) pp. 15-22. 
4 Alexander Cadogan and David Dilks, eds., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O.M. 1938-
1945 (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 21.  
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and, latterly, Iran-Contra. These events marked a developing battle in which 
Congress sought to restrain the executive power of the US President in the 
realm of national security, while the White House sought to push back. At the 
heart of this battle over a secret presidential foreign policy, characterised by 
executive privilege has been secrecy. The events of 9/11 led to an 
unprecedented expansion of presidential power, especially in the secret 
realm. This, in turn, resulted in a social movement, characterised by a more 
aggressive wave of transparency and civil rights activists, who have been 
influencing the public narrative on state secrecy. Activists, investigative 
journalists, critical academics, civil rights lawyers and whistleblowers are 
clearly different species, but they often hunt as a pack.5   
  
As a subject recognised by the academy, ‘intelligence studies’ is still the new 
kid on the block.6 However, its rising importance is marked by an increasing 
and impressive range of Universities offering specialised courses both at 
undergraduate and master's level.7 A paucity of scholarly literature in 
intelligence began to surface in the United States in the 1950s. In the late 
1970s, following key events such as Watergate that brought intelligence 
concerns to the forefront of political debate in the US, intelligence also 
emerged as a distinct academic field to be studied. On 22 December 1974, 
an article written by journalist Seymour Hersh was published in the New York 
Times claiming that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had overstepped 
their mandate by means of spying domestically on US citizens during the 
Nixon administration. The article helped to accelerate a season of inquiry into 
                                                        
5 For two different views of this fascinating period of expanding executive power but failing 
secrecy see Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: the Accountable Presidency After 9/11 
(New York: WW Norton & Company, 2012); Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice 
Presidency (London: Penguin, 2008). 
6 Christopher Moran and Christopher Murphy, Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: 
Historiography since 1945 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
7 Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, pp. 6-7. See also Martin Rudner, 
‘Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to meet Societal Demand’, 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 22:1 (2009), pp. 110-130; 
Jonathan Smith, ‘Common Thread? The Role of Professional Orientation in US and Non-US 
Intelligence Studies Programs’, Journal of Strategic Security, 10:1 (2017), pp. 118-142. 
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intelligence which, even more than Watergate, associated the subject in the 
public mind with the abuse of executive power.8 In 1975, a year that would 
be dubbed ‘the Year of Intelligence’, three commissions were formed.9 
President Gerald Ford set up the ‘United States (US) President's Commission 
on CIA Activities within the US’ also called the Rockefeller Commission led by 
Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. President Ford adopted this initiative, 
hoping to be able to pre-empt any profound external explorations into shady 
CIA activities.10 Regardless of this, the Senate and House of Representatives 
responded by setting up investigations of their own: The Church Committee 
led by Senator Frank Church also known as ‘US Senate Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities’, and 
the ‘US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’ (HPSCI) led by 
Democratic Representative Otis Pike also commonly referred to as the Pike 
Committee.11  
 
                                                        
8 Seymour Hersh, ‘Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in the U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, other 
Dissidents in Nixon Years’, The New York Times, 22 December 1974, available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/12/22/archives/huge-cia-operation-reported-in-u-s-
against-antiwar-forces-other.html. 
9 Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 2. 
10 For a debate on the controversies surrounding the Rockefeller Commission see: John 
Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, ‘White House Efforts to Blunt 1975 Church Committee 
Investigation into CIA Abuses Foreshadowed Executive-Congressional Battles after 9/11’, 
National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 522, 20 July 2015, available at: 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB522-Church-Committee-Faced-White-House-
Attempts-to-Curb-CIA-Probe/; John Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, ‘Gerald Ford White 
House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975. Removed Section on CIA 
Assassination Plots, National Security Archive’, National Security Archive, Briefing Book No. 
543, 29 February 2016, available at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-
book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-
report; and full text of Rockefeller Commission Report, ‘Report to the President by the 
Commission on CIA activities within the United States’, Internet Archive, 6 June 1975, 
available at: https://archive.org/details/Rockefeller-commission-report-to-the-president-
by-the-commission-on-cia-activiti/page/n5. 
11 See Church Committee (full text), ‘Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities’, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
1975-1976, available at: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources/intelligence-
related-commissions; and for Pike Committee see John Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, 
‘The White House, the CIA and the Pike Committee 1975’, National Security Archive, 
Briefing Book, No. 596, 2 June 2017, available at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-
book/intelligence/2017-06-02/white-house-cia-pike-committee-1975. 
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Academic literature on the topic of intelligence prior to the 1970s was 
limited. The first wave of studies consisted of the activities of the secret 
service during the Second World War or fairly abstract political science 
studies of the intelligence cycle in the field of national security.12 In the wake 
of the 1961 invasion of the Bay of Pigs (Cuba) a number of former intelligence 
officers published accounts defending the operation of the CIA, quite 
obviously avoiding the more controversial aspects of intelligence activities.13 
Publications include works by Allen Dulles, former CIA Director, who 
published The Craft of Intelligence in 1963.14 By contrast, a myriad of 
literature would emerge during and after the 1970s. The movement included 
both dissident memoirs and a determination to expose the mostly 
surreptitious and often reckless undertakings by the security services in 
peacetime. It was redolent of a period of intellectual post-Vietnam crisis in 
American power.15 Academic research on the subject exploited these new 
sources and has continued to developed substantially.16 Nonetheless, there 
continues to be a distinct lack of investigation into intelligence activities 
                                                        
12 See for example, Roger Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions (Glencoe: 
Free Press, 1956); David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York: 
Macmillan, 1967); Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., The U.S. Intelligence 
Community (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973).  
13 Christopher Moran, ‘Turning Against the CIA: Whistleblowers During the “Time of 
Troubles”’, History: The Journal of the Historical Association, 100:340 (2015), p. 253. 
14 Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); see also Simon 
Willmetts, ‘The Burgeoning Fissures of Dissent: Allen Dulles and the Selling of the CIA in the 
Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs’, History: The Journal of the Historical Association, 100: 340 
(2015), pp. 167-188. 
15 See for example, Harry Howe Ransom, ‘Congress and the Intelligence Agencies’, The 
Academy of Political Science, 32:1 (1975), pp. 153-166; Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An 
Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End Told by the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Saigon 
(New York: Random House, 1977); Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA (London: Simon & 
Schuster, 1994); Kathryn Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate 
Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 
16 For a discussion of intelligence studies as an academic discipline see, Loch Johnson and 
Allison Shelton, ‘Thoughts on the State of Intelligence Studies: A Survey Report’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 28:1 (2013), pp. 109 –20. 
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outside of the anglosphere.17 This is often due to accessibility and record-
keeping practices, especially in the Global South.18 
 
In the post-Watergate investigations of the 1970s, the debate rested on three 
areas of concern within the intelligence community.19 Firstly, the growing 
abundance of raw intelligence and the coordination of the analytical effort 
thereof. Even at this point in history, before the issue of the internet and 
mobile phones, the intelligence community suffered from information 
overload driven primarily by satellite collection of imagery and unencrypted 
telephony. Already isolating this as an issue decades prior to social media and 
the arrival of smartphones, Michael Handel reasoned that this was because 
of a failure to adapt to a new environment that, in retrospect, was a prelude 
to the twitter age.20 Secondly, the legislative developments of intelligence 
agencies being held publicly accountable to Congress for their activities which 
oscillated between restriction and renewed latitude over the next three 
decades. Thirdly, the inherent ‘secrecy’ of the intelligence community leading 
to over-classification. All three of these concerns still remain in political and 
public discourse today, arguably in an intensified way.21  
 
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) intelligence has rarely 
been off the front page of our newspapers. The controversy over the 
presence of Iraqi WMDs in 2003, followed by attacks on Madrid in 2004 and 
in 2005 bombings in London further raised awareness and interest in 
                                                        
17 Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage 
Outside the Anglosphere (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), pp. 3-12. 
18 Richard Aldrich and John Kasuku, ‘Escaping from American Intelligence: Culture 
Ethnocentrism and the Anglosphere’, International Affairs, 88: 5 (2012), pp. 1009-1028. 
19 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., The Missing Dimension: Government and 
Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1984), p.1. 
20 Michael Handel, ‘Avoiding Political and Technological Surprise in the 1980s’, in Roy 
Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates (Washington 
DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1980), pp. 85-112; ; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
Secrecy: The American Experience (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 
202-227. 
21 Peter Gill, ‘Theories of Intelligence: Where are we, where should we go and how might 
we proceed’, in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, eds., Intelligence Theory: Key 
Questions and Debates (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p. 208. 
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intelligence studies. These distressing events produced dozens of 
retrospective inquiries into intelligence across many countries. Meanwhile, 
knowledge and information on government activities have purportedly been 
converted from commodities to rights, through provisions such as the US and 
UK Freedom of Information Acts (FOIAs). These provisions have had little 
effect on the agencies, whose records are exempt from such requests. The 
perceived failures of such legislative provisions to reduce unnecessary 
secrecy, has resulted in a newly motivated movement demanding more 
government openness. In the 1990s, the transparency debate was often 
focused on improving governance in the Global South and was often spoken 
about in the same breath as democratisation.22 However since 9/11, in the 
wake of an accelerating debate over secret activities associated with the ‘War 
on Terror’, the concept of transparency has been more actively pursued by 
civil rights activists in the Anglosphere.23 
 
The US telephony metadata debate illustrates this well. On the 7 May 2015, 
the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York City ruled on ACLU 
v. Clapper.24 In this landmark appeals case the court decided that the 
‘telephone metadata program’ that the National Security Agency (NSA) had 
been running in the wake of 9/11 was ‘unlawful’.25 The full details of the 
program became public knowledge when, on the 6 June 2013, the journalist 
                                                        
22 Alasdair Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
23 The literature is extensive but see for example: Alexandru Grigorescu, ‘International 
organizations and government transparency: Linking the international and domestic 
realms’, International Studies Quarterly, 47:4 (2003), pp. 643-667; Peter Burnell, ‘Good 
government and democratization: A sideways look at aid and political conditionality,’ 
Democratization, 1:2 (1994), pp. 485-503. 
24 The listed plaintiffs/appellants of this case were American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (ACLUF), New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) 
and the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation (NYCLUF); against the listed 
defendants/appellees in this case JAMES R. CLAPPER, in his official capacity as Director of 
National Intelligence, MICHAEL S. ROGERS, in his official capacity as Director of the National 
Security Agency and Chief of the Central Security Service, ASHTON B. CARTER, in his official 
capacity as Secretary of Defense, LORETTA E. LYNCH, in her official capacity as Attorney 
General of the US, and JAMES B. COMEY, in his official capacity as Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.  
25 ACLU v. Clapper (2015) 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir.), US Court of Appeals. 
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Glenn Greenwald of the Guardian published a ‘top secret’ document issued 
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). The document granted 
intelligence agencies the right to obtain metadata communication records 
from the customers of Verizon, one of America’s largest telephone 
companies.26 The document had been passed to Greenwald by Edward 
Snowden, a former Booz Allen Hamilton employee, contracted to the NSA in 
Hawaii.27 Although the issues associated with this case are ongoing, the 
outcome of the case represented a major victory for Snowden, the journalists 
who worked on the story and their supporters.  
 
Despite the fact that aspects of bulk data collection have since been 
retrospectively sanctioned by FISC,28 the case signified recognition that 
despite the protest of NSA and the US government, Snowden was right to 
question the program’s legality.29 Indeed, we now know that senior lawyers 
with distinguished pedigrees both within the White House and the 
Department of Justice (DoJ) shared these concerns.30 Moreover, the related 
judgement suggests that had Snowden not come forward the program would 
have continued to operate without public awareness, as it had since May 
2006. Are actions by Snowden and Chelsea Manning examples of an 
increasing trend of what some academics have termed ‘regulation by 
revelation’?31 As the term suggests, could insiders to the intelligence 
                                                        
26 Glenn Greenwald, ‘NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily’, 
The Guardian, 6 June 2013, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. 
27 Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance 
State (London: Penguin, 2014), p. 58. 
28 Sean Gallagher, ‘The Snowden Legacy, Part One: What’s Changed, Really?’, Ars Technica, 
21 November 2018, available at: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/11/the-
snowden-legacy-part-one-whats-changed-really/. 
29 Jameel Jaffer, ‘What ACLU v. Clapper Means’, ACLU, 12 May 2015, available at: 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/what-aclu-v-clapper-
means. 
30 Goldsmith, Power and Constraint, pp. 123-212. 
31 Richard Aldrich, ‘Regulation by Revelation? Intelligence, Transparency and the Media’, in 
Robert Dover and Michael Goodman, eds., Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs 
the Media, Why the Media needs Intelligence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 
pp. 13-37. 
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community32 who carry out unauthorised disclosures of classified 
information revealing wrongdoing, be counted as a functioning part of the 
complex landscape of accountability?33 Alternatively, does an act of leaking 
secrets represent personalised and unrepresentative grandstanding by 
individuals with isolated issues?   
 
The members of the intelligence community could be broadly grouped into 
four categories: ‘National Intelligence Organizations, Department of Defense 
Intelligence, Military Service Intelligence Organizations and Civilian 
Departmental Intelligence Organizations’.34 However, the acceleration of 
counter-terrorism programmes across government sectors, including local 
government means that we are no longer certain where the boundaries of 
the intelligence community lie. In a post 9/11 surge of the subject’s relevance, 
clarity is affected further by the increasing privatisation of intelligence and 
the harnessing of many research centres, including those at universities and 
think tanks.35 
 
This thesis pursues two linked questions, one largely conceptual and one 
rather more empirical. It seeks firstly to explore the responsibility of a 
whistleblower or leaker and secondly to explore the impact that they have 
had. Furthermore, it suggests that these two questions, while seemingly 
                                                        
32 When referring to the intelligence community, the 17 agencies of the US involved in the 
business of intelligence are meant: ‘the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the 
Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the National Reconnaissance 
Office; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department; the intelligence elements of 
the five military services; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and intelligence components 
of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Energy, the Department of the 
Treasury, and the Department of Homeland Security.’ unless otherwise noted. See Jeffrey 
Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 12-13.  
33 Richard Aldrich and Daniela Richterova, ‘Ambient Accountability: Secrecy, Spies and the 
Rise of the New Oversight in Europe’, West European Politics, 41:4 (2018), pp. 1-22. 
34 Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 13.  
35 Richard Aldrich and Melina Dobson, ‘Literati or Illuminati? The Convergence of Spies, 
Scholars and Science in a world of Big Data’, in Liam Francis Gearon, ed., Routledge 
International Handbook of Universities, Security and Intelligence Studies (London: 
Routledge, 2019, forthcoming). 
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separate, are in fact linked, particularly if we embrace a consequentialist 
logic. The cases that will be considered span from 1970 to 2017. For 
continuity, as well as practical reasons of word limit, the cases are restricted 
to those emerging from the US. I acknowledge that the terms whistleblower 
and leaker are often used synonymously but seek to draw out central 
definitions of both after careful consideration of existing literature and the 
cases addressed. The terms are often used interchangeably, but it is only a 
whistleblower who has been granted some protection under the law. This 
distinction is fundamental, because the whistleblower is - by definition - held 
to a higher standard. Whereas the term leaker could describe anyone who 
discloses insider information, regardless of motive or content of the leak. 
Where necessary, in order to encompass these two terms, I will also use the 
word ‘insider’ as an umbrella term embracing both categories and anyone 
who falls outside them. This chapter primarily seeks to outline the approach 
that I have taken in this thesis and proceeds in the following way:  
 
(1) briefly outlines the conceptual puzzles that this thesis addresses within 
the existing literature. This section will be supported by an extensive 
examination of existing academic writing in the second chapter; (2) introduce 
my central research question, as well as the main argument that I will 
substantiate in this thesis; (3) outline the original research contribution to 
knowledge that this thesis embodies; (4) present the analytical framework 
that I will utilise throughout the thesis; (5) consider a new conceptual model 
that pertains specifically to unauthorised disclosures and their potential 
impact, aiding overall analysis;  (6) unpack the whistleblower and leaker issue 
while exploring the existing literature and debate that has ensued on this 
topic; (7) Examine the claim that whistleblowers might be thought of as a part 
of the accountability mechanism; (8) explain the research methods I 
employed to conduct my research; (9) and finally, offer a thesis outline and 
itemisation of the chapters within this thesis.   
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The Central Research Puzzle 
This thesis considers a prevailing puzzle that remains unaddressed in the 
rapidly growing empirical literature on unauthorised disclosures. The 
intelligence practitioner turned scholar Michael Herman famously defines 
intelligence as a form of power, not unlike economic or military power.36 Do 
whistleblowers and leakers also exert a form of informational power and if 
so, what is its nature? And what are its consequences? Predominantly, I seek 
to explore the potential impact that whistleblowers and leakers can have on 
themselves, their families, national security and international relations.37 This 
puzzle will shape the heart of my thesis. There has been a substantial trend 
to explore empirical cases in the media, sociology, philosophical and legal 
literature, but there has not been extensive investigation into these questions 
in intelligence studies or political science fields.38 The existing literature will 
be explored in the second chapter: a literature review. Furthermore, I seek 
to develop an agency-structure model (later on in this chapter) to explore 
specific cases of whistleblowers and leakers.  
 
This approach will also allow me to investigate three further problems that 
have not been explored markedly within the literature. Firstly, I examine the 
terms whistleblower and leaker; predominantly analysing how the two terms 
relate to each other in an intelligence studies context, within the existing 
literature and in practice. The thesis also aims to show the different ways in 
which these terms are used both in the media and in law. Secondly, following 
on from the theme of impact, I will explore whether whistleblowers and 
leakers should be considered as part of the landscape of ‘ambient 
accountability’.39 Ambient accountability is a concept that suggests a growing 
                                                        
36 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
37 Though this list is not exclusive.  
38 Historical analysis includes: Christopher Moran, Company Confessions: Revealing CIA 
Secrets (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015). 
39 Aldrich and Richterova, ‘Ambient Accountability’. 
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range of both official and unofficial bodies that perform functions of 
oversight within the intelligence community, often working together to 
unravel the concealment of wrongdoing. Thirdly, studying individual cases 
will also allow me to explore the relationship of whistleblowers and leakers 
with any third parties that play a significant role in their stories, such as 
lawyers or journalists.  
 
 
Central Research Question: Agency with Agencies? 
In order to lend further analytical depth to this debate, I will consider the 
symbiotic relationship of ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ when analysing each insider 
case study. The power of agency that each insider displays will determine 
whether or not they have any impact on the power structure with which they 
engage. However, the focus of the central question will be to examine the 
power of agency.40 In order to achieve this, I have considered each case from 
a chronological perspective employing a linear framework. This focused 
approach allows me to employ a degree of life-narrative in order to assess 
the values and motivations of the individual.41 In some cases, this involves 
primary research such as interviews, autobiographical works or archival 
material. Agency in these case studies is the whistleblower or leaker and the 
structure that they engage with is that of the intelligence community as a 
whole or the relevant agency as their employer, including the consideration 
of policy, oversight and accountability. While accepting that ideas like 
‘intelligence community’ and ‘intelligence culture’ can blur the boundaries 
between the individual and the organization, I suggest that the categories 
                                                        
40 For debates on agency and structure see Keith Dowding, ‘Agency and Structure: 
Interpreting Power Relationships’, Journal of Power, 1: 1 (2008), pp. 21-36; and Stewart 
Clegg, ‘Power and Authority, Resistance and Legitimacy’, in Henri Goverde et al, eds., Power 
in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 
2000), pp. 77-92. 
41 Eric Peterson and Kristin M. Langellier, ‘The Politics of Personal Narrative Methodology,’ 
Text and Performance Quarterly, 17: 2 (1997), pp. 135-152. 
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remain fundamentally robust, perhaps reinforced by the adversarial nature 
of whistleblowing.42  
 
In order to pursue the objectives of this research, I ask the following central 
research question:  
1. What impact do whistleblowers and leakers have upon 
intelligence communities and their governance? 
 
Further value will be added by also exploring these additional questions: 
2. What are the definitional differences between a whistleblower 
and a leaker? 
3. To what extent should whistleblowers and leakers be considered 
a part of the unofficial mechanisms of oversight and 
accountability? 
4. What responsibility does a journalist or lawyer carry when 
working with a whistleblower or leaker? 
 
The central premise of this thesis is that national security whistleblowers and 
leakers can potentially have impact in a variety of complex ways. Owing to 
the potential damage that an unauthorised disclosure of this kind can have, 
it is imperative that a need to study this area of intelligence further is 
recognised.  
There are three central arguments that will lead to this conclusion:  
1. Every employer has a duty of care to their employee and every 
employee has a responsibility to their employer. In an 
organisation designed to provide a public service, such as the 
intelligence community, this duty extends to the public. This 
‘special’ duty arises in the case of the intelligence community, as 
                                                        
42 Sharon Hays, ‘Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture,’ Sociological 
Theory, 12:1 (1994), pp. 57-72. 
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the information that the employer deals with and the employee 
has access to, could be potentially damaging to the public.  
2. Therefore, the employer-employee-public duty relationship 
demands that there should be provisions for the employee to 
voice their concerns in a safe and constructive way and without 
damaging national security. In the intelligence community these 
mechanisms should be more robust, as the potential 
consequences of disclosing classified material could be more 
harmful to public safety and security.  
3. If an unauthorised disclosure is made, this is as a result of a failure 
on the side of either or both parties. It is important to establish 
where the fault lies and how any future episodes can be resolved 
prior to escalation.  
 
By arguing that whistleblowers and leakers have potential impact, this thesis 
hopes to establish an incentive to consider the whistleblower, as opposed to 
the leaker or dissident, more carefully. I recognise that the whistleblower 
should be held to a higher standard than a leaker, due to the limited 
protection they can be afforded by the law. Therefore, I argue for the 
development of more robust reporting mechanisms for wrongdoing, 
especially in the intelligence community.  
 
In order to fully explore these assertions in a rigorous manner, I will first 
examine the definitional issues of the terms whistleblower and leaker. This 
will allow me to determine more definitively how to characterise impact in 
each case. Broadly, the thesis has two objectives – one, to determine an 
academic model that allows the examination of the whistleblower/leaker 
phenomenon, as well as draw the definitional parameters in both cases. Two, 
to consider whether the intelligence community should approach the 
tribulations of whistleblowers on a more humanistic level. If whistleblowers 
and leakers have impact, perhaps even power, logically it should follow that 
the intelligence community should take note of their observations with 
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curiosity, perhaps even seek to leverage their critical observations in a 
constructive way. Instead, it appears that the response is predominantly a 
form of national security alarm, which although understandable, is not 
productive. Below, I explore a preliminary model for investigating the path a 
potential whistleblower or leaker takes. Further, the use of the terms 
whistleblower and leaker in law will be directly engaged with and examined 
in this chapter.  
 
In the political science literature, these terms are often used interchangeably 
or in a way that does not credit their significant differences. Broadly, the 
terms leaker and whistleblower in an intelligence context describe individuals 
who are in possession of some information and subsequently raise this 
information in order for it to be discussed either publicly or within the 
intelligence community. In the case of a whistleblower, it is required that the 
information constitutes some wrongdoing on the part of the relevant agency. 
As a result of legislation, the whistleblower has a number of prescribed 
channels that he/she can pursue in order to raise this wrongdoing internally. 
The wrongdoing should not benefit the whistleblower directly but has to be 
of wider public concern and relevance. In the case of a leaker the nature of 
the information is not prescribed. The leaker is generally seen as an individual 
who shares sensitive information for diverse reasons and is not protected by 
law.  
 
However, the existing analysis is overly simplistic and does not give credit to 
the different experiences of insiders when considering and/or acting on the 
motivation to blow the whistle internally or leak information to external 
sources. Considering different definitions permits me to categorise my case 
studies, thus allowing me to draw conclusions about the different actions 
taken and any resulting consequences.43 Drawing from different case studies 
                                                        
43 Unauthorised disclosure in this context is intended to refer to the passing of information 
to anyone who does not possess the relevant security clearance to receive classified 
information. 
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allows me to gain definitional clarity, which in turn can have an impact on the 
potential consequences suffered by a whistleblower or leaker. There is an 
extensive business studies ethics literature on whistleblowing in an industrial 
or corporate context.44 This thesis will be restricted to considering the cases 
of individuals who gained privileged knowledge due to their positions within 
the intelligence community, rather than private companies not connected 
with the intelligence community. Nevertheless, parallels can be drawn 
between the moral dilemmas that a potential whistleblower will face in either 
sector. The nature of the intelligence community is defined further by central 
concepts, such as national security and secrecy that do not encourage the 
sharing of information and thus the penalty for unauthorised disclosures is 
much higher. This approach will draw attention to the peculiar challenges 
faced by the intelligence community when dealing with an unauthorised 
disclosure.45  
 
It could be argued that such an approach will suffer from epistemological 
limitations, such as:  
 
                                                        
44 See for example, George Brenkert, ‘Whistle-blowing, Moral Integrity, and Organizational 
Ethics’, in George Brenkert and Tom Beauchamp, eds., the Oxford Handbook of Business 
Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 563-601; Frederick A. Elliston, ‘Civil 
Disobedience and Whistleblowing: A Comparative Appraisal of Two Forms of Dissent’, 
Journal of Business Ethics, 1: 1 (1982), pp. 23-28; Harold Hassink, Meinderd de Vries, and 
Laury H. Bollen, ‘A content analysis of whistle-blowing policies of leading European 
companies’, Journal of Business Ethics, 75:1 (2007), pp. 25-44; W. Michael Hoffman, ‘The 
Ford Pinto’, in W. Michael Hoffman and Jennifer Moore, eds., Business Ethics: Readings and 
Cases in Corporate Morality (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), pp. 249-260; J. Vernon 
Jensen, ‘Ethical Tension Points in Whistleblowing’, Journal of Business Ethics, 6: 4 (1987), 
pp. 321-328. 
45  Key business contributions include: Brite Bjørkelo, Ståle Einarsen, Morten Birkeland 
Nielsen Einarsen, and Stig Berge Matthiesen, ‘Silence is Golden? Characteristics and 
Experiences of Selfreported Whistle-blowers’, European Journal of Work and 
Organizational Psychology, 20:2 (2010), pp. 206-238; Robert M. Bowen, Andrew C. Call, and 
Shiva Rajgopal, ‘Whistleblowing: Target Firm Characteristics and Economic Consequences’, 
The Accounting Review, 85: 4 (2010), pp. 1239-1271; Harold Hassink, Meinderd de Vries, 
and Laury H. Bollen, ‘A content analysis of whistle-blowing policies of leading European 
companies’, Journal of Business Ethics, 75: 1 (2007), pp. 25-44; Janet P. Near and Marcia P. 
Miceli, ’Organizational dissidence: The case of whistle-blowing’, Journal of Business Ethics, 
4: 1 (1985), pp. 1–16.  
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(1) Measuring ‘impact’ – Rules of causality or ascertaining the ‘truth’ of a 
particular statement is not always possible through qualitative research and 
conclusions can be vague with room for interpretation This thesis can only 
assume to deliberate the potential of whistleblowers and leakers to have 
impact, rather than coming to any concrete conclusions about precise cause 
and effect. This is often the case with causation in the social sciences.46 In this 
case, I will use any public statements and direct referrals to whistleblower 
cases in case law as an indication that change could have taken place;  
 
(2) Socially constructed definitions – this thesis recognises that there is a 
difference between an academic definition and the way in which particular 
terms are used colloquially. It will address these concerns early on in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, it is important to note that in this case the definitional 
questions surrounding the terms of whistleblower and leaker are pertinent 
outside of academia and even the legal sphere. Furthermore, even in practice 
there are continuous disputes about these terms;  
 
(3) Impact of interviews – The interviews conducted during this thesis have 
shaped the direction of my argument, so far that they have exposed areas 
that require further examination. The approach I have taken as been 
predominantly bottom-up and driven by this process of empirical collection 
and field work with interview subjects who are often ‘toilers in the vineyard’ 
of the intelligence community. While I acknowledge that there is a lack of 
elite representation in my interview subjects, at a general level I would 
observe that there is an excessive bias towards the study of the attitudes of 
elites in intelligence either in terms of intelligence leaders or in terms of the 
intelligence community-policy interface. We have few ethnographic studies 
of the everyday intelligence worker because access for the researcher is 
                                                        
46 Peter Hedström and Petri Ylikoski, ‘Causal mechanisms in the social sciences’, Annual 
Review of Sociology, 36 (2010), pp. 49-67. 
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difficult.47 Further funds and time would allow me to rectify this for a 
monograph.  
 
My approach was driven by a necessity to understand the impact of the 
individual on the structure and to document an account of their stories in the 
first instance. In order to construct a more comprehensive top-down 
understanding of how whistleblowers have impacted the structure, I would 
endeavour to interview individuals such as Michael Hayden, Keith Alexander 
and Robert Gates, but this lies beyond the realm of the current project.  
 
Contributions to Knowledge 
This thesis represents an original body of work and contributes to existing 
knowledge of whistleblowers in the following three ways: (1) Definitional 
hypothesis - I have developed a hypothesis about the peculiarities of the 
terms whistleblower and leaker, their usage as well as how they should be 
conceptualised; (2) Conceptual framework – I have devised a framework for 
considering the different elements of whistleblowing and leaking sensitive or 
classified information, as well as drawing differences between their paths. 
This three-stage approach utilises the agency-structure framework to 
emphasise the interaction between whistleblowers/leakers and the 
intelligence community. Furthermore, it allows me to identify areas of impact 
and conflict throughout the three stages; (3) Primary data - I have collected 
new primary evidence through around 35 interviews with whistleblowers, 
leakers, lawyers and journalists in order to triangulate these accounts with 




                                                        
47 Christopher Moran, et al., Spy Chiefs: Volume 1: Intelligence Leaders in the United States 
and United Kingdom (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2018). 
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Analytical Framework 
A centrally accepted definition of intelligence still eludes us. Nevertheless, 
the element of secrecy is broadly considered to prevail in the operations of 
the intelligence community.48 It certainly has a profound impact on the way 
in which scholars research this field. Much like intelligence professionals, 
scholars are challenged at all stages of research, such as collection and 
analysis of information. Therein also lies a similar danger of speculating and 
potentially accepting hearsay as fact. Therefore, to offer more than mere 
conjecture, history and theory are essential components to achieving 
valuable academic analysis.49 Wesley Wark identified six further types of 
contributions to (or ‘projects’ of) intelligence studies alongside ‘history’ and 
‘theory’. Wark holds that ‘definitional’, ‘methodological’, ‘memoirs’, ‘civil 
liberties’, ‘investigative journalism’ and ‘popular culture’ projects also 
contribute to the rich variety of research in the field. The various projects that 
Wark recognises should not be conceived of as being in competition with 
each other, in fact he states that these can overlap.50  The trajectory of 
intelligence studies over recent decade, which involves a broad range of 
types of investigation, supports the view that while research can depend on 
a single ‘pure’ approach, a mixed varied methodology is more likely to arrive 
at a well substantiated conclusion. This is particularly important in a field such 
as intelligence studies, as the material to be researched is naturally limited.  
 
An important question to answer at this stage is what purpose theory will 
serve in this thesis. It is clear that intelligence studies, once claimed to be 
under-theorised, is increasingly supported by a range of well-developed 
                                                        
48 For a debate on the definition of intelligence see: Jules Gaspard, ‘Intelligence without 
Essence: Rejecting the Classical Theory of Definition,’ International Journal of Intelligence 
and CounterIntelligence, 30:3 (2017), pp. 557-582; Warner, ‘Wanted’. 
49 Jennifer Sims, ‘Defending adaptive realism: Intelligence theory comes of age’, in Peter 
Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, eds., Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and 
Debates (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 151-152. 
50 Wesley Wark, ‘Introduction: The study of espionage: Past, present, future?’, Intelligence 
and National Security, 8: 3 (1993), pp. 1-13.  
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theorisation.51 The research design of this thesis will be deploying 
interpretive methods with an associated inductive approach, rather than 
employing a positive research model that engages in formal theory testing. 
This flexible approach allows the recognition of the endurance of central 
concepts within a structure, but also acknowledges the role that agency could 
play within it.52  
 
Many intelligence scholars have looked to international relations as a 
potential source of theory. However, the traditional schools of international 
relations focus predominantly on structure and in practice are not much used 
by operational researchers beyond formal theory testing. The realist 
perspective, for example prioritises the analysis of state to state relationships 
that develop as a result of defending self-interest and the decision-making 
that is guided by preserving national interests. Nevertheless, the proliferating 
range of realist approaches helpfully reminds us of the complexities of 
theorising power within a structure over time, and this thesis explores a single 
country over some decades.53 
 
At the other end of the spectrum sit the post-modern approaches that 
critically evaluate the ontology and epistemology of constructs of the state 
exertion of power and control.54 The post-modern lens requires a continuous 
awareness of interactions, communications and one’s own bias. This attitude 
requires the judgement of the structure in a way that exposes the 
relationship between independent thought and the pressure exerted 
                                                        
51 Christopher Andrew, ‘Intelligence, international relations and “under-theorisation”', 
Intelligence and National Security, 19: 2 (2004), pp. 170-184; Gill, Marrin and Phythian, 
Intelligence Theory. 
52 James D. Fearon, ‘Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science,’ World 
Politics, 43: 2 (1991), pp. 169-195. 
53 Stefano Guzzini, ‘The different worlds of realism in International Relations,’ Millennium, 
30:1 (2001), pp. 111-121. 
54 For an examination of concepts of Power, Knowledge and Control from a post-modern 
perspective see: Stuart Elden, Foucault: The Birth of Power (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 
2017). 
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through the enforced mechanisms within the system.55 Gill and Phythian 
acknowledge that there is merit to be found in each but are not convinced 
that either approach independently is suitable for analysing intelligence. 
Instead, they suggest that the exploration of the agency-structure debate 
offers an attractive mid-range approach.56 This avenue offers the additional 
advantage of a well-developed range of methods literature that illuminates 
the issues associated with this approach.57  
 
Therefore, I will be predominantly influenced by Gill and Phythian by adopting 
critical realism, originally conceived by Roy Bhaskar.58 On the theoretical-
spectrum critical realism occupies a space between traditional realism and 
post-structuralist thought. Critical realism unlike the methodological 
extremes, allows a mixed method evaluation and also permits an emphasis 
on interpretations and observations. This makes it much more suitable to 
empirical research that takes into account analysis of societal concepts and 
situations.59  
 
Gill and Phythian also recognise that intelligence studies benefit from an 
interdisciplinary approach, rather than adopting the shape or methods of one 
single discipline, which they view as a narrow approach. They have 
considered the rapid development in intelligence studies over the last two 
decades and subsequently propose four categories: research/historical, 
                                                        
55 Hamilton Bean, ‘Organizational culture and US intelligence affairs’, Intelligence and 
National Security, 24: 4 (2009), pp. 479-498.  
56 Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 31. 
57 See for example Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, ‘Structure, agency and historical 
institutionalism’, Political Studies, 46: 5 (1998), pp. 951-57. 
58 Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 32; Critical realism originally 
conceived by Roy Bhaskar, see the following for an overview of the debate, Roy Bhaskar, 
The Formation of Critical Realism: A Personal Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2010); 
Philip S. Gorski, ‘What is Critical Realism? And Why Should You Care?’, Contemporary 
Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, 42: 5 (2013), pp. 658- 670. 
59 Berth Danermark, Mats Ekstrom, and Liselotte Jakobsen, Explaining Society: An 
Introduction to Critical Realism in the Social Sciences (London: Routledge, 2005). 
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Table 1: Gill and Phythian’s ‘Map for Theorizing and Researching Intelligence’61 
 
My methodology is heavily influenced by these observations – mainly 
crossing into the definitional/methodological and the 
organizational/functional categories.  
 
                                                        
60 Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, ‘What is Intelligence Studies?’, The International Journal of 
Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 18: 1 (2016), pp. 8, 14-15. 
61 Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 43. 
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In order to generate a more specific approach to my case studies, I will use 
some of the elements of the ‘theorizing about researching intelligence’ 
framework that Phythian and Gill have constructed (Table 1).62 The model 
depicts a visual guide to approaching the intelligence process. Phythian and 
Gill emphasise that the two elements of the historical development and the 
location of agencies in any given study should be considered. In my thesis, I 
have acknowledged this by constructing a small historical backdrop, offering 
context to the chapter in each introduction. Here I address the relevant 
administrational and political climate at the time. Furthermore, the thesis is 
restricted to examining whistleblowers and leakers that have emerged out of 
the intelligence community in the US. This allows for a more effective 
comparison of cases and for a more in-depth analysis of the issues associated 
with the American whistleblower track and the policy adopted in different US 
intelligence agencies. In the case of Chelsea Manning (chapter four) this also 
includes a consideration of the US Court Martial.    
 
This model allows for a cross-level analysis by selecting elements to be 
analysed singularly or in a comparative study. At macro level, this may consist 
of a historical study that compares the hierarchies of signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) focused intelligence agencies in different countries. This model also 
takes into account the hierarchy of any structure from macro to meso and 
also at micro level. My own model for this thesis is influenced by this 







                                                        
62 Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 43. 
 - 36 - Dobson 
Conceptual Model 
This thesis seeks to look at the whistleblower/leaker phenomenon through 
an agency-structure lens. The symbiotic relationship of agency and structure 
represent the central ideas around which much inquiry in the social sciences 
is organised. Gill and Phythian describe the ‘agent’ as the individual being 
strongly interlinked with the ‘structure’ within which the agent operates. A 
small team within a larger structure such as the entire organisation could also 
represent agency.63 In order to explore the insider pathway, I will be 
examining this relationship with regards to my ten case studies of 
unauthorised disclosures.  
 
The objective is to draw out the possibility of impact at the macro level (either 
within the wider intelligence community or the individual intelligence 
agency), as a result of an action taken at micro level by an insider exercising 
their agency. Agency is examined by taking into account the insider’s personal 
history and the level of their working position. That is they are considered as 
an employee who has agency within an organisation. The employer and the 
wider institutional framework, in this case the relevant intelligence agency, is 
the structure. The history and trajectory of the structure are explored in order 
to establish whether or not the insider has had any impact.  
 
Considering the approach that Gill and Phythian have outlined in their 
reflections on studying intelligence, I will utilise the elements that they have 
underscored as central in this thesis. The ‘research elements’ considered are 
the setting/organizational and contrasted with the self/individual. The 
historical and special dimensions are taken into consideration for both, 
through a brief introduction in each chapter. Consequently, I have 
constructed a new model (Table 2) and approach to studying the insider and 
their potential impact, which will aid in the determination of (1) whether an 
                                                        
63 Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, pp. 60-62. 
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individual can be termed a whistleblower or leaker and (2) whether a 
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Secret-keeping laws (a) 






















Stage Two: The 
Disclosure 
Job security (a) 
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Table 2: ‘The Insider’, an Agency-Structure Model 
 
The table above illustrates a visual representation of this model. The table 
identifies the central concepts and elements that have been identified as 
fundamental to exploring the agency-structure relationship in this thesis. This 
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model allows for a stronger analysis through an interdisciplinary approach by 
considering these central concepts. The power dynamics are emphasised, by 
contrasting the potential impact of an insider on the structure of government 
with the impact on the agency of insiders within the structure. Although the 
structure exists separately from the agent, there exists a pronounced 
subservience of the whistleblower or leaker. The paths of the agent (left) 
follow chronologically and are paralleled with that of the structure which 
remains largely the same (right).  
 
Dividing each insider case into ‘three stages’, assists us in identifying where 
the differences lie between case studies. What defines a whistleblower? 
What defines a leaker? Stage One will examine the fore-story of the insider, 
before they decide to share any information outside of their organisation – 
the potential phase, where decisions are yet to be acted upon. This includes 
but is not limited to any action taken in order to acquire information. The 
impact at this stage is most acutely felt by the insider, who is often in a moral 
dilemma that is compounded further by the legal obligations that they have 
not to make unauthorised disclosures of sensitive or classified material. Stage 
Two explores whether or not there was a disclosure. The event of the 
disclosure itself – what are the elements of it and how was the information 
disclosed. Did the insider have contact with a lawyer or journalist or worse – 
such as contact with a foreign power? Although the evidence suggests that 
there is potential for impact on the structure at this stage, mainly in the form 
of embarrassment, the potential impact on the individual is still much larger. 
As the insiders job security is at risk for breaching his secrecy-agreement, he 
is also at risk of being influenced by third parties who want the information 
he has for their own gains.  
 
Stage Three analyses the aftermath of the leak and the potential impact that 
the individual would have had on the power structure, themselves or those 
around them. This contextual and time-sensitive approach sets itself apart 
from previous literature where the focus is often solely on the legitimacy of 
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the leak(er) or the recounting of their story as a whole without any structured 
analysis. It is at this final stage, where the impact of the unauthorised 
disclosure is most clearly visible and quantifiable in terms of impact on the 
state or the intelligence agencies. The extent of any such disclosure is difficult 
to quantify, but with time the effects will become more apparent, for 
instance through legislative reform. Whether the agency been held to 
account for any wrongdoing? Have international relations been affected or 
has there been any unrest internationally due to the disclosures? Have there 
been any repercussions for the insider and/or their family?  
 
 
Unpacking the Whistleblower Issue 
There is no universal understanding of what constitutes a ‘whistleblower’ or 
‘leaker’64 and therefore it is difficult to establish definitional clarity. Because 
the last decade has witnessed a rise in former intelligence community 
employees coming forward to expose potential wrongdoing, the terms 
whistleblower and leaker have been increasingly used to describe a wide 
range of activities. It is generally agreed that the social perception of the 
whistleblower has changed over time.65 At least in part, this can be attributed 
to an increased political use of the terms in order to serve different ends.66 
The term whistleblower is often used interchangeably with other terms that 
appear to mean the same, but in fact have rather different connotations, such 
as leaker, dissident or activist.67 It is necessary for these definitional problems 
                                                        
64 David Pozen, ‘The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones 
Unlawful Disclosures of Information’, Harvard Law Review, 127: 2 (2013), p. 512. 
65 Lowenthal, Intelligence. 
66 Kathleen MacClellan and Jesselyn Radack, ‘The Criminalization of Whistleblowing’, Labor 
& Employment Law Forum, 2:1 (2011), pp. 57-77. 
67 Dana Gold, ‘James Comey is Not a Leaker’, SLATE, available at: https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2017/06/james-comey-is-not-a-leaker-he-is-a-whistleblower.html. 
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to be explored, in some cases for myths to be debunked, in order to continue 
with a meaningful debate.68  
 
The approaches to ‘whistleblowing’ taken by the literature can be grouped 
into three schools of thought.69 The conservative school advocates the view 
that a genuine whistleblower is an individual rarely acknowledged external to 
any organisation. A genuine whistleblower can only be an individual who 
raises concerns internally, never externally, to the relevant agency. The other 
end of the spectrum is occupied by what I have termed the radical school. 
This school holds that any individual who reports or publicises information 
that exposes government activity suggesting wrongdoing a whistleblower 
and individual who should be protected.70 The middle school, which is where 
this thesis is located is situated in between the former schools. The middle 
school moves away from the Hero vs Traitor narrative and instead looks to 
establish a sophisticated model for analysis that will aid the understanding of 
the whistleblower paradigm. 
 
The conservative school of thought does not consider any individual to be a 
whistleblower unless they have followed the internal channels and even then, 
the title of whistleblower is not always guaranteed. This school generally 
follows the conservative interpretation of the law. The Protection of 
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act (PICWA) 2014 is the legislation 
that covers whistleblowers of the intelligence community.71  The bodies that 
employees within the intelligence community can approach with any 
concerns are: ‘(1) the Director of National Intelligence (DNI); (2) an employee 
                                                        
68 Government Accountability Project, ‘What is a Whistleblower?: Myths About 
Whistleblowers’, Government Accountability Project, 2019, available at: 
https://www.whistleblower.org/resources/#what-is-a-whistleblower. 
69 See Table 3, Chapter 2 for a thematic examination of these three schools, which are also 
used to analyse further themes occurring in the whistleblower-leaker debate.  
70 Peter B. Jubb, ‘Whistleblowing: A restrictive definition and interpretation’, Journal of 
Business Ethics, 21:1 (1999), pp. 77-94. 
71 The Protection of Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act, 2014 (PICWA hereafter) is 
codified at 50 US Congress (U.S.C.) Section 3234.  
 - 41 - Dobson 
designated by the DNI to receive whistleblower complaints; (3) the Inspector 
General (IG) of the Intelligence Community; (4) the head of the employing 
agency (e.g. the Director of the CIA); (5) an employee designated by the head 
of the of an agency to receive whistleblower complaints; (6) The IG of the 
agency that employs the whistleblower; (7) a congressional intelligence 
committee; and (8) a member of a congressional intelligence committee’.72 
An insider who follows these instructions, will be termed a ‘legal 
whistleblower’ for these purposes. That is to reflect that they have followed 
the recommendations of the law.  
 
Together with prescribing the above paths that a whistleblower has to follow, 
PICWA also stipulates under what conditions the whistleblower can come 
forward with a legitimate concern. These ‘protected disclosures’ have to 
constitute information, ‘the employee reasonably believes evidences (1) a 
violation of any Federal Law, rule, or regulation; or (2) mismanagement, a 
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety’.73 This broadly includes the same concepts 
of waste, fraud or abuse set out in previous laws that did not cover 
intelligence community whistleblowers and also includes public health and 
safety concerns. Nevertheless, it appears that this law gives with one hand 
and takes away with the other. Under PICWA the employee is protected from 
any retaliation against them, the listed eventualities are quite thorough and 
extensive.74 However, the catch is that the whistleblower is also prohibited 
from taking action to enforce this protection in the case of an ‘adverse 
determination’. That means if it is found internally that the concern the 
whistleblower has brought forward does not constitute a protected 
                                                        
72 Stephen M. Kohn, The New Whistleblower’s Handbook: A Step-by-Step Guide to Doing 
What’s Right and Protecting Yourself (Guilford, Connecticut: Lyons Press, 2017), p. 173. 
73 PICWA. 
74 Adverse actions include: ‘an appointment, promotion, or any disciplinary action; a detail, 
transfer, or reassignment; a demotion, suspension, or termination; a negative performance 
evaluation; a decision concerning pay, benefits, or awards; or any other significant change 
in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions’. See Kohn, The New Whistleblower’s 
Handbook, p. 173. 
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disclosure, the employee could face reprisal without an option to defend 
themselves in court. Kohn, a whistleblower lawyer, belongs to the middle 
school. He remarks that the provision ‘the President shall provide 
enforcement of this section’75 constitutes a failure to specify the measures 
for enforcing any protection ‘renders the law seriously defective, to say the 
least’.76  
 
It has to be recognised that states have used the tool of secrecy to exploit 
their power and therefore, the natural agency of the whistleblower in a 
democracy poses a genuine threat to the status quo.77 In order to allow an 
individual with genuine concerns of wrongdoing within the intelligence 
community to come forward, there should not be fear of retribution.78 
However, the uncertainty surrounding the judgement of who is deemed 
worthy of whistleblower protection naturally heightens the risk that an 
individual takes when coming forward. This is not a gamble that every 
individual is willing to take, often this is associated with a significant moral 
and personal anguish over whether to take action or not79 - the 
‘whistleblower’s dilemma’.80 The existing literature that covers this 
phenomenon will be explored more extensively in Chapter 2: The Literature 
Review.  
 
                                                        
75 PICWA. 
76 Kohn, The New Whistleblower’s Handbook, p. 173.  
77 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., ‘Preface (1987 Edition)’, in David Banisar, eds., Government 
secrecy: Decisions without Democracy (Washington DC: People for the American Way 
Foundation, 2007), available at: https://www.openthegovernment.org/wp-
content/uploads/other-files/otg/govtsecrecy.pdf, pp. 5-6. 
78 Mark Zaid, Personal Interview, Whistleblower Lawyer, 24 March 2016, Washington, DC, 
USA; Charles A. Blanchard, Personal Interview, Lawyer/Partner: Arnold & Porter, 27 June 
2016, Washington, DC, USA. 
79 Anonymous (1), Personal Interview, Former CIA Analyst. 
80 Janet Malek, ’To Tell or Not to Tell? The Ethical Dilemma of the Would-Be 
Whistleblower’, Accountability in Research, 17:3 (2010), pp. 115-129; John P. Keenan, 
‘Whistleblowing: A Study of Managerial Differences’, Employee Responsibilities and 
Rights Journal, 14:1 (2002), pp. 17-32; Randi L. Sims and John P. Keenan, ‘Predictors of 
External Whistleblowing: Organizational and Intrapersonal Variables’, Journal of Business 
Ethics, 17: 4 (March 1998), pp. 411-442. 
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Much of the more recent literature suggests that there should be an 
exemption to this conservative school of thought, which would allow a 
whistleblower to make an external unauthorised disclosure. The middle 
school of thought acknowledges that if the following two criteria are met, an 
unauthorised disclosure continues to constitute an act of genuine 
whistleblowing:81 (1) the individual would have to demonstrate that they 
have exhausted all internal reporting channels and this unauthorised 
disclosure is therefore a ‘last resort’; (2) the individual is making a disclosure 
in the public interest. These two conditions would ensure that even an 
unauthorised disclosure is defensible in the case of a genuine whistleblower. 
The whistleblower is held to a higher standard, as his position is potentially 
defensible in law. However, another type of disclosure would constitute an 
act of dissidence in the form of a leak, which is no longer defensible, 
especially in the case of classified information. This refers in particular to the 
extenuating circumstances that surround state secret-keeping. The middle 
school acknowledges that a degree of secret keeping is necessary in order to 
ensure the safe operation of the country’s intelligence services.82 The radical 
school condemns perpetual state secrecy and the activities of intelligence 
agencies generally, which it deems to be often in contravention of human 
rights. It often advocates much greater state transparency and it considers 
leaking classified information to be a justified action to help achieve this 
end.83  
 
Terms such as leaking, and dissenting are often used to describe the same 
action. Whilst the radical school sees all of these actions as defensible if they 
expose dubious government action of any kind, the conservative school is 
more prescriptive and only sees legal whistleblowing as a defensible action. 
                                                        
81 This type of action is generally referred to as public-interest whistleblowing, I will 
continue to use this term throughout the thesis.  
82 Ross Bellaby, ‘The Ethics of Whistleblowing: Creating a New Limit on Intelligence Activity’, 
Journal of International Political Theory, 14: 1 (2018), pp. 60-84. 
83 Daniel Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks: My time with Julian Assange at the World’s 
Most Dangerous Website (London: Random House, 2011), p. 28. 
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Nevertheless, the action of whistleblowing is often described as dissenting or 
civil disobedience, as with Bok who lists three central elements to 
whistleblowing: ‘dissent, breach of loyalty and accusation’.84 Dana Gold, a 
lawyer working for GAP comments on the implications of these definitions – 
‘The media makes a mistake when it buys into the administration’s labelling’. 
Gold explains that terms such as leaker have strong connotations (i.e. that 
the individual is doing something wrong) and are often used for political 
gains.85 In other words, as in so many contentious areas of security, naming 
and framing is a critical part of the debate and can determine the outcome.  
 
This specialist knowledge can constitute the understanding of internal policy 
or other secret information pertaining to operations. In order to perform 
their job, the insider is granted special access and permitted to join what the 
foundational theorist of secrecy Georg Simmel refers to as the ‘secret 
society’.86 A feature of a secret society is the trust between the individuals 
within the society.87 Whistleblowers and leakers in the intelligence 
community are often branded as individuals that have abused this trust 
afforded by the society. Nevertheless, the motivations are arguably quite 
different to those of an individual such as Aldrich Ames, a former CIA analyst 
who spied for the USSR providing highly damaging classified information. 
Ames was subsequently convicted and incarcerated under the Espionage Act 
for conspiring to steal US official secrets.88 Controversially, individuals 
characterised as whistleblowers and leakers have also been charged under 
the Espionage Act. For example, Thomas Drake who has been acknowledged 
as a whistleblower in academic writing, the press and by his lawyers. This 
                                                        
84 Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1982), p. 214. 
85 Gold, ‘James Comey is Not a Leaker’.  
86 Georg Simmel, ‘The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies’, The American Journal of 
Sociology, 11: 4 (1906) pp. 441-98. 
87 Georg Simmel, ‘The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies’, p. 450. 
88 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider Story of Five Presidents and 
how they Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 16-19. 
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concerning trend indicates a problematic definitional uncertainty at best, and 
an abuse of power at worst.  
 
Whistleblowers who raise concerns about any classified information can only 
do so to an authorised body or individual. These channels are internal to 
Congress and the intelligence community. Therefore, it does not include 
unauthorised disclosures to members of the press. This continues to put 
potential whistleblowers in a disadvantageous position since authorised 
channels often do not want to hear bad news. Jesselyn Radack calls the 
protective measures provided within this legislation a ‘paper tiger’, as it does 
not have any actionable grounds for defence.89 Radack is a lawyer and 
program director at the Whistleblower and Source Protection Program 
(WHISPeR) at ExposeFacts in Washington, District of Columbia (DC).90 
Additionally, Radack who has represented whistleblowers such as Thomas 
Drake, John Kiriakou and Bill Binney, has also had experience with 
whistleblowing herself and can testify to the enormous personal strain this 
can put on an individual. Radack speaks of the large sums of money that an 
individual will spend when trying to defend themselves and the way in which 
employment is actively prevented through threats and intimidation. 91 
 
Interviews conducted as part of this thesis have illustrated that there 
continues to be an active debate over what constitutes a whistleblower.92 
This is significant, as it dictates where a case could potentially be made for 
support and legal protection from reprisal or prosecution. Interviews and 
other conversations with former intelligence officials conducted whilst 
                                                        
89 Jesselyn Radack, ‘The Whistleblower Interview Project’ [Video], 5 March 2018, available 
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AUzkmcCjG_M&t=0s&index=2&list=PL0QUQ-
fl8iejnEtkeC5vU4UAHn_2BHmBy.  
90 WHISPeR at Expose Facts, WHISPeR Staff, WHISPeR, no date, available at: 
https://whisper.exposefacts.org/staff/.  
91 Jesselyn Radack, ‘The Whistleblower Interview Project’. 
92 Zaid, Personal Interview; Kathleen McClellan, Personal Interview, National Security and 
Human Rights Deputy Director for the Whistleblower and Source Protection Program 
(WHISPeR) at ExposeFacts, 22 June 2016, Washington, DC, USA. 
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researching for this thesis demonstrate that an insider who has divulged 
information to unauthorised persons is generally met with disdain and social 
rejection by their colleagues and friends. It is often difficult to conduct 
valuable debate, as the notion that a whistleblower or leaker could be 
valuable is often dismissed out of hand.93 This suggests that there is a unique 
culture in the intelligence community that promotes secret-keeping at all 
costs, and which devalues reflexive self-criticism. 
 
There is a pragmatic and a legal dichotomy between the terms whistleblower 
and leaker, yet there are also similarities that have developed through social 
construction, which make it difficult to distinguish between the terms. This 
presents a difficulty for analysis and academic discussion, as the lack of a 
common understanding ultimately creates a gap in the debate. The strict or 
‘narrow’ (as I will refer to it) legal definition does not allow for any overlap or 
mutual existence of the terms.  
 
The disparity with which whistleblowers and leakers of different political 
importance are treated throws into relief particular power-dynamics. John 
Kiriakou a former CIA analyst/operative, worked for the agency for a decade, 
joining immediately after graduating University.94 Kiriakou witnessed the 
execution of the CIA torture programs initiated after 9/11, being asked to 
partake in training on several occasions but rejecting this offer on principle. 
In 2004, Kiriakou resigned from the agency. Several years later, two separate 
incidents would occur that would change his life forever. In 2007, Kiriakou 
was interviewed on ABC News, in which he revealed the waterboarding 
practices carried out on suspected terrorists. In 2008, it was reported that 
Kiriakou confirmed the name of a covert CIA operative involved in the torture 
                                                        
93 Inter alia Elizabeth Goitein, Personal Interview, Lawyer: The Brennan Centre, 2 April 
2014, Washington, DC, USA; Kathleen, Personal Interview; Anonymous (1), Personal 
Interview, Former CIA Analyst; Anonymous (2), Personal Interview, Former CIA Analyst and 
personal information. 
94 John Kiriakou, Reluctant Spy: My Secret Life in the CIA’s War on Terror (New York: 
Random House, 2009). 
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programs to a journalist. Subsequently, Kiriakou was charged and later 
convicted under the Espionage Act – he would serve two years in prison. 95 
 
Kiriakou’s experience stands in direct contrast to the treatment of General 
David Petraeus (Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 2011-
2012). Petraeus supplied Paula Broadwell with notebooks containing 
extensive classified information. This action was justified by Petraeus, as 
Broadwell was researching material in order to write Petraeus’ biography. 
Furthermore, Broadwell was also in a sexual relationship with him.96 In 2015 
Petraeus pleaded guilty to a minor misdemeanour carrying a $40,000 fine and 
a two-year probationary period.97 Similarly, Leon Panetta (Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2009-2011; US Secretary of Defense, 2011-
2013), disclosed classified material concerning the raid to kill Osama Bin 
Laden to a producer for the film Zero Dark Thirty. This has left Obama accused 
of ‘double-standards’. 98 It is hard to avoid the conclusion, as in Britain, the 
espionage legislation is grade conscious. If a president reveals something 
secret in a memoir for which they have been paid millions it is overlooked, 
but if a lowly translator reveals the same secret, they can find themselves in 
prison.99 
 
Most recently, with the growing changes in legislation and a higher number 
of whistleblowers and leakers coming forward, there has also been a 
resurgence of legal literature in this space. Additionally, there has been 
                                                        
95 John Kiriakou, Personal Interview, Former CIA Analyst/Operative, 24 March 2016, 
Washington, DC, USA. 
96 Spencer Ackerman, ‘Petraeus leaks: Obama’s Leniency Reveals “Profound Double 
Standard”, Lawyer Says’, The Guardian, 16 March 2015, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/16/obama-double-standard-petraeus-
leaks. 
97 Pierre Thomas, Mike Levine, Jack Cloherty and Jack Date, ‘Former CIA Head David 
Petraeus to Plead Guilty’, ABC News, 3 March 2015, available at: 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/cia-head-david-petraeus-plead-guilty/story?id=29340487.  
98 Ackerman, ‘Petraeus leaks’. 
99 David S. Kaufer and Shawn J. Parry-Giles, ‘Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign 
memoirs: A study in contrasting identities,’ Quarterly Journal of Speech, 103:1-2 (2017), pp. 
7-32. 
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increased activity by whistleblower support groups who mostly provide legal 
advice to insiders, past and present. These groups including the Project on 
Government Oversight (POGO) and the Government Accountability Project 
(GAP), alongside independent lawyers who are experts in this area of law. 
When I asked for the definition of a whistleblower from Mark Zaid, a 
prominent Washington DC whistleblower lawyer, he quoted Justice Potter 
Stewart from a 1964 case Jacobellis v. Ohio100 where he states, ‘I know it 
when I see it’. Zaid implied that even though a definition is often sought, to 
define it would ultimately render application more complicated and varies 
from case to case.101 
 
Mark Zaid and Jesselyn Radack, both experts in the field, offer widely differing 
views on whistleblowers.102 Zaid says of this encounter that Radack and 
himself entertain rather different understandings of what constitutes a 
national security whistleblower. Zaid previously represented Kiriakou when 
the latter was first charged for sharing information with an unauthorised 
individual, but they parted ways when Kiriakou was not convinced Zaid was 
representing him well enough. Kiriakou and Radack claim that the 
prosecution against him was retaliation for his disclosure of the CIA torture 
programs on ABC News in 2007.103 Zaid disputes that these circumstances 
make Kiriakou a whistleblower.104 
 
Radack has written an intriguing paper on the criminalization of 
whistleblowers. She draws attention to the fact that the criminal prosecution 
of whistleblowers disproportionally and alarmingly increased under the 
Obama administration.105 Furthermore, she emphasises that prosecutions 
                                                        
100 Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964) 378 U.S. 184, US Supreme Court. 
101 Zaid, Personal Interview. 
102 Twitter Conversation Thread, ‘Mark Zaid, John Kiriakou and Jesselyn Radack’, Twitter, 
December 2015, available at: 
https://twitter.com/markszaidesq/status/675854464675393537?lang=en-gb. 
103 Kiriakou, Personal Interview. 
104 Zaid, Personal Interview. 
105 MacClellan and Radack, ‘The Criminalization of Whistleblowing’, pp. 57-59. 
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are taking place more readily when the insider has chosen to speak to the 
press. Radack explains that the central danger presented by such government 
action is that, ‘the prosecutions identify no actual national security harm 
caused by the leak, and they target those who appear to be classic 
whistleblowers’. This thesis concludes that protecting whistleblowers, rather 
than targeting them for criminal investigation, would more surely protect 
national security than the Obama administration’s policy of using the 
Espionage Act to criminalize whistleblowing.106  
 
Most importantly, this research has highlighted that the issue is not 
necessarily one of terminology, but of power. The concept of a whistleblower 
should not be one that is shunned. Instead the insider who turns 
whistleblower should be regarded as a brave individual who raises concern 
about wrongdoing, almost certainly with the effect of detriment to their 
career. This is not to say that there will not be individuals who will leak 
classified information in the hopes of damaging national security and plead a 
whistleblower-defence of mercy as a ruse, or as an adjunct to a personal 
vendetta with agency that they are employed by. A leak that otherwise fulfils 
the prerequisites constituting the actions of a whistleblower, should be 
defensible if it is in the public interest and proportional. A clear, unambiguous 
law to this effect, would be the best defence against leaks made for selfish or 
bitter reasons.  
 
Moreover, this thesis seeks to move away from the judgement of the leak 
itself – considering whether it is right or wrong, in particular the Cartesian 
judgement of whether the leaker is a ‘hero or a traitor’. The debate over 
leakers is often like a light switch – it is simply on or off, when in fact the 
situation is more like a dial. It can be reasoned that where there are secrets, 
there will be leaks. In a time where information is abundant, the intelligence 
community should be urged to confront itself with the issue of leakers as 
                                                        
106 Ibid. pp. 58-59. 
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abiding and omnipresent. Meanwhile, it is a primary objective here to 
determine whether the cases that I have examined in this thesis demonstrate 
that whistleblowers and leakers have an impact – be this positive or negative.  
 
 
Whistleblowers: A Part of the Accountability 
Landscape? 
Intelligence accountability is now a vast industry. European Court judgements 
prompted the United Kingdom (UK) to put its security and intelligence 
services on the statute book in 1989 and 1994 respectively, expanding the 
regulatory framework. This process was widely replicated across Europe. 
Initially, the agencies embraced this legislation as permissive and enabling, 
allowing many more operations. However, thereafter, the controversies over 
renditions and secret prisons attracted the attention of the UK and European 
courts. In 2006, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament both 
launched enquiries into secret prisons in Eastern Europe established by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), amplifying the demand for intelligence 
accountability mechanisms to be more effective. It has also increased the 
number and diversity of bodies monitoring the secret state, especially when 
operating internationally.107 Even a broad definition of accountability falls 
short of encapsulating its full extent.  
 
In recent years, state accountability has often been portrayed as a key 
element and the litmus test of a democracy.108 It denotes whether a state or 
regime can be held answerable for its actions or not. A large part of this 
mechanism is the function of oversight. Born and Wetzling observe there are 
                                                        
107 Ian Leigh, ‘Accountability and intelligence cooperation: Framing the issue’, in Hans Born, 
Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills, eds., International intelligence cooperation and accountability 
(New York: Routledge, 2011) p. 3. 
108 Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, ‘What Democracy Is… and Is Not’, Journal of 
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now many formal and informal aspects to the landscape of accountability.109 
In the US one of the central laws governing oversight is the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 (FISA), which established FISC. The US 
Senate Select Committee and FISC embody a central part of the formal 
intelligence oversight structure, whereas components, such as 
whistleblowers and journalists have developed informally and in parallel.110 
What is especially interesting is the way in which they learn from each other 
and interact, an issue identified by an informal body may be pursued by a 
formal committee, or vice versa.111   
 
Curiously, few have mentioned the role of the whistleblower as part of the 
accountability landscape. However, the recent changes in the global political 
climate have affected the responsibility that insiders carry as increasingly 
active participants in the public narrative.112 It has been argued that 
whistleblowers, due to their insider status, should in fact be considered as a 
part of formal oversight.113 Arguably a further independent examination of 
events by academics, often using declassified documents to access the 
intelligence domain, would be helpful. In their recent analysis of the 
landscape of accountability, Born and Wetzling, pinpoint five different layers 
of accountability: (1) internal regulations of the services including 
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whistleblowers, (2) robust measures enforced by the executive, (3) 
parliamentary oversight, (4) reviews conducted by the judiciary and (5) 
external oversight by independent civil liberty groups and human rights 
organizations.114  
 
Since the Snowden revelations in June 2013, many of which predominantly 
concerned America’s NSA and the UK's Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), civil liberty campaigners and human rights 
organizations have become more interested in the issues of oversight and 
accountability.115 Journalists working with 'off-the-record sources' including 
whistleblowers and leakers have traditionally considered themselves to be 
the 'fourth-estate' or ‘shock-troops’ of intelligence accountability, opening 
issues that will be explored later by formal bodies.116 More recently, complex 
involvement comes from an increasing ensemble of campaign groups, activist 
lawyers and government watchers conducting, which some have deemed 
'oversight-from-below'.117 Have we now entered an era of 'regulation-by-
revelation'?118 Such informal processes also present problems not least, as 
Aldrich's term implies, since these revelations are episodic, uneven and 
sometimes seemingly random and may miss serious and programmatic 
abuse. What is undeniable is that the current oversight structure of the 
intelligence services in western states is, by all accounts, innately 
unsystematic. It is littered with a historic legacy in institutions and therefore 
an increasingly cluttered landscape. 
 
                                                        
114 Born and Wetzling, ‘Intelligence accountability’, p. 317. 
115 Peter Gill, Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Limits of Reform (New York: Routledge, 2016); Mark Phythian, ‘The British experience with 
intelligence accountability’, Intelligence and National Security, 22: 1 (2007), pp. 75-99. 
116 Loch K. Johnson, ‘Harry Howe Ransom and American Intelligence Studies’, Intelligence 
and National Security, 22:2 (2007), pp. 402-28. 
117 Hillebrand, ‘The Role of News Media’, pp. 689-706;  Jelle van Buuren, ‘From Oversight to 
Undersight: The Internationalization of Intelligence Oversight’, Security and Human Rights, 
24:3-4 (2014), pp. 239-252. 
118 Aldrich, ‘Regulation by Revelation?, pp.13-37. 
 - 53 - Dobson 
One criticism levelled at more formal elements of the oversight structure is a 
conflict of interest. Oversight is often its concern with intelligence community 
efficiency and effectiveness, as well as lawfulness and civil liberties; issues 
that could be considered to stand in conflict with one another. Moreover, in 
the UK, a more personal conflict of interest could possibly arise, as 
Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee has often been led by 
former cabinet ministers who have previously worked closely with the secret 
services, including Tom King (Northern Ireland), Margaret Beckett (Foreign 
Office and Department of Trade and Industry) and Sir Malcolm Rifkind 
(Foreign Office). Should those who have operated as day-to-day managers of 
intelligence then serve as their overseers?  
 
A fascinating aspect of oversight is inquiry competition. The UK Parliament 
boasts a range of competing select committees that often conduct multiple 
retrospective inquiries into major public issues or perceived problems related 
to intelligence, for example the Iraqi WMD episode. A further range of bodies 
specialize in finance including the Public Accounts Committee. Competing 
with these myriad groups of politicians are the judges, either in the courts, as 
specialist reviewers or as leaders of independent investigations and 
commissions.119 In the US under Jimmy Carter there were perhaps as many 
as eight competing committees that needed to be notified of covert action. 
Working mostly behind closed doors with classified material, their 
involvement hardly ever sees the light of day. Does this machine work? Even 
the opinions of former secretaries of state, assumed to have an informed 
view, vary widely. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of official 
accountability and oversight measures. 
 
 
                                                        
119 Robert Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Washington DC: Brookings, 2001), 
pp. 2-7; Hugh, Bochel, Andrew Defty and Jane Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers: 
Parliament and the Intelligence Services (New York: Springer, 2014). 
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Research Methods 
Confronting and questioning our research when applying qualitative methods 
ensures that we are not only aware of their strengths and weaknesses, but 
also the limitations. Developing an awareness of the potential shortcomings 
of our research can help us navigate potential ‘traps’.120 As researchers we 
aim to construct robust and well substantiated arguments, rather than come 
to conclusions on mere conjecture. In order to afford integrity, triangulate 
material and arrive at substantiated conclusions, accordingly I have engaged 
critically with several different research methods.  
 
Intelligence studies scholars, mostly within the anglosphere, have been 
concerned with gathering empirical evidence on issues of intelligence 
practices and national security.121 Researching on intelligence is a particularly 
challenging endeavour due to limited accessibility122 and a lack of guidance 
on how best to approach research within this field.123 Typically, intelligence 
scholars (mostly without security clearances) construct research projects by 
                                                        
120 William S. Harvey, ‘Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews’, Qualitative Research, 11: 
4 (2011), p. 431. 
121 Loch K. Johnson, ‘The Development of Intelligence Studies’, in Robert Dover, Michael S. 
Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand, eds., The Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies 
(London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 4-9; Damien Van Puyvelde and Sean Curtis, ‘”Standing on 
the Shoulders of Giants”: Diversity and Scholarship in Intelligence Studies’, Intelligence and 
National Security, 31: 7 (2016), pp. 1040–1054. 
122 Wesley Wark, 'In Never-Never Land? The British Archives of Intelligence', The Historical 
Journal, 35: 1 (1992), pp. 195–203; John Ferris, 'Coming in from the Cold War: The 
Historiography of American Intelligence, 1945-1990', Diplomatic History, 19: 1 (1995), pp. 
87–115; Christopher J. Murphy and Christopher R. Moran, eds., Intelligence Studies in 
Britain and the US: Historiography Since 1945 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2013); Christopher R. Moran, ‘The Pursuit of Intelligence History: Methods, Sources, and 
Trajectories in the United Kingdom’, Studies in Intelligence, 55: 2 (2011), pp. 33-55; Richard 
J. Aldrich, ‘Never-Never and Wonderland: British and American Policy on Intelligence 
Archives’, Contemporary Record, 8: 1 (1994), pp.132-50; and R. Gerald Hughes, Peter 
Jackson and Len Scott, eds., Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State 
(London: Routledge, 2008). 
123 Philip Davies, ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite 
Interview Data in the Study of Intelligence and Security Services’, Politics, 21: 1 (2001), p. 
73. 
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scouring archives, memoirs, private papers and conduct interviews.124 The 
continued fervent secret-keeping of governments, quite often resulting in 
overclassification, hampers thorough research into the more sensitive areas 
of government.125 The justification often reverts to the argument that a 
laissez-faire attitude to sharing more information could afford an advantage 
to known and unknown enemies.126  
 
Talking to former or practicing intelligence officers often is a problematic 
trust exercise for the researcher. While talking to academic researchers 
rather than journalists is often overlooked or tolerated, there is nevertheless 
the potential for an enormous backlash against the former or serving 
intelligence practitioner who divulges information to an unauthorised 
person. The Kiriakou example is not an isolated one.127 Under the Obama 
administration, there have been seven other cases of charges brought against 
insiders who divulged information to the press.128 As a result of the possibly 
devastating consequences, most practitioners would rather not say anything. 
129 Despite the gulf between the amount of information that Kiriakou shared 
(confirming the name of an intelligence officer to a journalist in a private 
phone call) and the plethora of files (the highest estimate is 1.7 billion 
documents) taken from NSA by Snowden. Therefore, it is almost 
unconceivable that a measure of the same punishment is carried out in both 
cases. 
 
                                                        
124 Hughes, Jackson, and Scott, Exploring Intelligence Archives; R. Gerald Hughes, ‘Of 
Revelatory Histories and Hatchet Jobs: Propaganda and Method in Intelligence History’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 23:6 (2008), pp. 842-877. 
125 Peter Jackson, ‘Introduction’, in Hughes, Jackson, and Scott, Exploring Intelligence 
Archives, p. 3. 
126 Warner, ‘Wanted’, 2002, p. 17. 
127 Damien Van Puyvelde, ‘Qualitative Research Interviews and the Study of National 
Security Intelligence’, International Studies Perspectives, 19:4 (2018), p. 376. 
128 Peter Sterne, ‘Obama used the Espionage Act to put a record number of reporters’ 
sources in jail, and Trump could be even worse’, Freedom of the Press Foundation, 21 June 
2017, available at: https://freedom.press/news/obama-used-espionage-act-put-record-
number-reporters-sources-jail-and-trump-could-be-even-worse/.  
129 Personal Information. 
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The material gathered for this thesis consists of around 35 original oral 
testimonies of whistleblowers, leakers, lawyers and journalists. Furthermore, 
I have considered autobiographies of whistleblowers, leakers and former 
security services officials. Especially, where interviews were not possible 
these resources represented a rich source of information. In chronologically 
more recent chapters, I was also able to benefit from extensive open source 
material available online. This data included social media accounts of the 
relevant individuals, as well as official statements made by the US 
governments. In order to move beyond a story based on anecdotal evidence 
and online data, I have constructed a model lens through which to view and 
triangulate material on each case study.130  
 
Additionally, an increasing number of legal advisors and civil rights groups 
supporting whistleblowers and leakers have provided online libraries to 
explore the work they have been engaged with. Sources include, but are not 
limited to, WikiLeaks, POGO and GAP.131 In order to fulfil the crucial element 
of historical context, I have also visited several archives in the US, such as the 
Library of Congress in Washington DC, the National Security Archives located 
in the George Washington University library, the National Archives, Records 
Administration Collections in Washington DC, the CIA Records Search Tool 
(CREST), National Archives II, located in College Park, Maryland and Tamiment 
Library & Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York University. Finally, 
some personal papers that are privately held were also made available to me.  
 
Papers that I was able to view at the Library of Congress and the National 
Security Archives in Washington DC included the Moynihan Papers, the Lake 
Papers, the Odom Papers and the National Security Archives PROFS legal case 
files. Moynihan’s extensive collection – very much focused on secrecy - spans 
his entire professional career. Moreover, I was able to look at a number of 
                                                        
130 Davies, ‘Spies as Informants’, pp. 73-80. 
131 Van Puyvelde, ‘Intelligence Accountability’, p. 148. 
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records in the Anthony Lake Papers that concerned the Wiretap Lawsuit of 
the Nixon administration, but I was staggered at the large amounts of 
classified and top-secret material still withheld. Most of this material was 
dated between 1969-1973, thus almost 50-years ago. This gap exemplifies 
the difficulties faced by intelligence researchers. The National Security 
Archives have advocated for the declassification of material and open 
government, including the records surrounding these wiretaps since it was 
founded in 1985.132 
 
The technical problems of official document declassification and the 
subsequent analysis by academics has tended to be overlooked in the 
literature thus far. Nevertheless, academics now compete in this crowded 
market of accountability; this thesis addresses that omission. Aided by online 
sources, historians and political scientists in particular contribute, inter alia, 
through the analysis of declassified public records that accompany special 
investigations - such as Lord Sir John Chilcot’s inquiry into the Iraq War. 
Experienced academics often provide testimony for interpretation of newly 
declassified documents and offer their comments on proposed legislative 
changes. Moreover, the last two decades have seen the growing importance 
of historical revisionism generated by new archives, partly fuelled by archival 
releases but also influenced by factors such as global advances in technology. 
Are professors now part of an expanding and ambient universe of 
accountability? 
 
Historical revisionism recognizes the part that recent – and often revelatory 
- historical records can play in accountability. This term refers to the 
established record of historical events necessarily and continuously being 
questioned through new documentary evidence, including memoirs and 
                                                        
132 National Security Archive, ‘About the National Security Archive’, no date, available at: 
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/about.  
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archives being placed into context through secondary sources.133 Unlike the 
waves of ‘holocaust denials’, genuine historical revisionism is concerned with 
the re-interpretation of events based on evidence stemming from more 
reliable sources, such as archives. However, a historian’s analysis of the past 
is a lengthy process, consisting mostly of the meticulous scrutiny of a plethora 
of archived files to make sense of them through contemporary 
contextualization. It is an upward struggle to ensure that documents are 
preserved or indeed records created in the first instance. Scholars, such as 
Heald explore the postmodern approach that questions the reliability of 
archives and their propensity to be manipulated.134  
 
However, the scholar’s task is not restricted to the interpretation of archival 
material, but also to offer a more informed opinion on important events, to 
improve accountability and offer clarification of existing narratives through a 
fresh analysis of both primary and secondary material. Record keeping and 
the accessibility of official records to academics are essential in order to 
facilitate latent accountability and oversight, through the proper review of 
primary sources. Historians such as A. J. P. Taylor, Peter Hennessy, David 
Anderson and Christopher Andrew have sequentially battled successfully 
with the secret state in order to open up records and secure a reliable version 
of historical events, arguably making them the last forum of accountability. It 
could be argued that efforts to triangulate research now also includes open 
source material.135  
 
                                                        
133 Marnie Hughes-Warrington, Revisionist Histories (Oxford: Routledge, 2013); James 
McPherson, ‘From the President: Revisionist Historians’, Perspectives on History, 41: 6 
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134 Carolyn Heald, ‘Is there room for archives in the Postmodern World?’, The American 
Archivist, 59: 1 (1996), pp. 88-101; see also, Joan Schwartz and Terry Cook, ‘Archives, 
Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory’, Archival Science, 2: 1-2 (2002), pp. 
1-19.  
135 Melina Dobson, ‘The Last Forum of Accountability? State Secrecy, Intelligence and 
Freedom of Information in the United Kingdom’, British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, (2019, forthcoming), pp. 1- 29. 
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Legislative tools that are of particular interest to the subject matter of this 
thesis are the American Espionage Act in 1917 and FOIA in 1966. These 
divergent pieces of legislation are pertinent to my thesis as they represent 
the central mechanisms of the culture of secrecy and in contrast the 
ostensible movements towards an open government.  
 
When researching more recent case studies, accessibility of archival material 
became increasingly problematic. Therefore, I relied heavily on interviews 
when these were granted and open source material. Interviews are seen as 
the ‘gold standard’ when researching within the social sciences. Interviews 
often allow the researcher to put emphasis on an understudied area. 
Nevertheless, interviews considering the topic of intelligence present both 
issues of accessibility and legitimacy.136 Gill and Pythian caution against trying 
to ascertain ‘the truth’ at any given point within research. They state that, 
particularly in intelligence studies it is more important to uncover useful 
information: ‘our purpose must be to seek ways of understanding and 
explaining intelligence, including by way of analysing tests, believing that 
useful knowledge (that which has some real existence beyond the text) can 
be ascertained and made use of by those seeking to improve the human 
condition’.137 Therefore,  the objective of the research gathered in this thesis 
is merely to ascertain areas that will require further research and expose 
problematic themes within the practice as well as conceptualisation of 
whistleblowers and leakers.  
 
 
Thesis Outline and Case Studies 
In empirical terms, this thesis comprises a chronological account of ten case 
studies. Focusing on the US allows the comparison of similar cases and the 
                                                        
136 Van Puyvelde, ‘Qualitative Research Interviews’, p. 377. 
137 Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 37. 
 - 60 - Dobson 
search for difference: the classic modern comparative method.138 Due to the 
subject matter, the biggest challenge of this thesis has been accessing 
sufficient material. Therefore, the cases that have been chosen have been 
made public. In order to ensure valuable analysis and significant comparisons 
within the final conclusion, the central research questions will be considered 
for each case in the chapter conclusions.  
 
The first chapter - a literature review – examines the existing literature 
thematically. It will commence with a first section considering different 
conceptualisations of whistleblowers and leakers, exposing the disparities in 
order to challenge them in the chapters that follow. The second section of 
this chapter will engage with the moral and ethical dilemma that potential 
whistleblowers and leakers have before they take action. The third section 
considers the concept of jurisprudence and legislation that determines that 
action of a whistleblower or leaker. The fourth section maps the existing 
literature that considers US intelligence oversight and accountability. 
Furthermore, whether whistleblowers and leakers have previously been 
considered to be a part of this structure in an unofficial capacity.  
 
The second chapter of this thesis will explore a tumultuous period in the 
history of the intelligence community, the 1970s-1980s. The last two decades 
before the end of the Cold War were marked by the continued bipolar world 
order, but a decline, even collapse of the Cold War consensus in the wake of 
Vietnam and then Watergate. This era was a sign of what was to come, with 
questions being asked of record keeping, decision-making and other 
elements of the secret state. The first case to be analysed is that of Dan 
Ellsberg in 1971, a former US Military analyst and employee of the Research 
and Development (RAND), became one of the most notorious ‘insiders’ to 
leak classified information in modern US history. The second case that will be 
                                                        
138 Arend Lijphart, ‘Comparative politics and the comparative method,’ American Political 
Science Review 65: 3 (1971), pp.682-693. 
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considered is that of Philip Agee, a former CIA analyst who has been 
controversially described as both a whistleblower and a defector. The third 
case within this chapter is that of Frank Snepp, who was an analyst and 
operative in the CIA, specialising in north Vietnamese politics and strategy.139 
All three individuals have been called whistleblowers and traitors.  
 
The third chapter explores the period just before and after the end of the 
Cold War. It reflects the changes in the CIA leadership and the questions that 
were asked of CIA activity in the 1980s following Iran-Contra. The cases in this 
chapter are intrinsically linked, as both individuals – Melvin Goodman and 
Jennifer Glaudemans were part of the same team working as analysts in the 
Soviet Affairs department of the CIA. Both Goodman and Glaudemans gave 
testimony in front of the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence (SSCI) on 
the politically influenced decision-making during the 1980s. In particular, this 
concerned the nomination of Robert Gates to be Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI). These two cases offer a unique opportunity to triangulate 
the actions of two people who testified in front of the SSCI, but whose 
experiences are drastically different. Both Melvin and Jennifer have been 
described as whistleblowers. However, Jennifer struggles with this label.  
 
The fourth chapter explores another key period in security and intelligence 
history. Arguably, the 9/11 terrorist attacks shocked the western world like 
no other event since Pearl Harbour. This was followed by the Iraqi WMD 
controversy creating a considerable degree of self-doubt and introspection. 
In the aftermath, a number of individuals came forward to present troubling 
issues surrounding the events leading up to and including the 9/11 attacks. 
This chapter explores an individual, Chelsea Manning, who joined the US 
Army convinced that this would help their country, but soon developed 
doubts. Chelsea Manning and her widely documented relationship with 
                                                        
139 Moran, Company Confessions, p. 183. 
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WikiLeaks will be the focus of this chapter. Again, Manning and the WikiLeaks 
director Julian Assange have both been described as whistleblowers.  
 
In chapter five, the spotlight falls on the rise of the surveillance state and 
growing technological advances. This is juxtaposed with the difficulties that 
the intelligence community experienced during this time. Increasing debates 
on privacy and civil rights were dismissed as the US was determined to 
prevent further terrorist attacks. A number of whistleblowers spoke out 
about the programs that have been developed by the security services to 
monitor and collect mass data globally, but specifically on all US citizens. In 
this chapter, I explore the experiences of a number of individuals who worked 
in the NSA SIGINT Automation Research Centre (SARC). Namely, Bill Binney, 
Kirk Wiebe and Ed Loomis. Diane Roark, a staffer at the US Senate, became 
involved at a later stage. Finally, Thomas Drake, employed by the NSA to 
oversee possible avenues for change and development. Drake ended up 
being charged under the Espionage Act. Again, all individuals in this chapter 
have been described as whistleblowers.  
 
Chapter six focuses exclusively on the case of Edward Snowden. Here, I 
investigate the timeline of the events leading up to, including and exceeding 
the publication of documents collected by Snowden from the NSA. This 
chapter in particular explores some of the topics from the previous chapter. 
Snowden is unique in this collection of cases, as his story has been widely 
publicised and written about. Nevertheless, there are many peculiarities to 
this case which make it specifically important to explore. Again, Edward 
Snowden has been described as a whistleblower, a traitor, a hero, a leaker, a 
dissident and a defector.  
 
The conclusion and final chapter of this thesis will explore the four central 
research questions that I have outlined above. Through triangulation of the 
cases, I seek to make conclusions based on the material that I have analysed.  
Chapter 1        
  The Literature Review 
‘Leaking has a symbiotic relationship with secrecy. Without secrecy there 
would be no need to leak information.’1 
 
In January 2009, the then newly-elected President Obama wrote in a 
Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 
concerning FOIA, ‘The Government should not keep information confidential 
merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because 
errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract 
fears’.2 Conversely, during and particularly towards the end of Obama’s eight-
year administration, there were many criticisms of his dedication to make 
good on some of his promises, accompanied by worse accusations about his 
targeting whistleblowers.3 Prior to his presidency, Obama was not just an 
advocate of whistleblowers, but a defender in his job as an attorney.4 Yet 
remarkably, Obama’s subsequent administration represents the most 
controversial time for whistleblowers. It encompassed underdeveloped 
whistleblower legislation, insufficient policy on whistleblowers, a failure to 
acknowledge the complex reality of the whistleblower-dilemma and some of 
                                                        
1 Bok, Secrets, p.217. 
2 Barack Obama, ‘Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies’, 
Presidential Documents. Federal Register Vol. 74. No. 15, 21 January 2009, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/presidential-foia.pdf. 
3 See for example on this debate Steven Aftergood, ‘Secrecy News: Was Obama 
Administration the Most Transparent or the Least?’, Federation of American Scientists, 20 
November 2017, available at: https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2017/11/obama-transparency/;  
Jameel Jaffer, ‘Lecture: Government Secrecy in the Age of Information Overload’, Harvard 
Kennedy School: Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy, 6 November 2017, 
available at: https://shorensteincenter.org/jameel-jaffer-salant-lecture-2017/; and 
Margaret Sullivan, ‘Obama promised transparency. But his administration is one of the 




4 Richard Moberly, ‘Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security 
Dilemma’, College of Law, Faculty Publications, 153 (2012), pp. 51-141. 
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the biggest news stories featuring whistleblowers and leakers, together with 
accelerated prosecution.5 This chapter draws on some of the conflicting 
concepts that shape the debate around whistleblowers. 
 
The topic of whistleblowers and leakers is not a particularly popular topic of 
conversation with the security services.6 This could also explain why the study 
of whistleblowers, and leakers has been largely avoided in intelligence 
studies, a field that is densely populated by former intelligence practitioners.7 
There have been some significant normative and ethical contributions.8 
However, the literature has largely concentrated on individual whistleblower 
and leaker cases, highlighting the focus of each. For example, there has been 
a large body of literature concerned with Snowden, which only considers the 
questions of state secrecy or oversight mechanisms in passing. Instead, these 
texts focus on surveillance technologies, privacy and other civil liberty issues.9 
There is growing literature emerging from other disciplines, as well as outside 
of the academy that considers the intricacies of whistleblowing through 
different lenses, for example journalistic writing, law, 
                                                        
5 Spencer Kimball, ‘US whistleblower laws offer no protection’, DW: Deutsche Welle, 28 
January 2014, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/us-whistleblower-laws-offer-no-
protection/a-17391500.  
6 Personal Information. 
7 Van Puyvelde, ‘Intelligence Accountability’, p. 157 fn 87. 
8 David Leigh and Luke Harding, WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy (London: 
Public Affairs, 2011); Genevieve Lester, When Should State Secrets Stay Secret? 
Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Intelligence (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015); Rahul Sagar, ‘Creaky Leviathan: Comment on David Pozen’s Leaky Leviathan’, 
Harvard Law Review Forum 127 (2013-14), pp. 75-85; Gabriel Schoenfeld, Necessary 
secrets: national security, the media, and the rule of law (New York: Norton, 2011).  
9 Zygmunt Bauman, Didier Bigo, Paulo Esteves, Elspeth Guild, Vivienne Jabri, David Lyon, 
R.B.J. Walker, ‘After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance’, International Political 
Sociology, 8: 1 (2014), pp. 121-144; Timothy E. Edgar, Beyond Snowden: Privacy, Mass 
Surveillance and the Struggle to Reform the NSA (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 
2017);  Greenwald, No Place to Hide.; Luke Harding, The Snowden Files (London: Faber & 
Faber, 2014); Loch K. Johnson, ‘An INS Special Forum: Implications of the Snowden Leaks’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 29: 6 (2014), pp. 793-810; David Lyon, Surveillance after 
Snowden (Cambridge: Polity, 2015); David Lyon, ‘The Snowden stakes: Challenges for 
understanding surveillance today’, Surveillance & Society, 13:2 (2015), pp.139-152. 
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autobiographies/biographies, business studies, philosophy and sociology, 
together with psychology.10  
 
Historically, much like the label ‘dissident’, the terms ‘whistleblower’ and 
‘leaker’ have carried predominantly negative connotations, often used 
synonymously with terms such as ‘traitor’.11 I will be exploring three different 
schools of thought on the topic of whistleblowing and associate actions: (1) 
the conservative school; (2) the middle school; and (3) the radical school. 
These schools are intended as a guide to consider the spectrum of literature 
in this area. In order to achieve more valuable critical analysis, I will explore 
the existing literature through four dominant themes that I have identified in 
the literature, which relate directly to my analytical model of whistleblowers 
– (1) A power paradigm: transparency vs. secrecy; (2) Morality, ethics and the 
human condition; (3) The story of the whistleblower; and (4) The landscape 
of accountability. This list is not exhaustive but covers a broad range of 
literature on different conceptualisations, aspects and stages of 
whistleblowing. The table (Table 3) below gives further explanation as to the 







                                                        
10 On journalistic writing see, Harding, The Snowden Files; Greenwald, No Place to Hide; 
Epstein, How America Lost its Secrets; on law see, Kohn, The New Whistleblower’s 
Handbook and Pozen, ‘The Leaky Leviathan’, pp. 512-635; on autobiographies see Melvin A. 
Goodman, Whistleblower at the CIA: An Insiders Account of the Politics of Intelligence (San 
Francisco: City Lights Books, 2017); Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (New York: 
Stonehill Publishing Company, 1975); Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of 
Saigon’s Indecent End Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1980); on business see Elliston and on philosophy and sociology see, Bok, Secrets; 
Simmel, ‘The Sociology of Secrecy’, pp. 441-98; Max Weber, Economy and Society: An 
Outline of Interprestive Sociology (Berkley, California: University of California Press, 2013). 
11 Pozen, ‘The Leaky Leviathan’, p. 512. 
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Table 3:  Literature on Whistleblowers and Related Concepts 
 
To re-examine the term whistleblower, as presented in the previous chapter 
more extensively, I will look at the broad conceptualisation of the term in the 
literature. The conservative school of thought does not consider any 
individual a whistleblower unless they have followed the internal channels. 
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This school generally follows the conservative interpretation of the law. The 
radical school occupies the opposite end of the spectrum and represents 
those that hail all whistleblowers, leakers, hacktivists as heroes who 
demonstrate that the government acts only in its own interest. Meanwhile, 
there is a growing consensus in the normative political science literature that 
transparency is good and secrecy is almost exclusively bad, except in 
specifically defined circumstances, driven to some degree by causative 
assumptions about data, communications and waves of democracy.12 The 
middle school, which this thesis proposes as a more thoughtful approach to 
this subject is one that places itself in between the former schools. 
Predominantly, it hopes to achieve wider debate on the topic of 
whistleblowers, especially within intelligence studies, and considers them to 
be a valuable contributor to the intelligence community in the context of 
modern procedures. 
 
The themes listed above are not exclusive in their relevance to the 
whistleblower topic but represent the central themes to this thesis. The value 
of the secrecy vs. transparency debate is found partly in its consideration of 
the concept of power. It also contributes to the agency-structure debate. In 
this section, I consider the following questions addressed in the literature. 
 
• How does secrecy influence and perpetuate government power?  
• Is transparency the antidote to secrecy?  
• How do we achieve transparency?  
• What is the role of whistleblowers in this context?  
 
                                                        
12 For example: Paul Craig, ‘Public Law, Sovereignty and Citizenship’, in Robert Blackburn, 
ed., Rights of Citizenship (London: Mansell, 1993). Also, Max Weber, Economy and Society 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 
(trans. Alan Sheridan, London: Allen Lane, 1977); Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and 
Violence. Vol. 2 of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity, 
1985); Christopher Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity (Oxford: Polity, 1989); and 
David Lyon, The Electronic Eye: the rise of surveillance society (Cambridge: Polity, 1994). 
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The analysis of these debates leads onto a consideration of the wider moral 
and ethical implications that should be considered when we examine 
intelligence community whistleblowers. I seek to answer the following 
question through exploring scholarly writing on this topic. What is the 
whistleblower dilemma? Can the acts of the whistleblower be considered to 
be disloyal? Following on from the broader conceptualisation of the 
whistleblower case, we present the more specific examination of cases, such 
as Philip Agee, Dan Ellsberg, Melvin Goodman, Chelsea Manning and Edward 
Snowden. Therefore, this section considers some of the biographical or 
autobiographical literature on whistleblowers and leakers and what they 
have brought to the popular understanding of the nature of whistleblowing. 
Lastly, I want to consider the topic of oversight and accountability and what 
potential role the whistleblower can play in this specific context. Considering 
the broader aim of this thesis, to evaluate the potential impact of 
whistleblowers, it seems important that this latter issue should be 
considered. Can whistleblowers or leakers be considered, as the media often 




A Power Paradigm: Secrecy vs. Transparency 
At the heart of the examination of whistleblowers is a rather acrimonious 
debate between the conservative school of thought arguing to defend a 
consistent level of secrecy and the radical school, looking for drastic 
transparency from governments.13 The whistleblower’s decision represents 
the space between revealing classified information and potentially 
                                                        
13 On secrecy see: Itzhak Galnoor, ‘What do we know about government secrecy’, in Itzhak 
Galnoor, ed., Government secrecy in democracies (New York: New York University Press, 
1977) pp. 275-313; J.William Fulbright, ‘The high cost of secrecy’, The Progressive, 35:9 
(1971) pp. 16–21. On transparency see: Carolyn Ball, ‘What is transparency?’, Public 
Integrity, 11:4 (2009), pp. 293–307. 
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contributing to the transparency of government or keeping a possibly 
damaging government secret from the electorate and perpetuating abuse. In 
summary, secrecy presents a dilemma in a democracy. On the one hand there 
are clearly some matters that need to be kept secret in the public interest – 
how to build nuclear weapons for example. On the other hand, secrecy can 
cause harm, due to its potential to shield abuses of power. Maintaining the 
balance can lead to paranoia and obsession, as we saw with President Nixon. 
The fixation on keeping secrets can easily spiral into keeping secrets for the 
sake of keeping secrets. Moreover, many feel that the principle of secret-
keeping is contrary to the inherent moral values within a democracy.14 In this 
and the next section, I will unpack both claims independently by exploring the 
relationship between the concepts of power, secrecy and transparency.  
 
The concept of power, according to the radical school, encompasses more 
than the executive and political system instead the view is that it refers to the 
full reach of government.15 Surveillance as the coding of information is an 
‘essential element of such power’.16 Max Weber, who can also be located 
within the radical school of thought, though does not quite subscribe to the 
same extremes as Giddens. He attributes the concept of ‘office secrecy’ 
entirely as a phenomenon of bureaucracy, a term he propagated. Broadly, 
Weber considers secrecy to be a harmful practice, holding that, ‘bureaucratic 
administration means fundamentally dominating through knowledge’.17 This 
demonstrates that the ability to control public disclosure of information 
denotes a ‘monopoly’ on the possession and exertion of potential power in 
                                                        
14 Kenneth G. Robertson, ‘The Politics of Secret Intelligence - British and American 
Attitudes’, in Kenneth G. Robertson, eds., British and American Approaches to 
Intelligence, RUSI Defence Studies (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987), p. 244. 
15 Stefano Guzzini, ‘Max Weber’s Power’, in Richard Lebow, ed., Max Weber and 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 97; see also, 
James Faubion, Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 3, (Trans. Robert 
Hurley et al., London: Penguin, 2000). 
16 Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, p. 47. 
17 Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 225, 992; On administrative secrecy see: Francis E. 
Rourke, ‘Secrecy in American Bureaucracy’, Political Science Quarterly, 72:4 (1957), pp. 
540–564; Francis E. Rourke, ‘Administrative secrecy: A congressional dilemma’, American 
Political Science Review, 54 (1960), pp. 684–94. 
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such a structure.18 In part, power in government means being privy to the 
knowledge of certain classified information, and therefore having the ability 
to exert it over others. Furthermore, Weber expresses concern about the 
bureaucratic apparatus not being exposed to controls by an electorate or by 
public opinion, which might render secrecy under its reign as impenetrable. 
Indeed, Weber blamed bureaucratic secrecy and its associated pathologies 
for Germany’s failure to win the First World War. These considerations 
demonstrate the potential for abuse and inefficiency through official secrecy.  
 
Anthony Giddens has revised his ideas continuously. His early ideas of 
surveillance referred to such things as timetables that permitted others to 
have knowledge of where an individual was going at a particular time of the 
day, something which in turn he sees as a form of power. He links the concept 
of power as having a direct effect on the individual through information.19 
Dahl also moves away from a ubiquitous idea of power, instead considering 
it as an action. More specifically, he argues that exerting power means 
manipulating another individual into doing something they would not have 
otherwise considered undertaking.20 Giddens holds that, ‘Administrative 
power is based upon the regulation and co-ordination of human conduct 
through the manipulation of the settings in which it takes place’. Though this 
individualistic/causal approach may not be particularly helpful when we 
consider intelligence agencies within a larger structure, it can tell us 
something about the agency-structure relationship between two people 
where the power-balance is uneven – for instance an employer and 
employee. Therefore, in the case of a whistleblower, the knowledge of power 
and the possibility of repercussions could exert pressure on an individual. 
                                                        
18 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 952. 
19 Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, 1985, p. 174. 
20 Robert A. Dahl, ‘A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model’, American Political Science Review, 
52:2 (1958), pp. 463–69; Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an 
American City (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961); Robert A. Dahl, ‘Power’, in 
David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12 (New York: Free 
Press, 1968), pp. 405–15. 
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Some of the sentiments of the radical school are echoed and expanded on by 
Ken Robertson, belonging to the middle school of thought.21 Robertson thinks 
beyond the confines of bureaucracy and holds that secrecy is necessary in 
order for a democratic government to respond to certain kinds of threats.22 
Further, he states that there is value in both transparency and secrecy, in that 
they are linked and indispensable parts of government.23 Robertson 
distinguishes his approach from that of Weber, for instance, by arguing that 
secrecy is rarely absolute and can be used as a tool to control the flow of 
information to the public.24 The level of control over information is directly 
related to power and the ‘struggle for office’. Robertson identifies two factors 
influencing the balance of power within the political system, the underlying 
motivation to control information and the capacity to exert control.25 
Robertson’s analysis endeavours to examine the justifications given for state 
secrecy in a democracy. Unlike the wider defences of government secrecy, 
which often cites protection of the policy process against corporate lobbying, 
Robertson focused mostly on the security rationale.  
 
When considering the inherent function of intelligence agencies and the 
dominant functions of intelligence we inevitably return to the concept of 
                                                        
21 Kenneth G. Robertson, Public Secrets: A Study in the Development of Government Secrecy 
(London: The Macmillan Press, 1982). 
22 On necessary secrecy see: Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson, Democracy and 
Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1966); Steven Aftergood, ‘Government 
secrecy and knowledge production: A survey of some general issues’, in Judith Reppy, ed., 
Secrecy and knowledge production (Occasional Paper #23, Cornell University, 1999), 
available at: 
www.einaudi.cornell.edu/peaceprogram/publications/occasional_papers/occasional-
paper23.pdf; Alasdair Roberts, Blacked out: Government secrecy in the information age 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Gary D. Bass, Thomas S. Blanton, and Ralph 
G. Neas, ‘Foreword’, in David Banisar, ed., Government secrecy: Decisions without 
democracy (People for the American Way Foundation, 2007), available at: 
www.openthegovernment.org/govtsecrecy.pdf; Susan L. Maret and Jan Goldman, eds., 
Government Secrecy: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Westport, CT: Libraries 
Unlimited/ABC-CLIO, 2009); Schoenfeld, Necessary secrets.  
23 Robertson, ‘The Politics of Secret Intelligence’, p. 244. 
24 Robertson, Public Secrets, pp. 1-2. 
25 Robertson, Public Secrets, p. 3; see also, Kenneth G. Robertson, Secrecy and Open 
Government: Why Governments Want you to Know (London: MacMillan, 1999). 
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secrecy. Jeremy Bentham is to be found at one end of the spectrum. He 
stated that ‘Secrecy is an instrument of conspiracy: it ought not, therefore, 
be the system of a regular government’.26 This promotes the often long 
forgotten principle that secrecy was essentially a tool of wartime exception 
and ought arguably only to be used as such, not as a device to hide 
uncomfortable truths from the public in peacetime. Vincent has drawn on 
this idea and has succeeded in providing a multidisciplinary approach to 
secrecy by exploring key reforms in the law and media. Vincent takes a 
multidisciplinary approach to contextualise it and thus make it defensible.27  
 
Secrecy is also about society and groups, not just organisations and 
bureaucracies. Whilst considering the work of Simmel,28 Hazelrigg suggests 
that secrecy ‘is the ultimate sociological form for the regulation of the flow 
and distribution of information’. That is, careful management of the balance 
between knowing and not-knowing can shape societal interactions. Crucially, 
it shapes the relationships within any group that is bound by secret-keeping. 
Bound by an expectation of silence, there is greater trust within the group.29 
This observation certainly has an impact when we are discussing the act of 
whistleblowing, which can constitute an act of betrayal.30 This social function 
is strong within the sphere of official state security agencies, intelligence 
practitioner Michael Herman went as far as to argue that the ‘mystique’ of 
secret knowledge can have ‘therapeutic functions due to the group bonding 
it provides’ and can even generate a ‘wry professional pride in secrecy’.31 
                                                        
26 Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham: Published under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), p. 315.  
27 David Vincent, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832-1998 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), p. 4. 
28 Georg Simmel, ‘The Secret and the Secret Society’, 1906, pp. 441–498.  
29 Lawrence E. Hazelrigg, ‘A reexamination of Simmel’s “The Secret and the Secret Society”: 
Nine propositions’, Social Forces, 47:3, (1969) p. 324. 
30 Tony Pfaff, ‘Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground: Ethics of Espionage in the 
Modern Age’, in Jan Goldman, ed., Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence 
Professional (New York: Scarecrow Press, 2005). ProQuest Ebook Central, available at: 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/warw/detail.action?docID=731409, p. 103. 
31 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), pp. 329-330. 
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Robertson considers there to be three reasons for supporting the 
unauthorised publication of classified material - the right to know, a 
disclosure in the public interest and to ensure accountability.32 The right to 
know and the defensibility of an unauthorised disclosure in the public interest 
are concepts that have to be more carefully explored here. The landscape of 
accountability will be examined in a later section of this chapter.  
 
Following the fall of the Soviet Union that marked the end of the Cold War, a 
number of social movements demanding more government transparency 
gathered momentum. In the public mind openness and transparency were 
closely associated with the collapse of communism and the so-called ‘Third 
Wave of Democracy’. President Bill Clinton (in office 1993-2001) reportedly 
declassified an unprecedented amount of government secrets. As a result, 
the right to be informed of certain areas of state activity came to be more 
expected and normalised.33 Exploring where this right is grounded in law is 
essential to understanding its limitations. The US First Amendment holds, 
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances’.34 Although, it does not refer to 
a right to know, the First Amendment, ‘provide[s] a contextual hook for a 
generalized, context-independent right to know what the government is up 
to’.35  
 
                                                        
32 Robertson, Public Secrets. 
33 Roberts, Blacked out. (Explores the ‘transparency lobby’ that advocated and utilised 
public disclosure legislation to enable the international movement of the right-to-know); 
Thomas Blanton, ‘The World’s Right to Know’, Foreign Policy, 11 November 2009, available 
at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/11/the-worlds-right-to-know/. 
34 US Constitution, First Amendment, Freedom of Speech and the Press. 
35 David Pozen, ‘Deep Secrecy’, Stanford Law Review, 62: 2 (2010), p. 295; This line of 
argument is influenced by Thomas Emerson, ‘Legal Foundations of the Right to Know’, 
Washington University Law Quarterly, 1 (1976), pp. 1-24. 
 - 74 - Dobson 
The right to know is not generally recognised as an absolute right.36 Emerson 
acknowledges that it could be disallowed in the case of a national security 
issue or one of privacy.37 Similarly, Stiglitz makes a strong case for a right to 
know in order to foster trust, holding that a genuine democracy cannot exist 
without it.38 Yet he does accept that a right to secrecy should be retained, 
even in private corporations. Nevertheless, he holds that secrecy also 
cultivates ignorance of key political issues leading to a ‘distorted arena of 
politics’.39 In the case of a whistleblower, this argument about an ‘arena of 
politics’ goes beyond the narrow issue of ‘waste, fraud and abuse’ and so is a 
significant debate in terms of defending their action if they chose to make an 
unauthorised disclosure. Furthermore, this debate suggests whistleblower 
action could be defensible if the insider has revealed information that the 
public have a ‘right to know’. The question is, how is such a right determined 
in the case of classified information?  
 
In order to determine whether the public has a right to know, the information 
would also have to prove that the disclosure could reasonably be in the public 
interest.40 Any concern brought forward by a whistleblower (internally) in the 
US should, by definition, already be considered to be in the public interest.41 
According to the existing law PICWA, which stipulates that only information 
‘the employee reasonably believes evidences (1) a violation of any Federal 
                                                        
36 Pozen, ‘Deep Secrecy’, 2010, p. 295. 
37 Emerson, ‘Legal Foundations of the Right to Know’, pp. 16-17; Louis Henkin, ‘The Right to 
Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers’, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 120 (1971), pp. 271-280. 
38 Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of 
Transparency in Public Life’, in Matthew J. Gibney, ed., Globalizing Rights: The Oxford 
Amnesty lectures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
39 Stiglitz, ‘On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse’, pp. 115-116, 138. 
40 Emerson, ‘Legal Foundations of the Right to Know’, 1976, p. 883; an example of this type 
public-interest disclosure legislation is the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, United 
Kingdom.  
41 Elletta Callahan, Terry Dworkin and David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing: Australian, UK, and US 
approaches to disclosure in the public interest’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 44:3 
(2004), pp. 879-912. (This article argues that the US is a trailblazer in this area, due to their 
early legislation on whistleblower protection in 1989, but it fails to recognise the 
disadvantaged position that intelligence community whistleblowers continue to be in). 
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Law, rule, or regulation; or (2) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an 
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or 
safety’ may be brought forward.42 This type of disclosure is called a ‘protected 
disclosure’. Nevertheless, as already emphasised in the previous chapter, 
there is also a list of eight exclusive avenues that the whistleblower can 
approach with such a concern.43 Once again, the whistleblower must look to 
the First Amendment of the US constitution to remedy their disadvantaged 
position.44 This represents the heart of the dispute about whistleblowing – 
The balance has to be struck between the right to free speech, the public 
interest and national security.45 All these three areas are highly contested and 
potentially in conflict. 
 
Governments are often slow to admit that a particular instance of 
whistleblowing has been constructive or helpful. The failure to produce a 
more satisfactory answer in this case suggests that there is also inadequate 
transparency concerning the government’s willingness to admit that some 
whistleblowers can get it right and be of value. Ball has suggested that there 
are three ways in which helpful transparency is understood.46 Firstly, 
transparency is viewed as a value, closely associated with the idea of 
accountability. Secondly, transparency as an avenue to gain support for 
government openness, which can result in encouraging debate around 
secrecy and privacy. Thirdly, transparency as a positive organisational policy 
that encourages ‘accountability, efficiency and effectiveness’.47 Unusually for 
                                                        
42 PICWA, 2014. 
43 See Methodology, p. 38. 
44 Kohn, The New Whistleblower’s Handbook, pp. 151-153. 
45 Ibid. p. 152. 
46 Ball, ‘What is transparency?’, p. 293. (Ball calls these ‘metaphors’). See also: Ann Florini, 
‘The Evolution of International Norms’, International Studies Quarterly, 40:3 (1996), pp. 
363–389; Ann Florini, ‘The End of Secrecy’, Foreign Policy, 111 (Summer 1998), pp. 50–63; 
Greg Hill, ‘The Politics of Transparent and Opaque Communities’, Polity, 29:1 (1996), pp. 1–
26; Ronald B. Mitchell, ‘Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty 
Compliance’, International Organization, 48:3 (1994), pp. 425–458; Ronald B. Mitchell, 
‘Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes’, International 
Studies Quarterly, 42:1 (1998) pp. 109–130. 
47 Ball, ‘What is transparency?’, p. 293. 
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a postmodern approach, Ball belongs to the middle school of thought, 
encouraging transparency as a functional policy that delivers more effective 
government. Notably, Ball emphasises how transparency can foster trust with 
the public.48 This begs the question whether the episodic transparency 
provided by whistleblowers can be a remedy for excessive and systemised 
state secrecy?  
 
Transparency is changing fast. Astonishing technological advances in recent 
years have complicated the debate surrounding the interconnected 
relationship between secrecy, transparency and accountability. Through an 
increase of easily accessible information every individual is more vulnerable, 
but so are states and corporations. This vulnerability is emphasised by 
individuals such as Snowden. Some of the risks, and equally the opportunities 
that our society could be confronting by calling for more transparency are 
considered in David Brin’s forward-thinking book The Transparent Society.49 
By contrasting two potential futures, Brin illustrates the frightening leap from 
possibility to reality that now confronts us. These speculations predict two 
ways in which ultimate transparency in society could play out through the 
progression in technology.  
 
One scenario depicts an Orwellian society controlled and led by the state and 
corporations, characterised by an ownership of information that is vertical. 
The other is portrayed as one of a self-regulated society in which the 
ownership of information is relatively horizontal. Brin expected that society 
might have moved decisively towards one of these realities today. Neither 
appears as the ideal, both are extreme, but arguably in some respects 
                                                        
48 Ibid. pp. 297-298. See also: David H. Clark and William Reed, ‘The Strategic Sources of 
Foreign Policy Substitution’, American Journal of Political Science, 49: 3 (2005), pp. 609–
624; Peter F. Cowhey, ‘Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International 
Commitments: Japan and the United States’, International Organization, 47: 2 (1993), pp. 
299–326; Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, ‘The Surprising Logic of Transparency’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 43: 2 (1999), pp. 315–339. 
49 David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force us to Choose between Privacy 
and Freedom? (New York: Basic Books, 1998). 
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resemble some aspects of the world we live in today. Through the Internet, 
whether as individuals, private organisations or the state, with one click or a 
‘google search’ we have access to an unbelievable amount of personal 
information on each other. The most startling argument offered by this text 
is not only the new relationship between secrecy and transparency, but also 
the effect transparency could have on privacy. Brin anticipated the power of 
the internet to break down or blur boundaries including the one between 
government secrecy, corporate confidentiality and individual privacy. 
Transparency is largely thought of as a positive development in relation to 
the state, however, rarely are the boundaries or precise meaning of 
transparency discussed at any length. This new reality could also have 
repercussions for the post-internet whistleblower who hoped for anonymity, 
but in the future will now be unable to hide.  
 
Few writers are as dramatic or as utopian/dystopian in the view of 
transparency as Brin. Birchall warns against the common perception of 
viewing transparency as an objective, stating ‘it’s nothing at all, merely the 
absence of concealment’. An absence, she notes, that has become much 
easier to realise in today’s technology driven society.50 Thinkers such as Kant, 
Bentham and Foucault considered transparency long before the smart 
phone, viewing it in an uncomplicated way as a celebrated light that shines 
into the darkness of government secrecy.51 Birchall goes so far as to say that 
since this time, transparency has become, ‘a sign of cultural (as well as moral) 
                                                        
50 Clare Birchall, ‘Introduction to “Secrecy and Transparency”: The Politics of Opacity and 
Openness’, Theory, Culture & Society, 28:7-8 (2012), p. 8. 
51 On Kant, see Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Kant’s Open Secret’, Theory, Culture & Society, 28: 7-
8 (2011), pp. 26–40; on Bentham see, Christopher Hood, ‘Transparency in Historical 
Perspective’, pp. 3-23 in Christopher Hood and David Heald, eds., Transparency: The Key to 
Better Governance? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); on Rousseau see, Jonathan 
Marks, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Michael Sandel and the Politics of Transparency’, The 
University of Chicago Press Journal, 33: 4 (2001), pp. 619-642; and on Foucault, Michel 
Foucault, ‘The Eye of Power’, in Colin Gordon, eds., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 
and Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980). 
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authority’.52 Nevertheless, she cautions that there is reason to believe that 
whilst organisations appear to be transparent outwardly, there continues to 
be potential for what David Pozen terms ‘deep secrecy’.53 Pozen borrows this 
term from Kim Lane Scheppele, who distinguishes between ‘shallow’ and 
‘deep’ secrets. In his analysis, the ‘secret-keeper’ is the individual concealing 
the information, from a person that he calls the ‘target’. A shallow secret 
describes information, which the target suspects exists but where they have 
no knowledge of the content. Alternatively, a deep secret is one where the 
target does not even suspect that the information exists.54 It is likely that 
states are making efforts to secure more deep secrecy in the wake of the 
Snowden revelations. 
 
Lawrence Lessig – a classic occupant of the middle ground - warns us against 
getting carried away by this apparent trend. Calling it the ‘naked transparency 
movement’, Lessig cautions that there is not enough critical thinking involved 
when considering the complexities of transparency and openness. Although, 
he concedes that many aspects of the movement can be considered to be 
positive, there is still room for doubt. In an age where there is little general 
understanding of the vastness and reach of technology, naked transparency 
should be approached with a large serving of caution.55 Fenster, belonging 
more to the conservative school, also warns against uncritical calls for 
transparency. He reasons that many transparency advocates expect the 
information that is kept from them is important. However, he states that to 
expect all secret information to have relevance or importance is to ignore the 
                                                        
52 Birchall, ‘Introduction to “Secrecy and Transparency”’, p. 9; also see Mark Schmitt, 
‘Transparency For What?’, The American Prospect, 29 January 2010, available at: 
https://prospect.org/article/transparency-what-0.  
53 Clare Birchall, ‘Introduction to “Secrecy and Transparency”’, p. 14 and Pozen, ‘Deep 
Secrecy’, p. 262. 
54 Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 12-16, 21-22, 75-79, 84-85. 
55 Lawrence Lessig, ‘Against Transparency: The Perils of Openness in Government’, The New 
Republic, 9 October 2009, available at: https://newrepublic.com/article/70097/against-
transparency. 
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complexity of meaning.56 This has been the experience of many British Prime 
Ministers who have looked for a deeper meaning in a document stamped 
‘Secret’ or even ‘Top Secret’.57 It follows from this examination that 
transparency should be considered more carefully and in consequentialist 
terms, rather than as a means to exert pressure onto governments without 
cause. The next section will explore the value of transparency when it serves 
to further accountability as the objective. 
 
 
Landscapes of Public Accountability and Oversight 
Transparency is intrinsically linked to functioning oversight and accountability 
in a democracy. Accountability has been defined by Mark Bovens as a formal 
relationship between a government actor and the forum, ‘in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can 
pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences’.58 
The latter observation about consequences is often neglected by other 
writers. Much like transparency, accountability has been conceptualised as 
both a normative or virtuous notion and a structural mechanism that has the 
capacity to improve.59 It follows that, ‘comprehensive accountability needs 
to consider effectiveness and efficiency, as well as lawfulness and 
propriety’.60 Oversight is commonly understood to be, ‘a means of ensuring 
public accountability for the decisions and actions of security and intelligence 
agencies’.61 It follows that the two concepts of oversight and accountability 
                                                        
56 Mark Fenster, ‘The Opacity of Transparency’, Iowa Law Review, 91: 885 (2006), pp. 924-
925. 
57 Richard Aldrich and Rory Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British 
Prime Ministers (London: William Collins, 2016). 
58 Mark Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’, 
European Law Journal, 13: 4 (2007), p. 467. 
59 Mark Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a 
Mechanism’, West European Politics, 33: 5 (2010), pp. 946–967; Fenster, ‘The Opacity of 
Transparency’, pp. 924-25. 
60 Aldrich and Richterova, ‘Ambient Accountability’, p. 1007.  
61 Ian Leigh, ‘More Closely Watching the Spies: Three Decades of Experiences’, in Hans 
Born, Ian Leigh, Loch K. Johnson, eds., Who’s Watching the Spies?: Establishing Intelligence 
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should work in tandem rather than on independent tracks. It is worth 
observing that accountability and oversight are words that are often used 
interchangeably, and this is not helped by Transatlantic misunderstanding - 
since accountability is more often used in Europe and oversight is 
commonplace in North America – and perhaps reflects a greater reliance on 
law, including secret law.62 
 
The common concerns regarding intelligence oversight contain the following: 
‘the need to establish mechanisms to prevent political abuse while providing 
for effective governance of the agencies; upholding the rule of law; and 
ensuring the proportionate use of exceptional powers in order to protect civil 
rights’.63 Leigh warns that there are dangers with all three. The first, rests on 
the agencies retaining a certain amount of autonomy, being protected from 
political abuse, whilst still remaining accountable. If executive control is not 
strong enough, intelligence agencies would be too independent and left to 
indulge in self-regulation, which Leigh deems unwise. Furthermore, without 
executive control, public accountability would be unattainable. At the other 
end of the spectrum is excessive executive control, which would risk 
exploitation of special capabilities and politicisation of the agencies. Leigh 
holds that legislation is key, to ensuring the precarious balance is kept.64 
Furthermore, he emphasises that appropriate whistleblowing channels are 
imperative.  
 
                                                        
Service Accountability (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), p. 7; There are some 
differences in how oversight and accountability are defined. For example see, Amy Zegart, 
Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United States Intelligence Community (Stanford, California: 
Hoover Institution Press/ Stanford University, 2001). 
62 See especially Goldsmith, Power and Constraint. 
63 Leigh, ‘More Closely Watching the Spies’, p. 5. 
64 Leigh, ‘More Closely Watching the Spies’, pp. 5-6; See also Dawn Oliver, Government in 
the United Kingdom: the search for accountability, effectiveness and citizenship 
(Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1991), p. 22. (In this article Oliver defines 
accountability as, ‘being liable to be required to give an account or explanation of actions 
and where appropriate, to suffer the consequences, take the blame or undertake to put 
matters right, if it should appear that errors have been made’). 
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The second danger addresses the propensity of intelligence activities to 
operate outside of the law. Robust legislation is fundamental here, states 
Leigh, as it affords both legitimacy and limitations to agency activities. (Yet 
we have to accept that intelligence agencies are often legislated in such a way 
to give them legal permission to break the law in other jurisdictions, a 
fundamental contradiction). The third danger is proportionality of the special 
methods (such as surveillance tools) intelligence agencies are often 
permitted to use in the name of national security. Leigh advises aside from 
legal safeguards, close managerial control should be exercised at all times 
and the use of less intrusive measures should be favoured whenever 
possible.65  Overall, Leigh tends to focus on civil rights and largely ignores 
another realm of accountability/oversight, the duty of these mechanisms to 
ensure the efficiency/effectiveness of intelligence or to address waste. This 
in turn begs questions about a conflict of interest for political accountability 
bodies – or at least purpose. 
 
Born and Wetzling identify five ‘layers’ of accountability, which start at the 
centre of the agency. In this central layer, they include employee training and 
whistleblowers. Their inclusion of whistleblowers here by these two 
respected authors, demonstrates their acknowledgment that whistleblowers 
perform a valuable role. This thesis sets out to expand on this perception, 
holding that insiders perform a key role in our understanding of intelligence, 
as well as acting as a form of control in the case of agency misconduct. 
Further layers include (moving outwards from the centre), measures 
enforced by the executive, including instructions and equipment provided to 
the agency. The third layer includes committees and legislative oversight, 
whilst the fourth layer comprises the judiciary. The fifth and final layer 
consists of any outside forces that work independently to unearth 
wrongdoing or with insider-sources such as whistleblowers.66 
                                                        
65 Leigh, ‘More Closely Watching the Spies’, pp. 5-6. 
66 Born and Wetzling, ‘Intelligence accountability’, p. 317. 
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Considering themselves the ‘fourth-estate’ the media has consistently been 
a mouthpiece for less vocal ‘off-the-record’ sources, such as whistleblowers 
and leakers.67 Journalistic roles have expanded to become a part of the 
evolving system of accountability and oversight.68 Whistleblowers and 
leakers, joined by campaign groups, activist lawyers and government 
watchers have taken advantage of increasingly vulnerable electronic 
government databases when working with journalists, practicing what has 
been termed ‘oversight from below’.69 The growing literature analysing this 
reflects the momentum of the movement and its relevance. This has led to a 
discussion centring on what some call ‘regulation by revelation’,70 probing 
the actual significance and impact of leaks such as those by Edward Snowden 
or Chelsea Manning. Since the release of the Manning Iraq War logs in 2010, 
followed shortly by the Snowden revelations in June 2013, civil liberty 
campaigners and human rights organisations have become increasingly more 
engaged in the discussion on issues of oversight and accountability, also 
bringing it to the forefront of the academic literature.71 Some contend that 
these sorts of periodic ‘exposures’ are of limited value, since they are uneven 
and episodic. Others contend that nevertheless, fear of future exposure on 
the part of those in government who may be contemplating doing wrong is 
much increased through a broad deterrent effect. It may be many years 
before we can cast up an assessment of whether regulation by revelation had 
a significant impact. 
 
 
                                                        
67 Johnson, ‘Harry Howe Ransom and American Intelligence Studies’, pp. 402-28. 
68 Claudia Hillebrand, ‘The Role of News Media’, pp. 689-706. 
69 See Jelle van Buuren, ‘From Oversight to Undersight: The Internationalization of 
Intelligence Oversight’, Security and Human Rights, 24:3-4 (2014), pp. 239-252; Hillebrand, 
‘Intelligence Oversight and Accountability’, in Dover, Goodman and Hillebrand, eds., 
Routledge Companion, pp. 305-312. 
70 Aldrich, ‘Regulation by Revelation?’. 
71 See Mark Phythian, ‘The British experience with intelligence accountability’, Intelligence 
and National Security, 22: 1 (2007), pp. 75-99; Gill, Intelligence Governance and 
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Morality, Ethics and the Human Condition 
‘Alarms, like ripples in the water, weaken as they move away from their 
point of origin; if forced to go below the surface, they may be further 
attenuated’.72 
 
As the above quote from Sissela Bok suggests, the decision of an insider to 
disclose classified information can disturb the status quo in different ways, 
like a stone when it is thrown into water. As this thesis aims to demonstrate, 
every case has its own unique trajectory. Although on the whole, any initial 
disruption to an organisation and any debate that follows in the public 
domain tends to lessen over time. However, the impact that is caused to the 
insider who has raised the alarm can often be substantially more extensive 
and prolonged. The cases examined in this thesis illustrate that reprisals such 
as redundancy, criminal charges or exile are all possible consequences that 
could be suffered and entail a prolonged effect.  
 
Therefore, one of the central elements of this chapter is to examine the 
existing discourse on the humanistic element, the morals and ethics that 
surround the contentious topic of whistleblowers and their treatment. Bok’s 
analysis of whistleblowers and leakers was published in 1982, at a time when 
whistleblowers of the US intelligence community where omitted from any 
protection afforded by the law.73 Nevertheless, Bok, a philosopher and 
ethicist, continues to be influential in the literature with her comprehensive 
consideration of the moral issues surrounding whistleblowing and leaks. This 
section will be guided by Bok’s observations on whistleblowers, which 
suggest that she is aligned with the middle school of thought. I will explore 
the main themes around whistleblowers that Bok outlined, whilst evaluating 
and expanding on these thoughts in conjunction with other literature. The 
                                                        
72 Bok, Secrets. 
73 Ibid. 
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elements that will be considered are the integral moral choice that the 
whistleblower has to make or the ‘whistleblower dilemma’;74 the nature of 
whistleblowing or leaking information;75 and the provisions for potential 
whistleblowers within organisations.76 
 
Firstly, it is important to note that Bok does distinguish between the actions 
of leaking and whistleblowing. According to Bok, leaking reveals information 
that is secret or unnoticed, but insists that it does not have to concern a 
wrongdoing. Thus, it is the obligatory element of exposing wrongdoing that 
distinguishes a whistleblower from a leaker. Furthermore, Bok states that, 
‘when a leak from within does concern misconduct, it is a variant of 
whistleblowing undertaken surreptitiously because the revealer [sic] cannot 
or does not want to be known as its source’.77 This suggests that Bok views 
the act of whistleblowing to be on a spectrum, with internal reporting 
channels on one end (internal-whistleblowing) and a public disclosure of 
information to the press on the other end (public-whistleblowing). Both are 
considered to be justifiable as acts of whistleblowing. Thus, Bok’s analysis 
consistently tackles the tension felt by the insider who is torn between 
following internal channels and publicly disclosing what they know.78  
 
Bok also distinguishes whistleblowing from the act of dissenting and civil 
disobedience in three major ways, (1) whistleblowing has a narrower aim - 
casting light on negligence and abuse, (2) whistleblowing potentially alerts 
the public to a risk, (3) whistleblowing assigns specific responsibility for the 
                                                        
74 Adam Waytz, James Dungan and Liane Young, ‘The whistleblower’s dilemma and the 
fairness-loyalty tradeoff’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49: 6 (2013), pp. 1027-
1033.  
75 Pozen, ‘The Leaky Leviathan’, pp. 512-633. 
76 Thomas Devine and Donald Aplin, ‘Whistleblower Protection – The Gap Between the Law 
and Reality’, Howard Law Journal, 31: 2 (1988), pp. 223-240; Marisa Taylor, ‘Intelligence, 
Defense Whistleblowers Remain Mired in Broken System’, McClatchy Washington Bureau, 
30 December 2014, available at: https://www.pulitzer.org/files/2015/national-
reporting/mcclatchy/10mcclatchy2015.pdf. 
77 Bok, Secrets, p. 217. 
78 Ibid. p. 216. 
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abuse they reveal. In the same vein, Bok links the exposure of misconduct 
and the act of assigning blame solely with the act of whistleblowing. Whereas, 
by contrast, she considers that dissent is the request for a change in policy 
without assigning blame.79 Nevertheless, Bok holds that the two can 
converge in practice – a whistleblower can seek to expose wrongdoing, 
thereby also petitioning a change in policy and assigning blame.80  
 
The Whistleblower’s Dilemma 
The intelligence profession is one shrouded in secrecy and often involves 
ethically questionable conduct.81 Bellaby has explored what he calls the 
contradictory nature of intelligence, which means that the innate 
characteristic of spying can be considered to be unethical.82 Spying also 
involves double secrecy, since the stealing of secrets is rarely effective unless 
the secrets are appropriated in a clandestine manner, without the knowledge 
of the target. This generates intense secrecy and as a result, even with 
developed formal oversight mechanisms, ensuring transparent and effective 
intelligence oversight is practically unachievable. Therefore, it is particularly 
tricky to distinguish between necessary and unnecessary activities in the 
business of intelligence.83 Most secret services develop a culture of secrecy 
and so the issue of overclassification is widely remarked upon amongst 
intelligence practitioners.84  
                                                        
79 Ibid. p. 214. 
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The whistleblower is naturally mistrusted, as his ultimate objective is not only 
to effect change and to impact the status quo, but also to expose wrongdoers 
and assign blame to individuals who could potentially face retribution. This 
potential creates uncertainty within the organisation and amongst the 
whistleblower’s colleagues if they are involved in the wrongdoing. Often this 
results in the whistleblower facing furtive and unwarranted reprisal as a 
result of their perceived breach of loyalty.85 Moran notes that the problem 
with being a whistleblower, is that ‘when a person breaks agreement 
(secrecy) he is rejecting not just a job, but an entire belief system’.86 This is 
especially true in the intelligence community, as the element of secrecy plays 
an important factor in the identity of the organisation.  
 
According to Bok, there are three main concerns when an insider considers 
becoming a whistleblower. They will consider where their loyalties lie, the 
state of their own conscience and lastly, how candid they should be about 
the extent of the wrongdoing.87 I will refer to these considerations collectively 
as the ‘whistleblower’s dilemma’. At the core of the whistleblower’s dilemma 
is the consideration that an individual is morally obliged, to help or attempt 
to lend assistance when another’s welfare is threatened.88 Bellaby reasons 
that in the intelligence community the responsibility to take action is greater 
than in other situations, as the purpose of intelligence agencies is to ensure 
the safeguarding of society. Therefore, he reasons that if the intelligence 
community fails in this primary role, it loses the justification to continue with 
its practice. Furthermore, Bellaby states that due to this special situation 
arising in the intelligence community, strict limitations have to be placed on 
                                                        
56: 4 (2004), pp. 1195–1222; Erwin Griswold, ‘Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and 
Classified Information’, The Washington Post, 15 February 1989, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1989/02/15/secrets-not-worth-
keeping/a115a154-4c6f-41fd-816a-112dd9908115/?utm_term=.57368a8f7949. 
85 Bok, Secrets, pp. 213-214. 
86 Moran, ‘Turning Against the CIA’, p. 253. 
87 Bok, Secrets, p. 211. 
88 John Kleining, ‘Good Samaritanism’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 5: 4 (1976), p. 385. 
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whistleblowers to only act when the misconduct can be directly linked to ‘the 
source of the harm’.89  
 
The Nature of Whistleblowing 
Bok examines three elements to the act of whistleblowing that are entwined 
with the whistleblower’s dilemma, ‘dissent, breach of loyalty and 
accusation’.90 The act of dissenting, according to Bok, requires knowledge of 
accuracy and judgement about the relevance of the alleged misconduct. The 
two requirements to be fulfilled for dissent to be justified are that there is 
evidence of misconduct and that the misconduct is relevant to the public, in 
that it could be potentially harmful.91 Therefore, Bok cautions that if a 
wrongdoing is hard to determine, action could be premature. Furthermore, 
Bok warns, ‘suspicion is not knowledge’.92 In other words, it does not suffice 
for an insider to have a mere feeling or inkling that misconduct is taking place.  
 
The problem of loyalties is inherently linked to any oath or code of ethics that 
the insider agreed to when they commenced their employment with the 
organisation. Bok holds that the insider has to consider several factors at this 
juncture, the contractual obligation they have to their employer, their ethical 
loyalties to colleagues and a potential obligation to the general public.93 In a 
democracy, the power and thereby responsibility a state holds are a part of 
                                                        
89 Ross Bellaby, ‘The Ethics of Whistleblowing’, p. 66; see also Bok, Secrets, pp. 210-29. 
90 Bok, Secrets, p. 214. 
91 Ibid. p. 219. 
92 Ibid. p. 220. 
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the role for which they have been elected by its citizens.94 Therefore, Bellaby 
argues that the intelligence community ‘is responsible as both the legitimate 
authority to carry out harmful activities on their [the public] behalf and to 
them as the ethical end’. The insider also benefits from ‘knowledge authority’ 
that often eludes any outside body of oversight.95  
 
The element of accusation relates to the condition of the problem itself. That 
is, whether or not the issue has been considered internally and subsequently 
dismissed, despite sufficient evidence for action or whether those at the 
upper end of the hierarchy within the organisation are a part of the problem. 
Frustration and a lack of feedback from the internal system regarding the 
initial complaint – or perhaps other issues related to their employment – can 
cloud the judgement of the insider.96 At this stage, it is important that the 
individual asks themselves if the wrongdoing is truly an issue that concerns 
the public or even whether this matter constitutes private information.97 Bok 
clarifies this by arguing that whistleblowing has to be considered as a last 
alternative due to its potential to be damaging. She indicates that a disparity 
can exist when an insider is justified to raise concerns, but unjustified as to 
the manner in which they raised the concern.98 A genuine whistleblower is 
required to exhaust all internal channels before they consider leaking any 
information to the press and should take action that is proportional to the 
means.99 Exactly how these things are to be measured adds a further layer of 
difficulty. 
 
Bellaby considers that a proportionality calculation should help determine 
whether ‘the harm caused creates an obligation or merely a right to 
                                                        
94 Richard Norman, Ethics Killing and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
p. 118. 
95 Bellaby, ‘The Ethics of Whistleblowing’, p. 67.  
96 Zaid, Personal Interview. 
97 Bok, Secrets, pp. 222-223. 
98 Ibid. p. 221. 
99 Ibid. p. 221. 
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whistleblowing’. This calculation takes into consideration the insider 
themselves, as well as the harm that is being done. Bellaby states that one 
factor affecting the level of responsibility is the insider’s position within the 
agency’s hierarchy. The more senior the position, the greater the 
responsibility to act.100 Bellaby recognises the enormous potential for 
backlash in the case of intelligence community whistleblowers.101 Therefore, 
he holds that if the potential for reprisal to the insider is significant, the 
obligation to act is diminished.102 In the same vein, Bok adds that there are 
only two acceptable exceptions to having a duty to act in a proportional way, 
either through inaction or bypassing internal channels. The first is when there 
is an imminent threat that does not allow for the insider to follow the 
prescribed path and the second is when an institution is corrupt.103  
 
As there is a symbiotic relationship between secrecy and leaks, Bok warns 
against taking disproportionate measures.104 When considering the nature of 
a potential leak, Bok emphasises the choice between an anonymous-leak and 
a named-leak. An open accusation, Bok states, is preferable for two reasons. 
Firstly, an anonymous accusation is harder to defend, both from the 
accused’s and the accuser’s perspective. It prevents the potential for 
communication and resolution. Secondly, an anonymous leak is less likely to 
be considered as legitimate. As the information may pass through several 
filters of journalists and possibly lawyers, it is unlikely that the intended 
message will remain the same.105 Bok suggests that there could be a 
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compromise, whereby the insider reveals themselves to a journalist, but is 
not named publicly in order to protect themselves.106  
 
The Organisation 
Whistleblower issues are universal and affect every society. It follows, that 
any society that fails to protect whistleblowers from speaking out, regardless 
of their reasons, invites abuses of power and places an undue moral burden 
onto its insiders.107 This view is shared by Simmel who holds that secret 
societies tend to give the impression that they are hiding dangerous secrets 
even if they are not. Furthermore, he cautions that there is no guarantee that 
the secret society will not, ‘turn its legally accumulated powers to some 
undesired end’.108 Bok takes this further, suggesting that there is 
fundamental conflict between the duty that an insider has to raise the alarm 
and the obligation they have to remain loyal to the organisation. 
Furthermore, she gives consideration to self-preservation in an organisation 
where a whistleblower may be unfairly targeted after speaking out.109  
 
 
The Story of the Insider: ‘Publish and be Damned’110 
The limited literature that considers cases of whistleblowing or leaking will be 
utilised within the coming chapters and their arguments reconsidered. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note their importance and variety at this 
juncture. It is mostly through these writings, in combination with press 
articles that the general public are informed about the stories of insiders. 
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Therefore, it is important to understand their relevance and how they 
contribute to the deeper understanding of the impact of whistleblowers.  
 
Autobiographies 
Every story of an insider turned whistleblower or leaker is distinctive and 
often compelling. Most insider-whistleblower stories, particularly within the 
intelligence community, are not ones that the public are ever privy to. They 
are reported and resolved confidentially, behind the closed doors of the 
relevant agency.111 Nevertheless, there are those insiders who do not feel 
that they are (or would be) fairly treated by the inside channels of their 
agency.112 Therefore, they seek support from outside the obstructive agency 
reporting channels. Usually, this is achieved by communication with the press 
using a journalist as a filter.113 Other avenues include using web-based 
organisations, such as WikiLeaks as a less filtered or unmediated output, as 
in the case of Chelsea Manning. A third form of a public disclosure is that of 
writing an autobiographical book. There are three types of autobiographies 
by whistleblowers, the first is one that represents a leak itself,114 and the 
second usually constitutes an account of their experience of leaking 
information.115 A third category, more unusually, lightly fictionalises the story 
in an attempt to evade retribution.  
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The US has seen a fair number of publications by former intelligence 
community employees. The CIA proverb, ‘the secret of our success is the 
secret of our success’ perfectly encapsulates the intelligence community’s 
attitude towards unsolicited publications.116 Although it has become a much-
practiced and very lucrative activity for former intelligence professional to 
pen their memoirs today, this was not always the case.117 One of the earliest 
examples of spy memoirs is the story of Herbert Yardley, who began writing 
his memoirs in 1930 out of a desperate need to earn a living after the 
secretive cryptologic bureau, known as the ‘American Black Chamber’, which 
he had headed since 1919 was shut down.118  
 
Moran holds that the story of Yardley is particularly significant when 
considering intelligence community memoirs for five reasons. First, Moran 
states that Yardley’s experience of radio interviews and other public 
appearances as a result of the book’s success demonstrates the appeal of spy 
memoirs and that money can motivate the individual to publish. Second, 
Yardley’s book became a global bestseller, indicating a market for spy 
memoirs and encouraging others. Third, The American Black Chamber 
established many of the key properties that make spy memoirs so attractive. 
These included, following a ‘quasi-historical narrative’, an easy to follow 
chronological retelling with a gripping storyline. Fourth, there was enormous 
concern that the details contained within the pages of the book had harmed 
national security, by alerting the enemy to tactics and capabilities. Fifth, 
Moran speculates that this book could have triggered the ongoing adverse 
                                                        
116 Moran, Company Confessions, p. 4.  
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attitude that the services have since harboured towards any insider account. 
Yardley himself was snubbed and mistrusted by the services.119  
 
The year of 1975 represented a year of fundamental change for the 
intelligence community. Because of multiple intelligence inquiries, increasing 
public accounts of CIA blunders were in the news all too often. Additionally, 
former intelligence officers took to writing about their often-scandalous 
experiences in the services. Three such accounts should be highlighted at this 
stage. Those of Victor Marchetti, Philip Agee and Frank Snepp. The cases are 
intrinsically linked as the experiences of the former two would trigger the 
creation of the CIAs Publication Review Board (PRB) that would represent a 
personal catastrophe for Frank Snepp.120 Marchetti wrote The CIA and the 
Cult of Intelligence, which was published in 1974.121 This was not the first 
book Marchetti published. After leaving the CIA in 1969, Marchetti published 
a book marketed as a fictional spy novel, vetted and approved by the CIA prior 
to publication.122 Nevertheless, for those who knew and had worked with 
Marchetti the parallels between the book and his own career were hard to 
deny.123  
 
The most remarkable and controversial accounts of espionage are often 
memoirs. Perhaps for this reason, they often succeed in stirring the biggest 
hornets’ nest when deciding to publish. The 1980s saw a number of 
autobiographies in the spotlight, much to the dismay of the respective 
governments. Most famously, in 1987, Peter Wright a former Assistant 
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Director of the UK Security Service (MI5), attempted to publish an account of 
his career in the secret services.124 Additionally, he used the publication to air 
some of the grievances he had with his former employer, including pension 
issues. Towards the end of his time in MI5 (he left in 1976) he had become 
ostracised from his colleagues, predominantly due to his insistence that 
British intelligence had been infiltrated by Soviet agents.125 The book also 
contained accounts of operations where the agencies clearly stepping 
outside the boundaries of the law. Wright exposed details of the competitive 
relationship and enmity between the British intelligence agencies MI5 and 
the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). Consequently Wright, who was hiding 
out in Australia, stood accused of breaching the Official Secrets Act. Although 
eventually free to be published globally, the UK government originally 
attempted to thwart any attempt to publish the autobiography by means of 
an interlocutory injunction.126 Whitehall officials were furious. Christopher 
Andrew’s research into this episode depicts the alleged damage that was 
done to the reputation of the security services as a result of the Spycatcher 
affair.127 
 
Biographers, Historians and Journalists 
Insiders, whether whistleblowers or leakers, often work closely with 
journalists. Therefore, texts by members of the press also play a big part in 
the overall narrative of whistleblowers and leakers. 128  A number of eminent 
                                                        
124 Peter Wright, Spycatcher (Richmond, Victoria: Heineman Publishers Australia, 1987). 
125 Moran, Classified, pp. 333-334. 
126 See Attorney General v Observer Ltd (1990) 1 AC 109; Attorney General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (1988) UKHL 6 (No 2), for full judgements; an interlocutory injunction 
refers to a court order to provisionally prevent a particular action whilst a case is in court, 
on this occasion to prevent the publication of the book.  
127 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London, 
New York: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 563-564. 
128 Tom Wells, Wild Man: The Life and Times of Daniel Ellsberg (New York: Palgrave, 2001); 
Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance 
State (London: Penguin, 2014); Luke Harding and David Leigh, WikiLeaks: Inside Julian 
Assange’s War on Secrecy (London: Guardian Books, 2013); Harding, The Snowden Files. 
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investigative journalists published in the 1980s, exploring the revelations of 
the mysterious world of intelligence from an entirely different perspective.  
 
Both Chapman Pincher and David Leigh produced texts examining the secrecy 
of the state at this time. Their sources included Peter Wright, who was 
arguably a leaker before becoming a whistleblower. David Leigh published 
The Frontiers of Secrecy in 1980 and Pincher followed with Their Trade is 
Treachery in 1981 and Too Secret Too Long in 1984.129 The journalist forms a 
part of the institution of the media or the fourth estate.130 Not unlike the 
whistleblower, the investigative journalist attempts to expose the 
wrongdoings of the state and act as a government watchdog and this drives 
collaboration between journalists and whistleblowers or leakers.131 Rather 
than an observer or political analyst, David Leigh writes as a challenger of the 
secret state. He uses the witty term ‘secrecy-mongers’ and is especially 
outspoken and cynical on the topic of ostensible moves towards open 
governments. Addressing the declassification of certain records by the Public 
Records Office under the 30-year rule he states, ‘nothing of any serious 
content about MI6 was apparently released, but to admit its existence was a 
tiny step towards the real world’. Leigh concentrates his powers of 
investigation on the mechanisms of the state. Pincher, on the other hand, 
progressed into the sinister complicated world of the spy in order to bring 
some societal recognition to the value of intelligence. 
 
The case of Edward Snowden, a contractor to the US NSA, illustrated the 
relationship between journalist and leaker. Snowden illicitly appropriated an 
enormous collection of controversial documents (it is still unclear how much 
or what exactly was taken) on USB keys from the American intelligence 
                                                        
129 David Leigh, The Frontiers of Secrecy: Closed Government in Britain (Frederick, Maryland: 
Aletheia Books, 1980); Chapman Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery (London: Sidgwick and 
Jackson 1981); Chapman Pincher, Too Secret Too Long (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984).  
130 Julianne Schultz, Reviving the Fourth Estate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), p. 2. 
131 Bok, Secrets. 
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agency, which he proceeded to share with the journalist Glenn Greenwald 
and director/producer Laura Poitras. Subsequently, some of this information 
illustrating US mass surveillance programs was strategically and 
internationally published. Several books dedicated to analysing Edward 
Snowden’s actions have been written at what must constitute record rates. 
Early publications from media coverage and mostly journalistic literature 
alike saw two defining camps, those that hail Snowden as a hero132 and those 
that view him as a traitor who needed to be punished.133 More 
comprehensive and critical analysis has emerged since in academic literature 
and journalistic writing alike.134  
 
How-to Guides 
There are a number of Washington DC based lawyers who have compiled rich 
resources for the potential whistleblower. Stephen M. Kohn and Thomas 
Devine each specialise whistleblower protection law.135 Both are affiliated 
with organisations that guide potential and actual whistleblowers. Kohn is the 
partner in a law firm that represents and advises on whistleblower law, Kohn, 
Kohn & Colapinto LLP have been operating since 1988 and claim to be the 
US’s leading law firm on whistleblower protection.136 Alongside the 
handbook, written by Kohn, its website is also a detailed resource for 
potential whistleblowers.   
 
The volume is dense with legal jargon, but also educational with guidance on 
how to navigate the complicated legal terrain. Kohn sits in a liminal space 
                                                        
132 Harding, The Snowden Files; Greenwald, No Place to Hide. 
133 Edward Lucas, The Snowden Operation: Inside the West’s Greatest Intelligence Disaster 
(Kindle Edition, 2014).   
134 Epstein, How America Lost its Secrets; Phil Coleman, Edward Snowden: America's 
Whistleblower - Sinner or Saint? (London: 2017). 
135 Thomas Devine and Tarek F. Maassarani, The Corporate Whistleblower’s Survival Guide 
(San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2011); Kohn, The New Whistleblower’s 
Handbook.  
136 Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, ‘Our Firm’, no date, available at: https://www.kkc.com/who-
we-are/our-firm.  
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between the middle and radical schools. Predominantly, his handbook is 
instructional, but he also shares concerns about whistleblower law and the 
socially constructed perception of what a whistleblower is. Kohn notes that a 
genuine whistleblower often does not know that they are whistleblower, nor 
does he agree with the notion that a whistleblower intentionally sets out to 
become a whistleblower. His idea of a trajectory that is often unintentional 
and develops in unexpected ways is particularly useful.137  
 
The GAP was created in 1977, in response to prominent whistleblower cases 
like Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers. Devine has been a part of GAP 
since the late 1970s. The Survival Guide is a candid examination of the hurdles 
a whistleblower is likely to face in any industry. Whilst the book is primarily 
aimed at educating the potential whistleblower, with warnings about anti-
whistleblower tactics and how to counter them, it also includes a warning to 
‘corporate leaders’ that reads, ‘it is bad business to kill or silence the 
messenger. Rarely do whistleblowers want to break ranks with their 
employer or risk being exiled from the workplace. The overwhelming majority 
are motivated by loyalty to the company and professional pride in its positive 
role in society’.138 
 
It is clear from both these volumes that the path of a whistleblower is an 
uphill journey. Equally, the existence of such guides, that did not exist a 
decade ago, is reassuring. Due to their foundation in law, they lend an air of 





                                                        
137 Kohn, The New Whistleblower’s Handbook, pp. 193-194. 
138 Devine, The Corporate Whistleblower’s Survival Guide, pp. 6-7. 
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Conclusion 
The existing literature reviewed above illustrates the range of analysis 
achieved on whistleblowers, how it maps onto the three main schools, 
together with related concepts that explain the relationship between the 
state and the whistleblower, in intelligence studies and other disciplines to 
date. The subject is intrinsically interdisciplinary and calls for a combined 
structure-agency approach.  
 
It is important to appreciate the intrinsically intertwined relationship 
between the whistleblower concept and secret-keeping. It can be argued that 
without secrecy there would not be any whistleblowers. Lack of transparency 
is often used as justification for action, such as leaking information to the 
press. Therefore, the boundaries of the relationship between secrecy and 
transparency deserve greater theoretical investigation, well beyond what is 
possible here within the bounds of a largely empirical study. In a bewildering 
way, both transparency and secrecy are often claimed to ‘expand’. 
Meanwhile, there is often a failure to specify or consider the pragmatic 
qualities of transparency beyond the assertion that is it a self-evident good. 
Typically, the possibility of social dissonance that could stem from the 
revelation of a significant secret is an important consideration when 
deliberating state secrecy. The consequence of the unauthorised release of 
classified material has the potential to affect domestic and international 
relations. Although essential to the question of legitimacy, any credible socio-
political analysis has to reach far beyond the moral dilemma of the insider 
who is spilling a secret.  
 
The category of national security whistleblowers is defined by the element of 
releasing information that the intelligence community purportedly considers 
to be ‘necessarily secret’. In order to gain insight to official secrecy in the 
existing state structure, it is imperative to bear in mind the theoretical 
analysis of the features of secrecy. Bok demonstrates the inherent complexity 
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of the decision to become a whistleblower and arguably this is even more 
complex for someone working in national security where secrecy has a 
defining cultural quality. 139 
 
Furthermore, we are initially encouraged to consider the motivations behind 
the keeping of the secret, which improve our understanding of the nature of 
the secret. Therefore, when studying state secrecy, it is imperative to initially 
form a solid foundation of the legal and political instruments that govern 
secret keeping and oversight in the countries of interest. Thirdly, in order to 
achieve a greater understanding of challenges to official secrecy, we should 
determine the variations of challenges carefully. An analysis of 
whistleblowers or leakers, for example, should be approached differently in 
order to gain comprehensive knowledge of their motivations and actions. 
 
It is important to appreciate the relationship of secrecy to other concepts, so 
as to provide a pragmatic approach that can enter into dialogue with the 
empirical research that forms the core of this thesis. Therefore, I will examine 
the boundaries of the relationship between secrecy and transparency 
further. That is, whether or not transparency and secrecy are mutually 
exclusive. Transparency is often portrayed as the ideal design for a 
democratic government. In a whistleblower-leaker context this could mean 
unlimited public disclosures of classified information. This type of disclosure 
could harm an active intelligence operative or undermine the security of the 
country. Even outside the national security realm, unrestricted transparency 
raises serious issues of citizen privacy or of corporate and commercial 
confidentiality. 
 
Moreover, leakers and whistleblowers are prone to use the transparency 
movement as a blanket justification for their actions. They often fail to specify 
                                                        
139 Joseph Masco, ‘“Sensitive but Unclassified”: Secrecy and the Counterterrorist State,’ 
Public Culture, 22: 3 (2010), pp. 433-463. 
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or consider the realistic qualities of transparency. Furthermore, the 
possibility of social dissonance that could stem from the revelation of a major 
secret is a key issue when considering state secrecy. The consequence of the 
unauthorised release of classified material has the potential to affect 
international relations and global concord. Essential to the question of 
legitimacy, any credible socio-political analysis has to reach far beyond the 
moral dilemma of the ‘insider’, spilling the secret. The distinction Bok makes 
between whistleblowers and leakers also suggests that one may be 
considered to be more legitimate than the other, which in turn impacts on 
the social perception of their actions.  
 
My thesis is intrinsically positioned within the school of intelligence studies 
but benefits from an interdisciplinary approach. It is empirical in nature and, 
at its root, my chosen case studies will drive the direction of this thesis. 
However, I suggest that my project constitutes more than ‘old wine in new 
bottles’, by way of its contemporary focus. Although my case studies are not 
necessarily a comprehensive survey of the US story, they delineate the 
extremes of their respective group, one that is operating on a much larger 
scale than previously. This group have often enjoyed the protection and 
support of the mass media and this points the way forward to a growing and 
fruitful co-operation between intelligence studies and media studies in 
examining this area.  
 
Rather than another study of the secret state, my thesis proposes to analyse 
the trajectory that leads an insider to become a whistleblower. Why has the 
insider become a whistleblower? What path did they take and why? How 
have their relationships with lawyers and journalists affected their 
experience? Fundamentally, it presents an opportunity to analyse the 
potential impact that whistleblowers have not only on themselves, but also 
on the structure within which they operate.
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Chapter 2         
   Cold War Dissidents 
As Christopher Andrew has recently underlined, intelligence business has 
been operational for centuries.1 However, the official creation of what we 
often refer to as the western intelligence community, characterised by a 
number of complex entities, did not commence until the early Twentieth 
Century.2 From the very beginning, the Twentieth Century was marked by 
ideological unrest. World War One (WWI) was accompanied by the Russian 
revolution of 1917, triggering an undercover struggle between capitalist 
countries and the Comintern lasting much of the interwar period with its 
complex notions of subversion.3 Following World War Two (WWII, 1939 to 
1945), changes in the global landscape resulted in a new global bipolar power 
struggle which was not only military in nature, but extended to societies, 
culture and ways of life.4 After the test of a Soviet a-bomb in August 1949, 
the US and the USSR were locked in a nuclear and conventional stalemate, 
                                                        
1 Christopher Andrew, The Secret World: A History of Intelligence (London: Penguin, 2018). 
2 The clandestine creation of the British Intelligence Services commenced in 1906 with the 
creation of MI5 and MI6 as one service. GCHQ would not be formed as the Government 
Code and Cipher School until 1919. In the US, the FBI was the earliest to be formally 
recognised in 1896, with the CIA and NSA not following until 1947 and 1952 respecively. 
For prominent scholarly texts on these agencies see: Matthew Aid, The Secret Sentry: The 
Untold History of the National Security Agency (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010); Brent 
Durbin, The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Loch K. Johnson, America’s secret Power: The CIA in a 
Democratic Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Nigel West, MI5: British 
Security Service Operations 1909-1945 (London: Bodley Head, 1981); Andrew, The Defence 
of the Realm.; Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2011); Philip Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (Abingdon: 
Frank Cass, 2004); Aldrich, The Black Door; Richard Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of 
Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London: Harper Press, 2010); James Bamford, 
Body of Secrets: How America’s NSA and Britain’s GCHQ Eavesdrop on the World (London: 
Arrow, 2002); James Bamford, The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the 
Eavesdropping on America (New York: Doubleday, 2009).  
3 Andrew, The Secret World, p.12. 
4 G. John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2002). 
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transferring much of their Cold War fighting to the realms of espionage, 
subversion or proxy wars in the Global South.5  
 
The Cold War spanned just over four decades from 1947 to 1991. The doyen 
of Cold War historians, John Lewis Gaddis, called it ‘the long peace’ due to its 
largely ‘inactive’ nature on the surface.6 However, during this time the 
intelligence agencies, previously created and expanded predominantly for 
the purposes of active war, came into their own.7 Open warfare along the 
Inner German Border was always a possibility, but neither side desired it, and 
so it was covert action and clandestine operations, together with war 
warning, that ensured that this was a boom time for the business of 
intelligence.8 The East-West divide of Germany and other divided states, such 
as Korea and Vietnam, represented the wider fragmentation of the global 
bipolar power structure and it is no accident that these constituted espionage 
hot spots. 
 
The international atmosphere of ideological tension and informational 
aggression during almost half a century of Cold War perpetually re-shaped 
operational dynamics of the various intelligence communities.9 The post-war 
growth of intelligence was partly a by-product of the success of places like 
Bletchley Park, which had convinced the military of the value of big 
investment in this area. Therefore, one of the most important intelligence 
liaison relationships of English-speaking nations predominantly focused on 
                                                        
5 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our 
Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); John Diamond, The CIA and the 
Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq 
(Stanford, California: Stanford Security Series, 2008), p. 20. 
6 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). 
7 Federation of American Scientists, ‘The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community – An 
Historical Overview’, FAS, 23 February 1996, available at: 
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/int022.html.  
8 David Omand and Mark Phythian, Principled Spying: The Ethics of Secret Intelligence 
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018), pp. 92-94; Federation of American 
Scientists, ‘The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community’, 1996. 
9 Scott Lucas, Freedom's War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945-56 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999). 
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sharing SIGINT, known as the ‘five eyes agreement’. Originally, an ‘Anglo-
American’ allegiance formed against Germany and Japan during World War 
One. The formal agreement BRUSA created in 1945 was subsequently 
extended to include Canada, New Zealand and Australia.10 Although on a 
smaller scale, domestic operations in the realms of propaganda and counter-
intelligence continued to run parallel to these agreements on an allied 
basis.11 But there were differences between the allies, unlike their American 
counterparts, the British foreign intelligence agencies were not officially 
avowed until the latter half of the 20th Century.12 
 
WWII and the Cold War that followed marked a time of considerable 
development for the intelligence communities. In 1953, the defence budget 
climbed to an eye-watering, all-time high of $50 billion. It fell to $49 billion in 
1954 and $45 billion in 1955.13 This development was the result of several 
factors, one of which, according to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
(1953-1959), was the increased efficiency of acquiring and sharing security.14 
Whilst the budget had been decreasing, the percentage of spending on 
intelligence had been steadily increasing since the Korean War from 1950 to 
1953.15 By 1963, GCHQ was spending more than its superintending 
organisation, the Foreign Office.16 This underlined a further development of 
some importance. Intelligence was not necessarily considered a main priority 
in peace times, but because the Cold War represented a liminal period of 
‘twilight war’ the secret services remained large and continued to grow. 
Former DCI (1991-1993) and US Secretary of Defense (2006-2011) Robert 
                                                        
10 John Cary Sims, ‘The BRUSA Agreement of May 17, 1943,’ Cryptologia, 21:1 (1997), 
pp.30-38; Martin Rudner, ‘Hunter Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic 
Terrorism’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 17: 2 (2004), pp. 
193-230. 
11 Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (London: 
Routledge, 2012). 
12 By contrast, the 1963 Denning Report into Profumo repeated referenced MI5. 
13 John Foster Dulles, ‘Policy for Security and Peace’, Foreign Affairs, 32: 2 (1954), pp. 353-
364. 
14 Dulles, ‘Policy for Security and Peace’, p. 362. 
15 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2015, p. 25. 
16 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p. 521; Aldrich, GCHQ, pp. 210-22.  
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Gates estimated that during the Cold War around 50 percent of the 
intelligence budget was allocated to counterintelligence towards the Soviet 
Union.17  
 
Remembered as the CIA’s ‘time of troubles’, the late 1960s and the early 
1970s was a perilous period for the Intelligence Community.18 The full range 
of CIA activities had been opened to harsh public scrutiny by the shoot-down 
of the Gary Powers U-2 flight in May 1960 and the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. 
These twin events signalled the end of a convention whereby journalists had 
frequently exercised a degree of self-censorship on national security matters. 
However, the CIA’s real problems arose with the revelations that began to 
expose the CIA initiative on covert cultural programs in the late 1960s, which 
included a degree of domestic interference by foreign intelligence agencies. 
The CIA funding of the US National Students Association struck many as a 
dubious incursion into a sensitive sphere and was widely considered illegal.19 
These specific flaps were accompanied by large-scale political change driven 
by the Vietnam War, Watergate and the oil crisis. 
 
Resources were not a major problem for the secret services during the Cold 
War; however, they were significantly troubled politically and legally by a 
breakdown in the ideological consensus during the late 1960s and early 
1970s. The culture of secrecy expanded considerably in a bid to outwit the 
Soviet enemy. The CIA and NSA joined forces on covert operations in 
Eastern Europe. By 1966, the program had grown to include other areas of 
interest such as, South America, Africa and Southeast Asia.20 The 
international program consisted of a number of front organisations that the 
CIA had constructed to rival those founded by the Soviet Union. The 
organisations would, on the surface, act like any other, but concealed CIA 
                                                        
17 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2015, p. 349. 
18 Moran, ‘Turning Against the CIA’, p. 251. 
19 Karen Paget, Patriotic Betrayal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015). 
20 Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA played America (Cambridge, 
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clandestine recruitment and training. Their ultimate task was to 
surreptitiously effect influence over society of an anti-communist 
propaganda, more in line with the American ways.21  
 
Around this time, the CIA had also been tipped off about a magazine called 
Ramparts, which had been digging into its covert activities.22 In the final 
report of the Church Committee, it was revealed that Richard Helms23 
established domestic surveillance processes in order to gather information 
on foreign influence on Americans. These operations included maintaining 
watch lists and monitoring mail.24 It was also revealed that he appointed an 
investigator to gather information on the individuals involved with 
Ramparts and its agenda.25 An article in the New York Times in February 
1967 would expose the CIA’s clandestine activities. The article also included 
an advert for Rampart and an official NSA statement on the matter.26 
 
Republican President Richard Nixon took up his position in the White House 
in January 1969. He would remain there until 1974 before he was forced to 
resign in disgrace. His term in office witnessed incredible developments and 
a dramatic shift in the culture within the intelligence community that 
embraced significant self-doubt. With the benefit of hindsight, it was perhaps 
predictable that Nixon’s administration was going to be scandalous. It has 
been noted that Nixon was not only conspiratorially inclined but was also 
                                                        
21 Francis Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: 
Granta Books, 2000), pp. 1-3. 
22 Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?, 2000, p. 381. 
23 Richard Helms was Deputy Director of Intelligence for Plans from 1962 to 1965, at the 
time that he originally set up the domestic surveillance operations. Subsequently, Helms 
was DDCI from 1965 to 1966 and DCI from 1966 to 1973. 
24 Frederick A. O. Schwarz Jr., ‘The Church Committee and a New Era of Intelligence 
Oversight’, Intelligence and National Security, 22: 2 (2007), pp. 281-282. 
25 Church Committee Report, ‘Book II: Intelligence Activites and the Rights of Americans’, 
US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 26 April 1976, pp. 94, 100. 
209, available at: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_II.pdf.  
26 Juan De Onis, ‘Ramparts Says C.I.A. Received Student Report: Magazine Declares Agency 
Turned Group It Financed Into an ‘Arm of Policy’, The New York Times, 16 February 1967. 
 - 107 - Dobson 
predisposed to speculate on conspiracy theories involving his opponents.27 
Nixon’s relationship with the CIA was continuously troubled due to his 
suspicions that there had been some CIA involvement in his loss of the 1960s 
presidential election to John F. Kennedy.28 Nixon’s relationship with the 
intelligence agencies did not improve. As a result, Nixon predominantly relied 
on Henry Kissinger, his National Security Advisor, for guidance on intelligence 
and security matters rather than leaders of the intelligence community. DCI 
Richard Helms (1966 – 1973) said of the pairing that when it came to US 
foreign policy he believed ‘Nixon was the architect and Kissinger the 
construction manager’. Meanwhile, Helms had grown to distrust Nixon 
personally.29 
 
On 17 June 1972, five individuals broke into the Watergate office complex to 
access the offices of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters. 
Unfortunately for them, they were caught red handed. This became known 
as the ‘Watergate affair’. The five individuals were linked to the Nixon 
administration, eventually resulting in the forced presidential resignation of 
Nixon. Watergate, celebrated on in celluloid by All the President Men in 1976, 
ensured that this decade was the heyday of the intrepid investigative 
journalist and the media watchdog. This period saw many changes in foreign 
policy and regulation governing the intelligence community. It also saw an 
unusual volume of reports and inquiries as a result of rumours about the 
intelligence community surfacing in the media. Investigative journalists were 
widely celebrated and, competing against each other, constantly threatened 
the exposure of new scandals. 
 
In 1973, following the public revelation of the Watergate scandal, CIA director 
James R. Schlesinger set in motion the collection of information that would 
                                                        
27 Christopher Andrew, For the Presidents Eyes Only (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 
350. 
28 Andrew, For the Presidents Eyes Only, pp. 351-2. 
29 Ibid. p. 351. 
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later be known as the ‘CIA’s family jewels’.30 The order, circulated amongst 
all CIA staff, read:  
‘The purpose of this memorandum is to forward for your personal review 
summaries of activities conducted either by or under the sponsorship of the 
Office of Security in the past, which in my opinion conflict with the provisions 
of the National Security Act of 1947’.  
 
The request was for any information pertaining to illegality between 1959 
and 1973. Although quickly leaked, the complete set of documents, with 
some significant redactions, would not be officially released until 2007. A 
culmination of events and articles released during this time, in addition to the 
Watergate scandal triggered three separate enquiries. One presidential 
inquiry, initiated by President Ford was led by the Vice-President Nelson 
Rockefeller, and two congressional committees that were chaired by Frank 
Church in the Senate and Otis Pike in the House of Representatives.31 
 
The Church committee inquiry commenced in January 1975 and would 
address concerns that had been raised in the media. Senator Frank Church 
led an inquiry into some of the most questionable activities and operations 
of the intelligence community. In 1976, the committee report was published. 
The hearings revealed amongst other things, NSA and CIA domestic 
surveillance activities and CIA involvement in the anti-communist covert 
action programs.32 The inquiries also confirmed allegations of the CIA funding 
anti-communist movements and CIA involvement in plots of coups and 
assassinations, furthering a non-communist agenda throughout Latin 
America and Europe.33 Senator Church concluded that no fault for the 
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33 Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?, 2000, pp. 389-390. 
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overstepping of their mandate could be attributed to any particular 
leadership of the intelligence services or presidential administration. It held 
that the processes had become endemic to the culture of the agency.34 His 
report comprised 96 legislative and regulatory recommendations, which 
together represented a watershed. These recommendations represented the 
diligent and methodical work that the committee had carried out, for which 
it was highly respected. Increased intelligence oversight was at the top of the 
list of changes to be implemented.35  
 
Similarly, The Pike committee was tasked with the investigation of illegal 
activities by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CIA and NSA. Files held 
by the National Security Archive demonstrate the difficulties the committee 
experienced in cooperating with the CIA.36 The relationship between the 
investigators and the agencies were troubled and this led to hostility and a 
reluctance to reveal all its secrets. The eventual outcome of this committee 
was made public in 1977. The recommendations were two-fold; (1) the 
committee established a permanent mechanism for the declassification of 
documents, (2) much like the Church committee, a recommendation was 
made for improved intelligence oversight.37  
 
These controversial committees of inquiry had an unexpected additional 
effect. Employees within the intelligence and security agencies began to 
realise that their managers were not infallible and that they also had a voice. 
This chapter analyses this development by exploring the stories of two very 
                                                        
34 Church Committee (full text), ‘Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities’, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
1975-1976, available at: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources/intelligence-
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35 Church Committee, ‘Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities’, 1975-1976. 
36 John Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, ‘The White House, the CIA and the Pike 
Committee 1975’, National Security Archive, 02 June 2017, available at: 
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different individuals and the impact that they had. First: in 1971, Daniel 
Ellsberg presented a vast collection of files about the Vietnam War, now 
known as the ‘Pentagon Papers’, to the New York Times who began to print 
them. The Washington Post soon followed suit, despite being asked to refrain 
from printing by the US Attorney General William Rehnquist. Subsequently, 
an injunction was sought by Rehnquist, but the court ruled in favour of the 
freedom of the press. The Pentagon Papers revealed shocking decision-
making by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations on Vietnam, together 
with extensive cover-ups. Most importantly, it showed that government bent 
intelligence in order to claim that the US was winning – when it was not – in 
order to bolster support for the war. Ellsberg was taken to court after 
surrendering to the authorities but was never sentenced.38  
 
Second: In 1975, a CIA case officer by the name of Philip Agee would publish 
a book called Inside the Company: CIA diary.39 In this book, Agee details his 
experience whilst he was in the employ of the CIA. It also features a list of CIA 
operatives that were stationed in other countries. The book spanned 19 
years, starting in Indiana in April 1956 and ending in London in May 1975. 
Third: In 1976, Frank Snepp also a former CIA officer, published a book that 
brought to light a different version of the fall of Saigon, Vietnam and the 
American occupation than had been publicised until then, charging that 
dishonest accounts had been offered to the public to prolong the war. Still 
furious about the Ellsberg and Agee cases (not to mention another few in 
between), the CIA threw the book at Snepp. As the result of a civil law suit 
brought against him, Snepp went bankrupt.  
 
The contrast between these three figures: Ellsberg, Agee and Snepp, in 
almost all aspects, could not be starker. Whistleblower sympathisers still 
consider that Ellsberg had to make a difficult moral decision. Certainly, he is 
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considered by many as a bit eccentric, but overall his intentions appear to be 
considered as principled by many. Agee, on the other hand, is often described 
as a traitor and a defector, having co-operated with Cuban intelligence in the 
writing of his books. Although Snepp was, for all intents and purposes a 
poster boy for the CIA, a series of unfortunate circumstances, including the 
timing of his publication, meant that he was often tarred with the same brush 
as Agee. This chapter will explore each individual in turn, analysing each stage 
on their road to leaking classified information.40  
 
One thing that Ellsberg and Agee do have in common is that they publicly 
shared classified information through publications. Snepp is the only 
exception since he maintains that he intentionally only used unclassified 
information for his book. Though the nature of their publication is somewhat 
different, they have a similar approach to drawing attention to alleged 
wrongdoing. Furthermore, none of the three individuals withheld their 
identity. This left all individuals exposed, easy targets to be prosecuted and 
reprimanded. Moran asserts that, ‘the sad moral of their story was: publish 
at your peril’.41 The CIA proudly presents its seven core values: integrity, 
teamwork, total participation, innovation, adaptation, accountability and 
continuous improvement.42 These values are indicators of the CIA culture, 
being part of something bigger - ‘a special club’.43 All employees take an oath 
to defend the constitution when they join the agency and they also sign a 
secrecy agreement. The agreement clarifies that the information that they 
are privy to during their employment is the property of the US.44 ‘At the heart 
of the CIA’s habitus is a code: never celebrate our successes; never explain 
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our failures. All officers are expected to abide by this code. They are made 
aware of it from day one when they are asked to sign a secrecy agreement’.45  
 
Is it surprising then that these three whistleblowers cut the intelligence 
community so deep?46 The academic literature on intelligence has tended to 
interpret secret service activity as a specialist form of information that either 
allows policy-makers to avoid surprises, or which makes their decisions more 
efficient. But intelligence is also about secrecy and this is deeply engrained 
within intelligence agencies and indeed the national security state more 
generally. Somerset Maugham, primarily a novelist, part-time sleuth, 
undertaking a special mission on behalf of MI6, once observed that the first 
rule of any secret service is that it should be secret.47 To depart from this 
dictum is to break the code. Agee, in particular, did not merely publish a 
selection of dirty secrets on the CIA, but also handed over a significant 
amount of these to the sworn enemies of the US of the day - the Soviet Union 
and Cubans. 
 
The following analysis of Ellsberg, Agee and Snepp has been based in large 
part on the extensive existing literature, together with some archival 
documentation. Ellsberg is notoriously suspicious of being interviewed,48 
although I did meet him at an event for his Doomsday Machine monograph 
at the Eliot School at George Washington University. Much of the information 
on Agee came from the extensive Agee private papers held in the Tamiment 
library at New York University. Agee, Ellsberg and Snepp also all wrote 
memoirs, which have provided a different insight, not least because these 
tend to encourage a rationalisation of their motives. There are disputes and 
anomalies about the exact order and sometimes nature of events in all cases, 
which are indicated here. These incongruities pose certain problems when 
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analysing the overall picture, much like with any other historical analysis, but 
the overall picture is clear.  
 
 
Dan Ellsberg (1971) 
On his website, Daniel Ellsberg describes himself as being ‘a lecturer, writer 
and activist on the dangers of the nuclear era, wrongful U.S. interventions 
and the urgent need for patriotic whistleblowing’.49 The description does not 
do full justice to the variety of roles that Ellsberg has fulfilled over his lifetime. 
It would be difficult to deny Ellsberg’s academic aptitude. Not only did 
Ellsberg graduate summa cum laude (with the highest distinction) from 
Harvard in 1952 on a fully funded scholarship for four years, he also 
continued his education in economics at Cambridge University in England 
having been awarded a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship. Ellsberg published his 
senior honours thesis from Harvard on decision-making and uncertainty, 
which also formed the focus of his 1962 doctoral thesis that he earned at 
Harvard in Economics. As a result of his academic research, Ellsberg is 
recognised to have popularised a decision-making concept that was first 
considered by John Maynard Keynes,50 but has since become known as the 
Ellsberg paradox.  
 
Aside from his academic achievements, in 1959 Ellsberg started working for 
the RAND Corporation, an American non-profit defence think tank.  Starting 
in the lowly position of strategic analyst, Ellsberg had been attracted to RAND 
as a result of the leading research that they had carried out in his field of 
‘decision theory’. In his online biography, Ellsberg talks about the (what was 
later revealed to be) false postulation made by himself and his colleagues 
regarding the perceived threat level of the ‘missile gap’ between the US and 
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the Soviet Union. Additionally, Ellsberg discusses his high clearance level 
whilst conducting research for RAND and how the knowledge he amassed as 
a result troubled him immensely. He explains that he enjoyed a clearance 
level of higher than Top Secret, which translated as top-level and 
compartmentalised, something quite unusual for an agency outsider. 
 
Ellsberg gained important insights about US nuclear policies through his work 
that included providing advice to the Executive Committee of the National 
Security Council (NSC), the key decision-making body during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in October 1962. Continuing his research into decision-making 
at a higher level, Ellsberg took a position as Special Assistant to the Assistant 
Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs in the Defence 
Department. Ellsberg was answerable directly to John T. McNaughton, who 
engaged him with the ongoing Vietnam War, declaring, ‘You want to study 
crises; Vietnam is a continuous crisis’. Despite reservations, Ellsberg 
understood the authenticity of McNaughton’s words as soon as he took up 
his position in the Pentagon in August 1964. 
 
South-East Asia, the region in which Vietnam was located, was a morass of 
colonial troubles, with only Thailand having escaped direct and formal 
acquisition by the imperial powers. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had been 
colonised by France during the 1800s. Thereafter, these three countries were 
invaded by Japan and Thailand together and made a failed bid for 
independence in 1945.51 The region was in constant conflict for the first half 
of the 20th Century, with seemingly relentless battles over territory and 
power within the region. In 1954, following the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and 
the French withdrawal, Vietnam was divided into North and South. North 
Vietnam known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was supported by 
China and the Soviet Union and South Vietnam known as the Republic of 
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Vietnam was supported by the French Union’s French Far East Expeditionary 
Corps, financed by the US and Indochinese allies. South Vietnam would 
continue to be heavily subsidised by the US. A guerrilla war developed 
between North and South during the late 1950s, prompting US troop 
commitments – initially as advisers - by President John F. Kennedy.52  
 
As part of his assignment in the Pentagon, Ellsberg was privy to the 
surreptitious resolve of President Johnson and the Secretary of Defence 
Robert McNamara to further escalate the Vietnam War, in spite of their 
public assurances to the contrary. Fervently disagreeing with the decision and 
considering it to be perilous, not even a year passed from that date of his 
appointment to the Pentagon before Ellsberg volunteered for a transfer to 
the State Department to serve at the Embassy in Saigon, Vietnam. Ellsberg 
talks about the dismay of watching troops in combat and following operations 
into the field in a war that he describes as ‘hopeless’. As a result of contracting 
hepatitis, he eventually had to leave Vietnam mid-1967 and returned to 
RAND.53  
 
It was at this point that Ellsberg first started working on a study, then titled, 
‘U.S. Decision-making in Vietnam, 1945-68’. Commissioned by Robert 
McNamara in 1967, the information contained within it would be held as 
classified until June 2011.54 The resulting report would formally be known as 
the Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defence Vietnam Task Force, but 
more commonly referred to in the press as the Pentagon Papers.55 With 
exclusive authorisation to explore all the material, Ellsberg claims he was 
amongst the first three people to read the complete study comprising around 
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7000-pages and spanning 47-volumes. This collection of papers was the 
product of the Vietnam Study Task Force and was intended to be an 
‘encyclopaedic history of the Vietnam War’ according to McNamara.56 
McNamara himself had been the leading policy advisor to the Kennedy 
administration on Vietnam since early 1962. McNamara was confident that 
communist forces were successfully being fought. He announced publicly, 
‘every qualitative measure we have, shows that we’re winning this war’. The 
position taken on Vietnam thereafter was predominantly influenced by 
McNamara’s belief that it was imperative that the Indochina peninsula 
remain under non-communist rule.57 In fact, the war in Vietnam was often 
referred to as ‘McNamara’s war’. In response to being told this by a journalist, 
McNamara retorted ‘I’m proud to be associated with it’.58 Indeed, after 
visiting Vietnam along with General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, McNamara supported increased supply of aid, further funds 
and strong political backing.  
 
The support provided to the South Vietnamese forces in all of these areas 
continued to be expanded. However, in 1966, McNamara started to realise 
that he had drastically misjudged the conflict in Vietnam. McNamara had 
been a senior manager for the Ford motor company, valuing the precise 
analysis of empirical data. New data that had been collected on 
developments, convinced McNamara that the enemy forces in North 
Vietnam had increased to the extent that would threaten a defeat for the US 
side. By late 1966, McNamara’s opinions on the war had undergone a 
remarkable transformation. Although McNamara’s efforts to reverse his track 
went as far as to petition Johnson to stabilise the region rather than continue 
supporting any conflict, he did not press for a ceasefire or military 
withdrawal. McNamara’s anxieties were partly reflected in the decision to 
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commission the internal study entitled ‘U.S. Decision-making in Vietnam, 
1945-68’ that Ellsberg would be a part of. There are a variety of different 
theories about why McNamara commissioned the study. It has been 
speculated that the only person that McNamara truly confided in regarding 
the reason for study was McNaughton. In a tragic twist, McNaughton, his wife 
and youngest son died in a plane crash in 1967. 
 
The only evidence remaining of McNaughton’s influence on McNamara is 
held in a personal diary that was discovered to be in the possession of the 
McNaughton family.59 The content of the diaries is significant for the 
understanding of how events unfolded. The diary reveals an innate desire to 
establish prolonged peace in Vietnam on the part of McNaughton and, by 
1966, also on the part of McNamara.60 According to his diary, McNaughton 
was highly sensitive to the fact that his opposition to the war had to be kept 
out of the public domain. Nevertheless, he also appeared to be working 
tirelessly behind closed doors to convince the Johnson administration 
through McNamara to change their approach in Vietnam.61 McNaughton was 
under immense pressure to continue his support of McNamara. The role he 
fulfilled within the administration as a senior aide to McNamara was to 
support him and ensure that his policy was implemented in the way that he 
wanted. This left McNaughton in a difficult position, where he was torn 
between his personal views and the views he was dutifully bound to hold by 
indirect cabinet responsibility.62 Arguably, it is this tension and the ability to 
compartmentalise it that is at the root of most dissident’s decision to 
continue with the job that they have been tasked to do or else to follow their 
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instincts and raise concerns. Ellsberg has made comments on how his 
personal views ran parallel to those of McNaughton.63  
 
Stage One: The Insider  
In his book, Ellsberg states that his reasons for publishing the Pentagon 
Papers were that he wanted to expose the corrupt actions of the 
administration in continuing to fund the Vietnam War, despite the private 
knowledge that the war was unwinnable. Ellsberg explains that the public had 
a ‘right to know’ that they were being deliberately and systematically denied 
the clear and unambiguous evidence that the conflict in Vietnam was a lost 
cause for the US, both in terms of blood and treasure.64 Although Ellsberg’s 
service in the Vietnam War has been taken to mean that he supported this 
military action, he has stated on a number of occasions that this was not the 
case.65 Although Ellsberg freely admits that he was once ignorant about the 
strategic reality of Vietnam, he attributes this to his lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the region. He cites McNaughton as one of the key policy-
makers who educated him on the conflict. For Ellsberg, the image of 
McNaughton as ‘the hawk’, a nickname he earned through his public persona, 
could not be reconciled with the mentor he knew. 
 
Starting in late 1968, Ellsberg took a position for a few months as advisor to 
Henry Kissinger, the National Security Assistant to the then President-elect 
Richard Nixon.66 During this time, he was closely involved with formulating 
policy-advice on Vietnam. By 1969, Ellsberg had completed his review of the 
McNamara study. Ellsberg was convinced that the study illustrated that the 
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conflict was doomed to be a failure for the US. The study clearly emphasised 
the dogged approach of American policy, and even under the new 
administration of President Nixon, change seemed unlikely. Ellsberg 
concluded that the only logical course of action to trigger change would be 
to provide Congress with more information and to enlighten the public with 
the hopes of shocking them into civil action – a view that reflected the strong 
role that public opinion played in major issues of American foreign policy.  
Ellsberg claims to have been influenced by non-violent anti-war protestors 
who had chosen to go to prison for their principles. He recalls that watching 
other individuals do ‘the right thing’ made him confront himself with the 
question of whether he would also go to prison for this cause. It struck 
Ellsberg that if his actions could ‘help shorten this war’, he was indeed 
prepared to risk his career, security clearance and perhaps even go to 
prison.67 
 
After his epiphany, Ellsberg started to explore the different options open to 
him. It is evident that the option of approaching an immediate superior to 
address the short-comings of the current policy could not have reaped a 
positive discussion, or in Ellsberg’s view at least not a very productive one. 
This was a reasonable presumption, given that he knew that some of his 
superiors, far above the managers he might turn to with his own concerns, 
were also secretly opposed to the Vietnam War, yet had failed to secure 
change. Indeed, in 1968, McNamara resigned from his government post to 
work for the World Bank. There are speculations as to the reasons for his 
resignation, including that his view on the Vietnam War had drastically and 
irreparably changed. In October 1969, Ellsberg enlisted the help of a former 
colleague from RAND, Anthony Russo, in order to make fifteen photocopies 
of the 7000-page study that would later become known as the Pentagon 
Papers. The entire process lasted around three months and all the work was 
done surreptitiously and under the cover of night. Ellsberg writes that when 
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or if he went public with the study, he expected to serve the remainder of his 
life in prison.  
 
Stage Two: Sleepless Nights 
Ellsberg resolved to act. He wanted to draw attention to the continued US 
involvement in Vietnam, despite its appalling prospects. The persistence of a 
US presence in South Vietnam, given there was no prospect of a good 
outcome, now seemed criminal. Mostly, Ellsberg wanted to inform his fellow 
citizens and let the evidence speak for itself. The first step that Ellsberg took 
was to approach Senator William Fulbright, who was the Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. However, the Senator feared reprisal 
and was unwilling to address the subject publicly, as he had not officially been 
permitted to see the study. Fulbright did subsequently requested access to 
the study from the Secretary of Defence, Melvyn Laird, but this was refused. 
Growing impatient after further military action suggested the war was 
widening across South East Asia, including an invasion of Cambodia in 1970 
and action in Laos in 1971, Ellsberg decided to take more drastic action. 
Ellsberg had moved from RAND to MIT in 1970, where he met Noam Chomsky 
and Howard Zinn who would play an integral role in unpacking the most 
controversial aspects of the files.68  
 
In 1971, he passed the bulk of the study to the New York Times. In the face of 
controversy, the US newspapers were put to the test. After three instalments, 
the Times was ordered to refrain from further publication. Thus, Ellsberg 
provided copies to the Washington Post, who’s publisher, Katharine Graham, 
and executive editor, Ben Bradlee, approached this challenge head on, as 
recently depicted in the Tom Hanks film the Post, directed by Stephen 
Spielberg. Nevertheless, the Washington Post was also warned not to 
continue publishing. Despite four federal injunctions and charges brought by 
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the Attorney General, nineteen other papers would publish the story without 
much hesitation. The government’s claim was that the files were endangering 
national security.69 Ellsberg wanted to illustrate that the government had 
overclassified in order to avoid embarrassment. 
 
Stage Three: Outrage 
The immediate reaction of the Nixon administration to the release of the 
Pentagon Papers was outrage. Nixon and Kissinger were obsessively secret 
individuals, going to extreme lengths to hide their own activities from the 
Pentagon, the State Department and the CIA. Indeed, CIA analysts were not 
even told when Nixon attempted to build bridges with China until it became 
declared American policy. Therefore, the leaking of the Pentagon Papers 
delivered a considerable psychological shock to those at the very summit of 
government. Nixon was furious with Ellsberg, who Kissinger had permitted 
into the inner circle of intelligence and decision-making. Thanks to the Nixon 
tapes, the extreme rage that Nixon felt at this perceived betrayal is evidenced 
and recorded.70 As a direct result of the scandal and the knowledge that 
Ellsberg had copied the National Security Council’s Top Secret NSSM-1, the 
suspicious Nixon suspected that Ellsberg might have made copies of other 
such documents. As a result, Nixon’s aides, possibly with Nixon’s direct 
approval, arranged for the burglary of the office belonging to Lewis Fielding, 
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist in Los Angeles in 1971.71 Just the tip of the iceberg 
when it came to Nixon abusing his presidential powers. In 1972, another 
break-in took place at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters 
located in the Watergate office complex in Washington DC. Although Nixon 
denied any involvement and attempted to lay blame at the door of the CIA.72 
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What became known as the Watergate scandal would also mark Nixon’s 
downfall. The Watergate affair would in turn shake the trust that ordinary 
citizens had in the administration. 
 
For Ellsberg personally, there were, to his relief, far less stringent 
consequences than he had imagined in terms of any prosecution by the state. 
After handing himself into the police, Ellsberg and his collaborator Russo 
were arrested and charged with violations under the Espionage Act. Though 
it ended in a triumph, the trial would hold its own challenges for Ellsberg. 
Ellsberg tells the story of how he had to come to terms with his family’s 
questions at home. 
 
In many ways, it is very difficult to draw a definitive line of causality between 
the publication of the Pentagon Papers and the shaping of the US foreign 
policy during the following few years. The leak did not result in an immediate 
reversal of policy and Nixon continued to search for a negotiated peace that 
looked less like defeat, resulting in the Paris accords in 1973. By December 
1973, there were only a small number of American military personnel left in 
Vietnam, providing assistance to the beleaguered Saigon government. After 
Nixon resigned in 1974, his successor, President Ford, was eventually forced 
to withdraw all support and troops from Vietnam due to pressure from 
Congress who refused to continue supplying funds. The Saigon government 
fell in 1975, punctuated by the dramatic evacuation of the American embassy 
in Saigon. Nevertheless, it has to be recognised that Ellsberg’s actions, and 
especially their vindication by the courts, have, if nothing else, promoted the 
idea of whistleblowing and leaking classified information, not least through 
Hollywood films such as, most recently, The Post.  
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Philip Agee (1975) 
Philip Agee was born Philip Burnett Franklin Agee in 1935. From 1957, he was 
a CIA case officer who was predominantly stationed in Latin America during 
his employment. A case officer typically takes on the role of spotting, 
recruiting and training potential agents. Agents are individuals who are 
outsiders typically affiliated with foreign agencies or organisations. Agee has 
been described as many things, including a whistleblower, a defector and a 
traitor. This is the direct result of his public activities after leaving the CIA, 
which took the form of a number of revealing books and magazines.73 Agee 
passed away in 2008 whilst residing in Cuba, following his expulsion from the 
UK and banishment from the US.  
 
Agee first drew attention to himself when he published his book Inside the 
Company: CIA Diary in 1975. The book is written in a diary format, which 
makes it a cumbersome read. However, the broader themes are indicated 
early on, which include a disenchantment with what he saw as American neo-
colonialism. He subsequently collaborated with other authors on further 
volumes and a magazine CovertAction Magazine exposing CIA activities in 
Europe and Africa, making him a bête noire within the intelligence community 
in Washington DC. 
 
In the decades that followed Agee’s book, evidence has surfaced that 
categorically links the US with conflicts in Latin America. As in Vietnam, the 
US often fought this conflict covertly through the CIA and other undercover 
units. Ostensibly, the motivation for their involvement centred on preventing 
communism taking root in countries like Cuba. Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, the CIA staged a number of coups and destabilisation activities to try 
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to influence the leadership in other states. In 1954, the CIA staged a coup in 
Guatemala, overthrowing Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán who had been 
democratically elected. The real reason behind this desired regime change 
went beyond its communist leanings. In 1953, Arbenz nationalised holdings 
of the US United Fruit Company in Guatemala and continued to seal his fate 
by trading in arms with the Soviet Union. As a result of the coup, Guatemala 
descended into violent conflict lasting some four decades.74  
 
By far the boldest move of all, however, was one of a number of assassination 
attempts on the Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro (Prime Minister 1959-
1976; President 1976-2008). Early in 1961, an inexperienced – in the ways of 
intelligence business – newly inaugurated President Kennedy was briefed on 
the ‘communist-controlled state’ of Cuba by CIA Director Allen Dulles (1953-
1961). This conversation persuaded Kennedy to ‘increase propaganda, 
increase political action and increase sabotage’.75 The CIA had concocted a 
plan that was always likely to fail. It rested on exiled adversaries to Castro. 
Operation Zapata, later known as the Bay of Pigs, was fraught with issues. 
Chiefly amongst these were the poor preparation and the even worse 
implementation of the operation.76 The biggest problem was poor 
communication between the CIA and the White House. Richard Bissel, the 
main architect of the plan, assumed that if the rebels failed the Us marines 
would be sent in – but Kennedy was not prepared to do that.77  In the early 
1970s, the CIA was exposed to have been involved in a plotting to either 
destabilise or remove Salvador Allende as the Chilean President.78 Amidst an 
attack by the Chilean military involved in the coup, Allende committed 
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suicide. This was not confirmed until a Chilean court had his body exhumed 
and forensically examined in 2011 as part of a criminal investigation.79  
 
Stage One: Inside the Company 
In his book, Agee explains that at the outset, when first employed by the CIA, 
he believed in the overall programme of work that the CIA did. Interestingly, 
Agee states at the very beginning of his book that he was an enthusiastic 
member of the exclusive ‘club’, ‘the company’.80 Agee says that after twelve 
years of working for the agency he became disillusioned and recognised the 
harm that was being done in other parts of the world - Agee left the CIA in 
1968. Agee claims that he had become cognisant to the destructive effects of 
international CIA activities and felt – much like Ellsberg - that he could no 
longer ‘sit by and do nothing’. However, he only commenced the writing of 
his memoirs or ‘diaries’ in 1972.81  
 
It is claimed that at a public meeting he offered the following reasons for 
leaving the CIA, ‘I fell in love with a woman who thought Che Guevara was 
the most wonderful man in the world’.82 His motivations for leaving the CIA 
are widely disputed, with some reports stating that his ‘catholic social 
conscience had made him uneasy with US foreign policy’.83 Agee’s book 
suggests that there is truth in these assertions, mixed with slow 
disillusionment, as time went on, reflecting the wider collapse of the Cold war 
consensus.84 Agee writes little about the woman that he met and wanted to 
marry whilst he was working under-cover on the Cultural Programme during 
the Olympics in Mexico.85 What he does say, however, is that she was a 
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‘leftist’ and firmly believed in the CIA’s involvement regarding the death of 
Che Guevara.  
 
The latter years during the period in which Agee served in the CIA, (1956-68), 
was a period marked by a notable breakdown in the domestic consensus in 
the US, not least regarding the Cold War and American foreign policy 
generally. Nevertheless, trying to find the precise reason underpinning some 
of the decisions Agee made or retracing his steps after he left the agency is 
not an easy feat. The conflicting reports on Agee’s departure from the Agency 
cast a shadow and many questions over his motivation to publish the book. 
Conflicting statements within his own account can be read within the Agee 
papers kept at the Tamiment Library at New York University. They suggest 
that Agee did not quit at all, but that he was asked to leave. The personnel 
files include a report that states he ‘showed himself to be an egotistical, 
superficially intelligent, but essentially shallow young man’.86 There were 
further accounts of his finances being in disarray and some suggestions that 
he struggled with alcoholism.87  
 
In the introduction to his book, Agee comments on the fact that as a CIA 
operative, deceit becomes second nature. He continues to explain that as you 
develop this skill-set you develop the capability to take on another 
personality completely, at a moment’s notice. Agee adds that it also leaves 
very little room for any other type of thinking or reflection.88 Describing his 
experience as exciting and romantic at times, it is also clear from Agee’s 
writing that this feeling of elation petered out towards the end of his times 
as a spy.89 In hindsight, it is impossible to determine Agee’s exact reasons for 
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choosing his path that he did. However, Agee does appear to have once been 
a loyal employee of the agency. It is likely that personal reasons, both in terms 
of his relationships and his own health played a part in this change of heart 
and that it was not just an abstract ideological transformation.  
 
It is unclear exactly when Agee arrived at the conclusion that he should 
publish his experiences and share his knowledge of CIA activities in Latin 
America. Apart from the reasons for his resignation, the manner of his 
resignation is curious. Agee recollects that he was acutely aware of the 
possible consequences of the rationale he was required to cite for his 
resignation. If he would make any kind of false noise at this stage, he risked 
alerting the agency. He stated, ‘I was careful to cite my personal reasons as 
the only motive behind my decision, lest someone pounce on me as a security 
risk’.90 There are no records that suggest that Agee attempted to raise the 
concerns he had regarding the involvement in Latin America, internally with 
the agency at any point or indeed with a member of Congress or the Senate.  
 
Stage Two: A Security Risk  
Agee admits struggling to find work in Mexico, upon first leaving the Agency. 
He spent some time travelling to different countries, trying to find work to 
support himself. Agee eventually started writing his book in earnest in 1972. 
The most difficult aspects seemed to be finding material and remembering 
the details of operations that he did not have records of. He also struggled to 
find a publisher. Agee writes about the frustration that this caused him, not 
understanding the lack of enthusiasm for his project and adds that he thought 
it might never be published.91  
 
In June 1970, he describes trips to meet with New York publishers and 
became quite worried about his personal safety. He noted that he left copies 
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of his material there, ‘and despite assurances by the editor I’m afraid that the 
Agency may learn of plans for my book.’92 Throughout his book, the latter half 
of which details Agee’s long writing and research process, Agee also 
comments on his interactions or lack thereof with the CIA. When living in 
Paris, he is surprised that there is not more activity or contact from the CIA. 
In fact, unbeknown to him, he was being monitored by two CIA officers, 
Salvatore Ferrera and Leslie Donegan aka Janet Strickland, who posed as his 
friends and patrons in order to obtain a copy of his manuscript and learn of 
his publication date.93   
 
Agee’s own declared reasons for publishing are relatively vague. He even 
states that the reasons for his revelations will be ‘found in the text’, therefore 
not committing himself explicitly. Although, he alludes to these reasons 
largely being related to discovering misdeeds he felt were not reasonably or 
justifiably within the mandate of any intelligence agency active during the 
Cold War.94 It is not until after he published his book that Agee became more 
vocal. He started to give public speeches and interviews to newspapers. This 
change in behaviour suggests the possibility of post facto rationalisation 
encouraged by the persecution he faced for writing his book. Agee does offer 
a disclaimer of sorts for any information that he may have not accurately 
remembered or forgotten altogether stating, ‘no one, of course, can 
remember in detail all the events of a twelve-year period of his life.’95 This 
has made the chosen format for his publication a difficult one to follow. Agee 
concedes that the material is not infallible, which could be reason enough to 
doubt some of its content that cannot otherwise be substantiated. Doubts 
emerge, not merely due to his self-portrayal of an unreliable author, but also 
the quality of material that has been used to reconstruct events as they have 
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been presented. Indeed, the writing often seems haphazard and with large 
omissions that leave room for speculation on the readers part.  
 
Agee was acutely aware that he was in direct violation of the secrecy 
agreement he signed when joining the agency through the publicity he 
sought from the publication of his book. However, considering the agreement 
to be ‘immoral’, he was adamant that remaining silent was worse.96 During 
the last few chapters of his book, Agee writes about the persecution he felt 
he was subjected to by the CIA and the demands made for his silence. His 
response was, ‘sorry, but the national security for me lies in socialism, not in 
protection of CIA operations and agents’.97 The ideological appeal created for 
him by communism is something that cannot be examined in enough depth 
here, but his decision to work with the intelligence services of Cuba is 
significant. For some his ideology indicated a depth of commitment, for 
others it indicated an agent working under foreign control. On balance, 
Agee’s actions certainly suggest that he was completely absorbed by the 
socialist philosophy.  
 
Agee’s book contains some contradictions, which he argues are 
understandable given the length of time that had passed between the events 
and the writing up of a narrative of the events. However, this also throws up 
questions about the reliability of Agee’s accounts. Nevertheless, the 
collection in the Tamiment library contain, amongst other things, a 
compilation of ‘biographical materials, correspondence, datebooks, 
documents obtained under the FOIA Act, notably CIA documents, as well as 
FBI and State Department documents; legal materials from various cases in 
which Agee was the plaintiff; lectures and university teaching files; subject 
files, many relating to Latin American and other countries and to CIA activity 
in them, and some relating to his expulsion from Great Britain; published and 
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unpublished writings by Agee; reviews of his work; and other writings about 
Agee.’ After trawling the files available, it is possible to build up quite a rich 
picture of Philip Agee and his activities and to come to certain conclusions. 
 
Agee provides anecdotal information about the coup to topple the socialist 
President Allende of Chile.98 The events in Chile and the invasion of Cambodia 
clearly triggered a visceral reaction in Agee. In January 1972, he decided to 
write to the Uruguayan newspaper Marcha, in Montevideo. In this letter 
Agee unwittingly ‘outed’ his agenda. Within the letter, Agee draws attention 
to the way in which the CIA had launched covert action in order to influence 
past elections in Latin America. Agee emphasises that he has no knowledge 
if similar actions had been taken in Uruguay, but speculates that, given his 
knowledge of previous CIA interference, this would be highly likely. Agee 
provides further details on the nature of CIA covert action in the past. 
Publicly, this was the first indication of the actions that Agee will later take. 
Agee describes his decision to write this letter as a ‘mistake’.99 As a result of 
this letter, he was visited by a former CIA colleague, who he identifies as Keith 
Gardiner. Gardiner delivered a message from CIA Director Richard Helms, 
asking him, what on earth he thought he was doing.100 Agee decides to come 
clean about the writing of his book, though he is deceitful on the details of 
his progress.  
 
In 1975, Agee’s book was published by Penguin in London, not only one of 
the world’s most powerful publishers, but crucially one outside of the 
jurisdiction of the US. Agee had been warned not to publish before a review 
of the manuscript had taken place.101 However, Agee did not heed the 
warning and went ahead with the publication, which was an instant 
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bestseller. In addition to the book, Agee was also involved in the publication 
of a magazine that followed the general trend of his book. The magazine 
Counterspy dedicated itself, much like the book, to exposing current CIA 
operatives in foreign countries.102 
 
There are a number of rumours surrounding Agee and his relationship with 
the KGB and other communist factions that were never quite settled. Further, 
it was alleged that Agee was being financially supported by the Russian KGB 
and Cuban intelligence, whilst he was writing his book.103 Although Agee 
admits to being supported by the communist party of Cuba, he fervidly 
denied giving any information in return. Further light has recently been shed 
on Agee by Vasili Mitrokhin, a KGB officer and key archivist during the Cold 
War. Mitrokhin copied a large number of KGB files during his employment 
and in 1991, brought them to the British Embassy in Riga, Latvia after being 
turned away by the Americans. The files give details of Agee’s codename as 
‘PONT’.104 Oleg Kalugin, the former head of the KGB’s counterintelligence 
Directorate, expands on this story in his memoirs.105 Kalugin writes that in 
1973, Agee presented himself at the KGB station in Mexico with ‘reams’ of 
information. However, Agee much like Mitrokhin many years later, was taken 
for a plant and turned away. Plants and other provocations were common on 
both sides during this period of the Cold War. Not phased, Agee then 
allegedly turned to the Cuban Direccion General de Inteligencia (CDGI) and 
offered the files to them - The CDGI welcomed him with open arms. Kalugin 
adds that the Cubans did later share what they had received with their 
Russian allies and concedes that there was some embarrassment on the part 
of the KGB for ‘turning away such a prize’.106 This story is not implausible, 
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though Agee does not refer to it in his book. Agee denies working for the KGB 
or the DGI, but there are mentions in his book of research trips to Cuba and 
Mexico during the time he was writing his book. It is quite improbable that 
Agee, as a former intelligence officer working in Latin America, could 
legitimately claim ignorance regarding the likely intelligence interest his 
contact with the Cubans would attract and this part of his account has to be 
regarded as disingenuous. 
 
Stage Three: Judas 
Interestingly, within the introduction of his book Agee makes measured and 
reasonable comments concerning the publishing of CIA names and the 
considerations he has given this. These remarks can only be held in contrast 
with those he makes later. Agee writes that the only way to have an impact 
is to list case officers in those regions in order to prevent them from 
continuing their missions. No consideration for the safety of named 
individuals is evident in his writing. On 23 December 1975, Richard Welch, 
the Athens CIA station chief, was assassinated. Although there is no evidence 
to suggest that Agee’s book or any other publication, he was involved in was 
responsible for Welch’s death, he was made into a scapegoat. The CIA press 
release stated, ‘we’ve had an American gunned down by other Americans 
fingering him – rightly or wrongly – as a CIA agent’.107 This very much sealed 
Agee’s fate and he was now a marked man. It was clear that Agee was 
partially, if not entirely, blamed for this by senior figures, such as George H W 
Bush.108 Agee was named as the cause for Welch’s discovery in Barbara 
Bush’s memoirs. The remarks were claimed to be defamatory by Agee and he 
took Mrs Bush to court. In the evidence submitted to court, it was discovered 
that Richard Welch had long been identified as a CIA officer, by his neighbours 
and by other locals. Moreover, he had also been listed as a CIA operative in a 
leftist book published in East Germany in 1967 entitled Who’s who in the 
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CIA109. Barbara Bush removed the claim in the paperback edition of her 
memoirs. 
 
Agee’s passport was revoked, and he was unable to step foot inside the US 
for a long time, for fear of prosecution.110 Seeing his children had become an 
impossibility. Agee blamed his involuntary nomad existence, and the pressure 
exerting on his ex-wife by the CIA, for his children not being able to visit him. 
Agee claimed that these tactics were part of a ploy to get him to return to the 
US. This attitude left little no room for self-blame or the consideration that 
he had any power of agency in this situation. In later years, he secured 
passports from Grenada, then Nicaragua and eventually Germany due to the 
nationality of his wife. Thereafter he was able to travel to both the US and 
the UK again and intriguingly was not arrested or prosecuted. 
 
 
Frank Snepp (1976) 
The 1970s was a busy decade for dissident insiders and the atmosphere in 
the US intelligence community was in turmoil, with a large number of public 
revelations about surreptitious agency activities alongside those of Ellsberg 
and Agee. Following the disaster of the three enquiries into the activities of 
the CIA, the Ford administration was challenged by senior figures within its 
own party.111 In a desperate bid to recover control, President Ford fired a 
number of prominent figures within the intelligence community, including 
the CIA Director Colby, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and the 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. The announcement was made on 
3 November 1975 and was dubbed the ‘Halloween Massacre’ by the 
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media.112 Further changes were on the horizon. There had been a number of 
leaks from inside the government, specifically concerning the CIA and causing 
some embarrassment. Along with Ellsberg’s leaks to the press in 1971 former 
CIA officer Victor Marchetti, like Agee published a book in 1974 depicting his 
experiences working for the agency. Marchetti’s was the first book about the 
CIA to be censored and the possibility of further leaks caused alarm inside the 
agency.113  
 
George H. W. Bush took over as CIA Director on 20 January 1976. Quickly, he 
instigated the Publications Review Board (PRB). On 10 June 1976, ‘Notice 178’ 
created the PRB chaired by the Assistant to the DCI for Public Affairs.114 As 
there had not been many issues of embarrassment through publications until 
this point, there had been no prescribed way in which the CIA reviewed 
previous books. The agency had not even sought to keep any records of 
previously published works, but this was now changing.115 The next CIA 
Director Stansfield Turner (from 1977) took extra measures to prevent 
potentially problematic requests being published. Turner expanded the 
capabilities of the PRB to restricting the disclosures of former as well as 
current personnel. As the result of an in-house enquiry, the CIA started to 
realise that even well-intentioned publications in defence of the agency could 
present potential security risks to serving intelligence officers in the field.116 
Frank Snepp was the insider that vindicated the Bush initiative, arguably his 
decision to create the PRB came not a moment too soon.  
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Stage One: Poster Boy 
Frank Snepp describes a conservative and idyllic upbringing in Kingston, 
North Carolina.117 He was well-educated, attending Columbia University with 
a major in Elizabethan literature before moving on to work for CBS News for 
a year. Whilst Snepp was studying at the School of International Affairs back 
at Columbia, he was approached by the Associate Dean of the School, Philip 
Moseley. Moseley apparently convinced Snepp that he wasn’t fit for the State 
Department, but that he was perfectly suited to becoming a spy.118 In 1969, 
after some initial trepidations when he was first assigned to Saigon in 
Vietnam, Snepp threw himself fully into his work. The hard graft paid off and 
in the early 1970s Snepp became the chief analyst on the politics and 
strategies of North Vietnam. Controversially, and highly unusual for the CIA, 
he was also a field operative. Whilst on his last tour in Vietnam (he served on 
two) Snepp partook in a number of high-profile missions. These included a 
unique variety of tasks including, ‘running a key informant network in the 
north; preparing estimates; debriefing the CIA’s best spies; writing segments 
of the President’s Daily Brief; and interrogating high-ranking prisoners and 
defectors’.119  
 
The success of his work would advance Snepps’ profile within the CIA further. 
Respected by the esteemed CIA Station Chief Thomas Polgar and achieving 
recognition for his accomplishments, such as the ‘Medal of Merit’ made 
turning a blind eye to the more troubling activities of the CIA in Saigon 
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easier.120 Nevertheless, the corruption that was rife in the South Vietnam 
system, the continuing immoral CIA intelligence practices and the tense 
atmosphere at the embassy where he was stationed, started to chip away at 
Snepp’s belief that American involvement was serving any defensible 
purpose. If Snepp still held out hope that the situation would change, this 
vanished with Saigon’s fall at dawn on 30 April 1975. When America retreated 
from Saigon, they abandoned many personal connections who were seized 
by the North Vietnamese victors, including some CIA assets they had 
recruited.121  
 
Snepp was incensed at the lack of an evacuation plan for the South 
Vietnamese that had supported America during the conflict, something he 
had counselled his superiors to put in place on a number of occasions. In his 
position as senior analyst, Snepp was not blind to the growing disquiet 
signalling - changes on the horizon. However, regardless of his efforts, there 
was no contingency plan in place when the two-year ceasefire ended. The 
ceasefire had been negotiated with the North Vietnamese in Hanoi by 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, during Richard Nixon’s 
administration. Nixon was widely viewed by Hanoi as unpredictable and a 
loose cannon, hence the famous ‘madman thesis’. Following his disgraced 
resignation, there was nothing stopping the 140,000 North Vietnam troops 
that had carelessly been allowed to remain in the South to make their 
move.122 One of Snepp’s best informants warned him two weeks before the 
attack that Hanoi would dismiss any attempts for a peaceful resolution – the 
attack would come before 1 May.123  
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All attempts Snepp made to ensure the safe evacuation of those remaining in 
Saigon were thwarted. Saigon was the personal fiefdom of Ambassador 
Martin and his dogged attitude that America should remain, ensured that a 
successful evacuation was, ultimately no longer possible.124 Upon discovering 
that Snepp, along with several CIA colleagues, had started burning files, 
Martin was incensed exclaiming, ‘don’t be defeatist’.125 Ironically, two years 
later in December 1977 it would be discovered that Martin had removed a 
substantial cache of classified papers and transported them back to the US. 
Despite having submitted a signed affidavit declaring that he had relinquished 
possession of all classified documents, it was revealed by an unfortunate 
series of events that Martin had in fact retained a good many files. However, 
unlike Snepp, he would not suffer any consequences for these actions.126  
 
On 30 April 1975, North Vietnamese forces poured into the city.127 Snepp 
estimated that aside from the thousands of South Vietnamese civilians left in 
Saigon, around 400 ‘South Vietnamese special police’ officers, along with 
hundreds of other embassy staff including code clerks, translators and high-
level informers working for the American’s were left behind.128 Additionally, 
Snepp suffered a personal tragedy hours before his evacuation when a 
former girlfriend May Ly and her son, who she claimed was Snepp’s, were 
found dead by May Ly’s own hand. It transpired that May Ly had contacted 
Snepp for help to flee the country. When, in the chaos of the day, Snepp had 
missed her second call she assumed he had deserted them and left him a 
                                                        
124 Evan Thomas, ‘The Last Days of Saigon’, Newsweek, 30 April 2000, available at: 
https://www.newsweek.com/last-days-saigon-157477. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Gregory Rose, ‘The Stolen Secrets of Vietnam’, New York Magazine, 27 November 1978, 







127 Moran, Company Confessions, p. 183. 
128 Seymour Hersh, ‘Ex-CIA Man Assails Saigon Evacuation’, The New York Times, 18 
November 1977. 
 - 138 - Dobson 
haunting message, ‘I would have expected better of you’.129 The last 
helicopter airlift out of Saigon code named, ‘Operation Frequent Wind’ was 
announced to the waiting Americans by playing the song ‘White Christmas’ 
on the radio.130 Snepp left Saigon on the last helicopter taking off from the 
embassy roof on that fateful day.131 
 
Stage Two: A ‘Decent Interval’ 
On returning to Langley, Snepp tried and failed to persuade his superiors to 
authorise an investigation into the American failings in Vietnam. Snepp then 
approached the IG and the CIA’s ‘Office of Political Research’, but to no 
avail.132 At this point he realised that the upper echelons of government were 
trying to absolve themselves from blame and all responsibility. Polgar stated 
that the CIA intelligence received had been optimistic in indicating a peaceful 
negotiation and that the tragic events that followed proved the 
capriciousness of Hanoi leaders. Even worse Snepp discovered that the CIA 
East Asia Division head Ted Shackley, was disclosing favourable material to 
the media.133 Snepp’s final act of rebellion was to write his own report that 
detailed his fruitless attempts to secure action from his superiors and how 
this had unnecessarily caused the loss of so many lives. The paper went down 
like a lead balloon.134  
 
This experience convinced Snepp that it was time to consider a different path 
of action. Accordingly, Snepp began meeting and discussing a possible book 
with Bob Loomis, who was then the senior editor at Random House. The first 
meeting between them took place in a busy Manhattan restaurant.135 Loomis 
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had worked with similar stories before. The Invisible Government by Thomas 
Ross and David Wise published by Random House in 1964 had left the CIA 
red-faced when it revealed its unsavoury international activities, including 
coups in Guatemala, Iran, the Bay of Pigs and a number of other covert 
operations.136 The threats of espionage offences against Loomis had come to 
nothing, but alerted him to the real possibility that the CIA could try to 
interfere with Snepp’s plans to publish if they had any suspicions. It would 
not be the first time that the CIA had stolen book proofs. In 1972, operation 
‘Butane’ was an order to conduct surveillance on Victor Marchetti who was 
then writing his book on the CIA.137 As a result Loomis was extremely 
cautious. He requested that Snepp did not disclose any secrets in the book.138 
Inherently a patriot, Snepp had never intended to exacerbate the situation 
through the use of classified material. Loomis also insisted that Snepp be 
provided with the cover identity ‘Virgil Black’ and also keep his writing 
activities a secret.139  
 
However, Snepp did not heed the warning. He later stated in an interview 
that the book was ‘common knowledge’ to many at the agency.140 Snepp 
resigned on 26 January 1976, when the CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) 
demanded he submit to a lie-detector test. The CIA wanted information on 
the existence of a manuscript and publishing contract. Snepp also confided in 
some friends, who unbeknownst to him were sharing the progress he was 
making with CIA counter-intelligence.141 Snepp had bonded with Bill and Pat 
Johnson as a result of their experiences in Vietnam. Colleagues from the 
agency, Bill and Pat ostensibly supported Snepp throughout the 18-month 
writing process, supplying him with classified material in order to entrap him. 
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However, Snepp was adamant that he did not want to undermine the ‘good’ 
work that the agency was doing, as he continued to believe intelligence was 
a necessary and useful practice to ensure security.142 It is likely that Snepp’s 
reasons for writing the book were more cathartic, seeking redemption rather 
than seeking to stick the boot in.  
 
However, this was not the view of the CIA, who feared another Marchetti or 
Agee situation. In May 1977, Snepp was called into a meeting with CIA 
Director Stansfield Turner. There are conflicting reports by the two men 
about the content of the conversation they had. The issue that is disputed is 
a promise that Snepp allegedly gave to Turner, to submit his manuscript to 
the CIA’s PRB. Snepp insists that he made no such promise. Turner 
maintained that he did.143 In the end, Snepp published without the consent 
of the CIA’s PRB.144 The timing of this publication could not have been worse. 
The CIA was still reeling from the cases of Marchetti and Agee, who had each 
published a book containing embarrassing agency secrets.145 Snepp now 
believed that he was being tarred with the same brush as those he called 
‘turncoats’ and ’traitors’.146 
 
Stage Three: The Whipping Boy 
Described as a ‘poster boy’ for the CIA by his lawyer,147 Snepp had suddenly 
become the ‘whipping boy’ for all insiders that had published negative 
reports of the agency.148 Ted Shackley, the Deputy Director of Cover 
Operations took a particularly firm stand. He had a particular loathing 
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towards Agee, which subsequently coloured his attitude towards Snepp. 
Therefore, he seized the chance to make an example of him.149 Turner’s 
ruthless execution of what would be known as the ‘Halloween Massacre’, the 
sacking of a number of veteran officers, would no doubt make him immensely 
unpopular and ensured that another disgruntled employee would surely not 
be hard to find.150 Consequently, there was real fear that publishing CIA 
secrets without review would become a trend, explains Snepp.151 
 
The CIA approached Snepp with a calculated caution. It was Turner who 
convinced Attorney General Griffin Bell that a civil suit should be brought 
against Snepp. Filing a civil case against Snepp in the Federal Court of Virginia, 
circumvented the drawn-out painful process of a criminal trial. Criminal 
proceedings would undoubtedly have involved testimony and the possible 
questioning of serving intelligence personnel under oath, thereby risking the 
possibility of unearthing secrets that Snepp had not even touched upon in his 
book.152 The civil suit cost Snepp dearly.153 Charges for breach of contract 
were brought against Snepp, citing his signing of a fiduciary obligation to the 
CIA 1968, which obligated him to refrain from publishing without having the 
material cleared through internal channels first. The claim was that 
‘irreparable harm’ had been done to national security and the CIA’s internal 
practices had been called into question, as a result of Snepp’s book. Although, 
it was recognised that Snepp did not publish any classified material, Turner 
maintained that the book had caused a tension in international relations.154 
The trial was a shamble according to Snepp.155 Persistent parallels were 
drawn between Snepp and Agee, which worked against Snepp throughout his 
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trial.156 In 1980, the final judgement on appeal at the Supreme Court came as 
a huge blow. The decision that Snepp had been in violation of his contract 
was upheld. He would hereafter be prevented from publishing without going 
through the PRB again. Furthermore, all of Snepp’s proceeds from the book 
were seized.157 Of the aftermath Snepp has said, ‘One day I had $300,000 in 
the bank; the next day I was flat broke’.158 
 
Aside from the personal hardship that the judgement brought on Snepp, it 
also constituted a landmark case in terms of constitutional rights. Probably 
the most shocking revelation was that an individual would effectively 
surrender their First Amendment rights of free speech when they entered 
employment with the agency. Furthermore, if they violated this agreement, 
they were likely to suffer severe financial losses.159 Ironically, around the 
same time as Snepp’s trial a Civil Service Reform Act was recommended by 
President Jimmy Carter that was intended to set up provisions for an Office 
of Special Counsel for the protection of whistleblowers. Carter showed his 
hand when he declared Snepp was not a whistleblower as he ‘revealed our 
nation’s utmost secrets’. A journalist then pointedly asked why no criminal 
charges had been brought against Snepp for breaking secrecy law.160 Turner 
would get a taste of his own medicine when he submitted the manuscript for 
his memoir to the PRB in 1983. The PRB did not give him an easy ride, which 
is unsurprising given his background with the agency.161 Furthermore, now at 
the helm was the new CIA Director William Casey, who was even more 
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Whether or not one has any sympathy towards any of the individuals 
described as whistleblowers in this chapter, it is clear that for all of them the 
decision to make an unauthorised disclosure had drastic personal 
consequences. Interestingly, it is also quite clear from the majority of the 
information that has been collected that both Ellsberg and Agee were acutely 
aware of the possible consequences that they might have to face. Snepp’s 
case was markedly different in that way. Although this does not provide any 
further proof of their motivations to leak information, it does indicate that 
there was an element of forethought or, at the very least, a consideration for 
what would happen afterwards. It is also clear in the case of Agee that even 
without a mobile phone, the agencies’ technology for tracing and tracking 
individuals was highly advanced implying that, even in 1970, there was no 
place to hide. Because of the pervasive culture of privileged CIA secrecy, 
betraying the trust afforded to agency employees was to become persona 
non grata. The code that exists within the agency, ‘never celebrate our 
successes; never explain our failures’ does not allow for unauthorised 
disclosures. 
 
The three cases presented here are very different in nature and each 
represent very inconsistent experiences for the insiders. Ellsberg has 
traditionally been considered to be the first whistleblower and his actions 
certainly reflect those of an insider who has discovered a case of abuse of 
power within the intelligence community. From the evidence examined it can 
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be discerned that Ellsberg did explore a number of avenues, including 
bringing the files to the Senate, before he used leaking as a last resort 
medium to blow the whistle. I would conclude that Agee, on the other hand, 
does not qualify as a whistleblower. Agee purportedly wrote his book to 
expose the globally surreptitious nature of the CIA. There is no evidence to 
suggest that he pursued raising his concerns internally. Furthermore, Agee 
was continuously involved in the publicising of active CIA officers stationed 
abroad. Although there was no proof that Agee was in fact responsible for 
Welch’s death, these actions are not in keeping with those of a genuine 
whistleblower exposing waste, fraud or abuse. Out of these three cases, 
Snepp is most easily defensible as a whistleblower. The evidence explored 
above illustrates Snepp’s attempts to raise his concerns. Additionally, Snepp 
allowed for an internal intervention by expressing his intentions to publish 
early on. Unlike Ellsberg and Agee, Snepp is also singular in his decision not 
to publish classified material.  
 
Ellsberg, Agee and Snepp were not the only ones who had experienced 
prosecution during this period. Marchetti also suffered financially and 
psychologically.163 Other notable individuals who have been named under 
the headings of ‘whistleblowers’ in the US at this time are Perry Fellwock (aka 
Winslow Peck), the first NSA whistleblower. Fellwock, like Ellsberg, came 
forward in 1971. In the UK, the 1980s were the time of the leakers and 
dissidents. In 1980, the Zircon Affair set the ball rolling. 
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Chapter 3        
   A Game of Politics 
‘There has never been a greater need for whistleblowing and 
there has never been greater intimidation to restrict 
whistleblowing or dissuade people from whistleblowing.’1 
 
The 1990s were marked by the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet 
Union. These events cast along shadow through much of the decade. 
Accordingly, it is not possible to discuss the significant elements of this period 
of time without addressing the catalyst for this phase of forced, rapid change 
in foreign policy for the western world; particularly the adjustments made by 
the US and the UK. Above all, it is important to underline the point that the 
end of the Cold War was a notable surprise for most officials both in the East 
and the West.2 There were a number of complex issues for the intelligence 
community that arose as a consequence of this unexpected and significant 
shift in the structure of the international order, including that relating to 
information and communications.3 
 
Most importantly, the Cold War had seen intelligence agencies organised 
around the Westphalian divide, with most states choosing to separate their 
domestic and foreign agencies. The continuing disconnect between the 
various US agencies in the 1990s was, in hindsight, a key ingredient to the 
intelligence failures that were to follow. It has to be acknowledged that 
relationships between the intelligence agencies were not ideal for a newly 
globalized world. The US NSA and the UK Government Communication 
                                                        
1 Melvin Goodman, Personal Interview, Former CIA Analyst, 12 April 2018, Washington, DC, 
USA. 
2 Ofira Seliktar, Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures: Why So Few Predicted the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union: Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
(London: Routledge, 2015). 
3 Moran, Company Confessions, pp. 216-220.  
 - 147 - Dobson 
Headquarters (GCHQ) enjoyed a stronger connection than the NSA with the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
Naturally, this throws up some questions regarding the transnational 
challenges posed by terrorism and organised crime during the 1990s, two 
targets that deliberately leveraged the spaces between national 
jurisdictions.4 
 
The US believed they had ‘won’ the Cold War. Moreover, the CIA felt 
responsible for the victory associated with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.5 Yet the end of the Cold War marked a change in the public perception 
of the importance of intelligence in the US. Throughout the years of the Cold 
War, the growth and continued operation of the intelligence agencies were 
deemed justifiable due to the need for warning of Soviet aggression, 
especially of nuclear attack, together with a focus on indirect conflict in the 
third world. Moreover, it was deemed an advantage to have as much data 
and knowledge about the closed societies of ‘other side’ as possible and this 
required an immense effort to discover even basic facts about the Soviet 
Union. However, by the mid-1990s some politicians were calling for a post-
Cold war peace dividend and budgets were typically cut by a quarter.6 Some 
countries, such as the Netherlands, even abolished some of their secret 
services.7  
 
The 1990s brought a unique blend of issues. As the intelligence agencies 
struggled to adapt, so did the laws and foreign policies in the US. Initially, the 
CIA’s Director James Woolsey predicted that the CIA’s new target was 
economic intelligence and America’s commercial rivals. Only in the second 
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half of the decade did it become clear that a shift in the global atmosphere 
had stirred a different type of enemy. The end of the Cold War had seen a 
collapse of leftist extremism, namely that of communism that had flourished 
in Eastern European states and Latin American countries. However, this 
opened up a void that was filled with, what is now known as, ‘new terrorism’ 
characterised by extremist interpretations of religion and mass casualty 
attacks.8 Zegart argues that across the board, the US intelligence 
communities’ ability to adjust to the new post- Cold War reality was poor, 
resisting the prescriptions of the plethora of blue-ribbon panels that 
suggested reform.9 It is perhaps not so surprising then that, only a decade 
later, with 9/11, another failure to predict events resulted in one of the 
largest terrorist attacks of the western world. Zegart explores the case for the 
agencies failure to adapt following an intelligence breakdown. She argues 
that the inability to implement structural reform left a gaping security hole in 
the defence of the state that would be exploited in the worst possible way.10  
 
In 1989 George Herbert Walker Bush, father to George Walker Bush, was 
inaugurated as the 41st President of the US. According to the Intelligence 
Historian Christopher Andrew, Bush Snr was one of only three Presidents that 
had an appreciation for intelligence before coming into office.11 Bush Snr had 
the benefit of serving as the Director of the CIA from 1976-1977. Bush Snr 
was succeeded by President Bill Clinton, who managed to hold onto the 
White House for two consecutive terms. While Bush Snr focused on foreign 
affairs to the exclusion of almost everything else, Clinton reversed this trend, 
reportedly offering his intelligence chiefs little time or attention.12  
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The focus of this chapter will be on Melvin Goodman and Jennifer 
Glaudemans who have been referred to as whistleblowers. Both were active 
during this fascinating period which was, paradoxically, marked by 
uncertainty in the international system and a decisive turn away from foreign 
affairs in the White House. Furthermore, there was a reluctance to change or 
restructure within the intelligence community, which was exacerbated by 
budget cuts that limited the scope for new recruitment or retraining.  
 
 
DCI Robert Gates and the CIA 
The idea of Robert or ‘Bob’ Gates as the new CIA Director had already been 
debated in the previous decade, since he had first been nominated in 1987, 
but withdrew his nomination due to controversy over the Iran-Contra affair. 
Gates was an unusual choice for Director, as he was a former analyst but had 
nevertheless held the post of DDCI from 1986 to 1989.13 It was announced 
that Gates would be taking over as Director. Gates, described as a ‘career 
professional’, joined the CIA in 1966 and served the US national security 
establishment through various different roles until his retirement from the 
role of US Secretary of Defence in 2011. In this respect, he followed the path 
of others before and after him like John Schlesinger and Leon Panetta who 
also held both these roles.14  
 
Gates stands out in history, having risen from the rank of an entry-level 
analyst, he was the youngest person ever to be appointed as DCI. This feat is 
even more remarkable considering that Gates had first been nominated as 
the Director for Central Intelligence by Ronald Reagan in 1987, four years 
prior to his successful second nomination in 1991 by George H W Bush. His 
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nomination followed the retirement of William Webster, who had taken on 
the role after Gates withdrew his nomination in 1987. The questions over 
Iran-Contra, perhaps the greatest US intelligence scandal of all time, 
remained unanswered.15 Reportedly singled out and mentored closely by 
William Casey, Gates was tarred with the same brush. An old hand from the 
swashbuckling wartime OSS, Casey was a cold warrior, notorious for his anti-
communist position on the Soviet Union and his aggressive approach to 
covert action during the Cold War. Consequently, Gates’ judgements and 
decision-making were under scrutiny. This was largely due to the perceived 
need for objectivity in any analysis compiled by the intelligence agencies. 
Objectivity, at least on the surface, was key to a mutually beneficial 
relationship between any intelligence organisation and its customer.  
 
The Iran-Contra affair or scandal was exposed in November 1986. It resulted 
from a decision taken by senior officials in the US government in 1985, to 
surreptitiously and illegally sell arms to Iran. The aim was to use profits from 
this sale to fund anti-communist activities in Latin America, also an 
embargoed activity. The antagonistic relationship between the US and Iran 
had heightened, following a hostage crisis at the American Embassy in Tehran 
in 1979. Tensions had been rising, culminating in over 50 Americans being 
held captive at their Embassy in Tehran. After a 444-day siege, fruitless 
diplomatic negotiations, one successful Canadian-CIA rescue mission of six 
American diplomats and one disastrous rescue attempt by the US military 
resulting in casualties in April 1980, the remaining diplomats and other US 
citizens detained in the Embassy were finally released. The episode resulted 
in economic sanctions against Iran that included freezing Iranian assets held 
in the US and an embargo on any arms trade deals. It was a significant 
moment in US-Iran diplomatic history that would affect the relationship 
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between the two countries for years to come. It is likely that this also had a 
major impact on Jimmy Carter’s failed re-election in 1980.16  
 
Iran-Contra was one of the major scandals of the Reagan presidency and 
indeed threatened to topple the administration. The subsequent inquires led 
to the imprisonment of members of National Security Council staff and it had 
a lasting impact on US foreign policy and intelligence operations. Especially in 
the ensuing decade, it would lead to more questions being asked of future 
leaders. The covert operation known as Iran-Contra was leaked to the 
Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa on the 3rd November 1986. Details came to 
light after the affair was confirmed by the Iranian government and President 
Ronald Reagan. The primary aim of the sale of arms to Iran through Israel was 
to secure the safe return of US hostages held by the paramilitary group 
Hezbollah. Subsequently, a portion of the proceeds from this sale were then 
redirected to fund various right-wing rebel groups in Nicaragua, known as the 
contras. The orchestrator of this operation, which was in direct violation of 
directions given by the US Congress banning funding of the contras, was 
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council. President 
Reagan also was implicated in the scandal through his support of the Contras, 
which he expressed in a public statement on the 13th November 1986. Many 
suspected that he had been told in outline about the scheme and had given 
his assent.17   
 
Subsequently, winCongress and the Tower Review Board launched 
investigations that found several false claims had been made by the 
administration - at best, questionable decision-making and at worst, 
deliberate concealment of illegal activities at the highest level of government. 
                                                        
16 Warren Christopher, American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985); David Patrick Houghton, US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage 
Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
17 The key accounts are: Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1991); William S. Cohen and George John Mitchell, Men of Zeal: A 
Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings (New York: Viking, 1988). 
 - 152 - Dobson 
It was only natural then that any future leadership would come under close 
scrutiny. Much of the debate turned around the degree to which Iran-Contra 
had been organised by the CIA on the one hand, or by free-booting officials 
under the National Security Council staff working unofficially with private 
security companies on the other. The question of the degree of involvement 
by DCI Casey and his immediate circle, including Gates, has never quite been 
resolved and continues to be debated.18 However, James McCullough, 
Director of the DCI Executive Staff, recalls that late November and early 
December of 1987 'were the three weeks when the roof, in both political and 
physical terms, fell in on DCI Bill Casey.'19 
 
The office of the DCI existed from 1946 to 2005. As with other senior roles of 
the executive branch, there were two requirements in order to be 
successfully selected as DCI. Firstly, a nomination by the President of the US 
and secondly, a confirmation by the Senate. The holder of the position was 
the highest-ranking intelligence officer in the US. Simultaneously acting as 
head of the CIA, chief intelligence advisor to the US President and chairing 
the National Security Council (NSC), the DCI also performed an important co-
ordinating (although not controlling) function for the whole of the US 
intelligence community. This office was in operation for 59 years, until the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 divided the role of 
DCI into two positions. Firstly, the Director of the CIA, as the chief of the CIA 
and secondly, the DNI the head of the intelligence community, taking over 
the role of chief advisor to the President, as the chair of the NSC, together 
with a command function for the whole community. The DNI’s own co-
ordinating staff quickly grew to over 5,000, twice the size of the UK’s MI6.20 
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In 1976, the Senate formed the SSCI to provide oversight ‘of the intelligence 
activities and programs of the US Government’, to deliver ‘appropriate 
proposals for legislation’ on intelligence to the Senate, to inform the Senate 
on ‘intelligence activities and programs’, to make sure government adheres 
to relevant legislation on oversight and to make every effort to ensure 
‘conformity with the Constitution and laws of the US’ governing intelligence 
activities.21 A part of the SSCI’s purview was to assess the Gates’ nomination 
for DCI. On the 17 February 1987, the SSCI met for the first time to discuss 
the nomination of Robert Gates as DCI. In a letter to Gates that contains a 
questionnaire, David Boren, then chairman of the SSCI, writes ‘…the 
Committee has an obligation to review your role in matters that are currently 
under investigation by two special Congressional committees, an 
independent counsel, and a Presidential panel […] additional questions are 
intended to provide a comprehensive record with respect to topics of special 
concern.’22 The answers to these questions, some of which are declassified, 
reveal that Gates concedes to having knowledge of the plans for Iran-Contra. 
The question then centred around the details. Subsequently, Gates decided 
to withdraw from his nomination.  
 
In June 1991, marking another first for Gates, he was (to date) the only 
individual to be nominated for DCI a second time.23 On this occasion, he was 
nominated by President George H. W. Bush. The SSCI hearings commenced 
on the 16th September 1991. There was a delay in scheduling the hearing due 
to the guilty-plea of a former CIA officer, who admitted to two 
misdemeanours for withholding information regarding the Iran-Contra affair. 
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Moreover, the individual had disclosed that, contrary to previous accounts, 
there had been greater knowledge of the operation within the CIA. Although 
Gates was not implicated directly, the decision was taken to delay until the 
full testimony of the officer was delivered. During this period of delay, two 
further sets of allegations were brought to the Senate. Firstly, concerns were 
raised by some of Gates’ colleagues within the agency, regarding his proclivity 
for manipulating intelligence in a way that would suit policy-maker objectives. 
These allegations of ‘politicisation’ referred particularly to Gates’ time as 
DDCI under Casey. Secondly, allegations were made by the media and others 
external to the agency that Casey had deceived Congress by withholding 
information and been involved with the illegal trade of arms and intelligence 
to foreign states.24  
 
Consequently, there was an investigation by committee staff into both 
allegations. It was held that there was no evidence to suggest that there was 
truth to the allegations made by outsiders. However, the other set of 
allegations made by Gates’ agency colleagues, concerning politicisation, 
would be explored further.25 Overall, the investigation included 80 interviews 
and the examination of hundreds of documents. The decision was taken to 
hold two public hearings from the 1-2 of October, where six (current and 
former) intelligence officers testified. These are the stories of Melvin 
Goodman and Jennifer Glaudemans - two former CIA analysts who gave 
evidence against Bob Gates in 1991. This raises the interesting question of 
whether the SSCI mechanisms of DCI nomination review inadvertently 
created a formal mechanism for retrospective whistleblowing within the 
intelligence community.26   
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Melvin Goodman (1991)27 
Melvin Goodman is an intelligence practitioner turned academic. Through his 
work at the CIA and since then in an academic context he is a Soviet/Russian 
expert. Amongst others, he has written for the New York Times, Washington 
Post, and Harper's. Goodman is the author of six monographs on US 
intelligence and international security. Goodman joined the CIA in the 1960s 
and his career serving in the military and intelligence spans a total of 42 years. 
Goodman proceeded to become division chief and senior analyst in the Soviet 
division of the CIA.28 After leaving the CIA in 1990, Goodman was appointed 
as a Professor of National Security at the National War College in Washington 
DC and taught there for 18 years and he is currently the Director of the 
National Security Project at the Centre for International Policy in Washington 
DC.29 In 1987, Goodman had been seconded to the War College, to ‘make 
War College students more aware of the role and importance of intelligence 
in the formation of national security policy’.30 Goodman writes that the War 
College gave him an extraordinary amount of freedom to explore and publish 
research. Except for one case, there was no major censoring of his largely 
critical writing of the White House and Congress.31 Again, this raises the 
fascinating question of formal mechanisms, in this case the military’s own 
university system, as an accidental site of both whistleblowing and 
accountability.   
 
In the nomination letter that Gates wrote for Goodman’s original 
secondment to the War College he states, ‘Mr Goodman is one of our most 
able and experienced officers, having twenty years’ experience with this 
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Agency. […] Based upon his intellectual attributes and experience, I am 
confident that Mr Goodman will be a strong addition to your faculty.’32 This 
is somewhat contrary to some of the reports given during Gates’ nomination 
hearing, which suggested that Goodman produced reports that were not well 
received by Gates. These reports primarily concerned the activities in the 
third world and overall threat level of the Soviet Union. Gates objected 
vehemently to the analysis that Goodman provided. The New York Times 
archives provides some interesting excerpts of Gates’ comments on these 
reports that were released as part of the hearing. His responses are largely 
emotive and contemptuous. On one occasion Gates writes, ‘Per your request, 
I have read the attached draft and, unhappily, find it to be rather dry and 
lacking any sense of the dynamics of Soviet involvement in the third world…’33 
This suggests that maybe there was an ulterior motive for no longer wanting 
Goodman at the Agency. Though, Goodman frames his decision to leave as 
entirely his own, it could have been a pleasant development for Gates.  
 
In 2017, Goodman published his book Whistleblower at the CIA: An insider’s 
account of the politics of intelligence. This depicts Goodman’s journey from 
his early years at the CIA, to his path to becoming a dissident and providing 
evidence to the SSCI. Reviews of the book demonstrate that Goodman is well 
respected in the whistleblower community. Seymour Hersh is a prominent 
journalist and no friend of the CIA who has mainly written for the New York 
Times and the New Yorker. He was involved in publicising the Pentagon 
Papers and writes in recognition of Goodman, who he states has continued 
to make a case to recognise corruption and politicisation within the 
intelligence community and the American military. Daniel Ellsberg, the figure 
at the centre of the Pentagon Papers, writes that Goodman’s book 
demonstrates why whistleblowers are so important. Goodman also has 
                                                        
32 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Letter of recommendation’. 
33 The New York Times, The Gates Hearings: Excerpts from CIA documents released in 
Gates Hearings, The New York Times, 2 October 1991, Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/02/us/the-gates-hearings-excerpts-from-cia-
documents-released-in-gates-hearings.html. 
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ringing endorsements from individuals such as Thomas Drake, John Kiriakou 
and Coleen Rowley. This, in turn, indicates that whistleblowers and 
journalists, while not at all the same thing, often hunt as a pack and recognise 
a common quarry in what they consider to be excessive government secrecy.  
 
Stage One: Going Against the Grain  
When Gates was first nominated to step up as DCI in 1987, Goodman was 
hesitant to act.34 He explains that this was not due to any uncertainty that 
coming forward would be the right thing to do, but that he was conscious of 
the potential consequences for himself and his family. He also notes that he 
was, at the time, still in the employ of the CIA, which he was certain would 
complicate his position considerably. Goodman details how the agency had 
changed considerably the moment that William Casey took over as the 
Director. In his book, Goodman writes, ‘Casey would be the first CIA Director 
who would not require a scrambler telephone; his speech was naturally 
scrambled. […] He was incomprehensible’.35 However, more than his curious 
speech, Casey’s fixed views proved problematic for analysts of the Soviet 
division. The situation would grow worse over the course of Casey’s 
directorship and Goodman became increasingly troubled. Under Casey’s 
leadership the CIA went underground, even abolishing its press office for a 
while. Whether as a symptom of the scandals of previous decades or as a 
particular objective by those in charge, the CIA tried to melt into the shadows, 
hoping to disappear from the public conscious.  
 
By 1991, everything had changed for Goodman. He did not hesitate to come 
forward to oppose Gates’ nomination for Director, as he was no longer 
employed by the CIA. Goodman now felt there was no reason to hold back.36 
Goodman became the primary accuser, he lists a number of different reasons 
                                                        
34 Goodman, Whistleblower at the CIA, p. 130. 
35 Ibid. p. 106. 
36 Goodman, Whistleblower at the CIA, p. 130. 
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for his decision to take the actions he did. Goodman also persuaded two of 
his former colleagues to testify. He recalls that there were a number of his 
former colleagues who were feeling exactly the same as he was but were too 
afraid of the consequences of coming forward. The justification he offers for 
asking Ford and Glaudemans to support his statements was that both had 
already left the CIA at this point, so the danger of any reprisal was limited.37  
 
The concept of a whistleblower is contentious, Goodman makes a specific 
distinction between a leaker and a whistleblower. Interestingly, Goodman 
sees himself as both a whistleblower and a leaker. In his book, Goodman also 
explores the concepts of dissidents and contrarians, though he states he does 
not like either term.38 According to Goodman, a whistleblower is an individual 
who acts in order to correct, reverse, challenge or expose something that 
they ‘reasonably’ deem to be wrong. They do this either for political or moral 
reasons.39 Leaking is an act of providing information to an external party, for 
instance, the press. This distinction highlights that a separation should be 
made between the two acts. Additionally, in this case, it suggests that the 
process for whistleblowing is more emotionally involving, time-consuming 
yet essential for any insider who wants to raise concerns about a wrong. 
 
Goodman speaks of his ‘internal battles about politicisation’.40 He explains 
that it was a strong feeling that originated in the 1980s. Goodman, by his own 
testimony, had spent 15 happy years at the CIA, but was beginning to see a 
sharp escalation of politicised intelligence when William Casey first became 
DCI in 1981. As the problem worsened, Goodman says, ‘after five years of 
fighting it within the agency and not having a lot of success, I have to say, I 
chose to leave.41 Colleagues and supervisors at the War College, Goodman 
asserts, were supportive overall, but did not ‘pitch in’ when it came to battling 
                                                        
37 Goodman, Personal Interview. 
38 Goodman, Whistleblower at the CIA, p. 7. 
39 Goodman, Personal Interview. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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Gates and Casey. After his secondment to the War College finished, Goodman 
decided to stay on despite receiving good job offers back at the agency. He 
states, ‘I didn’t want to go back to the CIA’. This feeling only intensified when 
Goodman realised Gates had been nominated for DCI again. ‘The idea of 
taking the person who was responsible and putting them at the head of that 
organisation was unthinkable. This is when I knew I had to act.’42 
 
Stage Two: The ‘Revolution’  
In this case, the act of whistleblowing was Goodman approaching the Senate 
with concerns about politicisation – the deliberate means of manipulating 
intelligence to meet political ends. The first meeting Goodman was called to 
consisted of a small gathering of staffers without the presence of any 
Senators. Here, Goodman spoke about the concerns he had and provided 
examples of politicisation. Goodman recalls that the body language of the 
staffers conveyed their surprise; they had never heard of anything like this. 
Following this first meeting, Goodman was invited to three further meetings, 
each time with more people in the room until they were standing behind the 
desks due to a lack of chairs.43  
 
Goodman recollects that John Moseman, the Minority Staff Director, became 
incredibly hostile towards him. He only realised later that Moseman and the 
future DCI, George Tenet (DCI 1996-2004), who was then the SSCI Staff 
Director, were very good friends. Goodman claims there was a lot of internal 
political gameplay that affected, not only the outcome of the hearings, but 
also the process.44 It was reportedly Moseman who fought against 
Goodman’s testimony being heard in an open session. However, after the 
first 20 minutes of Goodman’s statement in the closed session Senator Sam 
Nunn of Georgia raised concerns, ‘this is much too sensitive to discuss in a 
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closed session, we should hold this in open session’. Goodman says this 
sparked such an intense verbal conflict between Nunn and Senator Warren 
Rudman of New Hampshire that the room had to be cleared. An open session 
was scheduled for the autumn. Nonetheless, the irony of Nunn’s interjection 
should not go unmentioned.  
 
The main SSCI open hearings were stretched over three days, 24 September 
and 1-2 October. Alongside the testimony from Charles Allen, then the 
National Intelligence Officer for Warning, and Richard Kerr, then the acting 
Director for Central Intelligence, the SSCI heard statements from six 
individuals concerning the allegations of politicisation. Testimonies were 
given by: Harold (also known as Hal) Ford, former acting chairman of the 
National Intelligence Council (NIC); Graham Fuller, former Vice Chairman of 
the NIC; Lawrence Gershwin, the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic 
Programs at the CIA; Melvin Goodman, former Division Chief, Office of Soviet 
Analysis at the CIA; Jennifer Glaudemans, former Analyst, Office of Soviet 
Analysis at the CIA and Douglas MacEachin, former Director, Office of Soviet 
Analysis at the CIA.  
 
Goodman describes the process of testifying in front of the Senate as 
isolating. There was a very real feeling of not only going against the system, 
but against the express wishes of the President of the US.45 Goodman talks 
of a conversation he has with his brother-in-law that angered him immensely, 
‘He told me, you know what is going to happen to you, don’t you? [mimes 
crushing something under his thumb]’. Though Goodman concedes that ‘this 
is the world you enter’. There is no real understanding of what will happen to 
you, you are naïve and thoroughly unprepared.46 The advice that Goodman 
wishes he had received beforehand was to get guidance from a lawyer and 
have them proof the testimony. There was no level of support from the 
                                                        
45 Ibid. 
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Senate, though he feels that he should have approached the Democrats on 
the committee for guidance. Considering the high stakes, it is surprising that 
more support was not sought. Equally, had Goodman sought a lawyer he 
would have been required to pay it himself. 
 
There is also a serious question to be levelled at the CIA. The wider process 
suggests an unwillingness to hear concerns. Although, Goodman was no 
longer an employee of the CIA, he had sufficient knowledge from his years of 
service and support from former colleagues still at the agency to warrant 
mature consideration. On the contrary, Goodman details shocking levels of 
intimidation that were used against him, his partner, who has since become 
his wife, and anyone else who was supporting him publicly. The pressure 
extended through threats is, perhaps, difficult to comprehend for an outsider 
who is often reassured that polygraph tests are notoriously unreliable.47 
However, it is clear to see from Goodman’s reaction when talking about the 
threatened polygraph test that this is not a joking matter for those who find 
themselves in such a situation. Goodman explains that his now wife had 
submitted a sworn affidavit in support of his testimony. Following this, she 
had become the target of an intimidation campaign, where she was 
polygraphed.48  
 
The relationship between whistleblowers and the press can be tense, even 
strained. Primarily, this is due to their different objectives. Nevertheless, 
Goodman holds that: ‘Ultimately, you cannot have an impact unless you go 
to the press’. He references Thomas Drake as the perfect example of an 
individual who was unsuccessful in pursuing multiple official internal routes 
to bring attention to a wrong. Drake, in the end, took the only path that was 
left. Goodman sees this as a confirmation that he did the right thing in leaking 
information to the press during the hearings. Moreover, he regrets not being 
                                                        
47 Personal information. 
48 Goodman, Personal Interview; on this subject see, John F. Sullivan, Gatekeeper: Memoirs 
of a CIA Polygraph Examiner (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007). 
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more active in pursuing news stories and getting the proof of his allegations 
out there. After the hearings were over, Goodman says he was approached 
by CNN, NBC and television chat shows, such as Ted Koppel, all of which he 
now regrets turning down, for this would have brought more public attention 
to both his whistleblowing claims and his subsequent treatment by the 
Agency. One remark that Goodman makes in his book is particularly 
troubling, as it shows the magnitude of the actions he was taking. Major 
General Walter Stadler was Goodman’s boss at the National War College, 
which formed a part of the Department of Defence. Stadler attempted to 
convince Goodman not to testify, which would have been a violation of 
federal law as Goodman had been issued with a subpoena.49 
 
Stage Three: Moving On 
The testimony provided by Goodman and the other analysts did not alter the 
outcome of the nomination. Though, it did provide cause for concern and 
prompted Gates to make promises to implement change.50  
 
For Goodman himself, there was little personal backlash. Speaking about the 
hearings, Goodman notes that it was like being in the eye of the storm, but 
not quite being aware of the periphery. Nevertheless, he continued to work 
for the War College, eventually being promoted to Professor. It was the 
anecdotes of his family that suggested that the direct consequences of his 
actions did not become clear to him until afterwards. Goodman talks of his 
daughter, who was at University during this time, calling him following his 
public testimony. She had one question for him, ‘Are you telling the truth?’. 
Goodman’s son went to a bar during the evening, where they were showing 
the testimony of the day. He told his father that every time Rudman said 
something the people in the bar would boo and every time Goodman spoke, 
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they would cheer. Goodman remarks that being in the limelight like that is 
nerve-wracking, there is no way of anticipating what the reaction of the 
public will be.51 The general sense throughout my 80-minute interview with 
Goodman was that the experience still brought negative feelings and 
concerns to the surface.  
 
Overall, Goodman says of the government, ‘they don’t really want to know 
how bad the situation is, because then they might have to do something 
about it’. There is a clear sense of frustration when speaking of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, marking an enormous failure of intelligence and a complete 
lack of foresight on behalf of the government. Despite initial ostensible 
moves to make changes, overall Goodman has little faith that the system 
itself will ever change. If anything, he believes that the consistent efforts to 
force change may have exacerbated these negative practices and increased 
resistance to reform. Since Gates, Goodman insists the DCI’s have been 
carefully chosen. This suggests that there is, if not intention then certainly 
potential, to influence decision-making and politicisation of intelligence in a 
major way. Perhaps one of the biggest examples in the last two decades is 
the WMD fiasco. Goodman’s thesis also converges with that of Amy Zegart, a 
political scientist who explained intelligence failures around 9/11 in terms of 




Jennifer Glaudemans was 32 at the time that she testified in front of the SSCI 
on the 2nd October 1991. Glaudemans gained her Master’s in Public Affairs 
from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs in 1983. 
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In October that year, she entered the Career Training Program. Until her 
resignation in 1990, Glaudemans mainly worked on Soviet intelligence. After 
leaving the CIA, she went to law school and is currently working in the Office 
of Global Criminal Justice (Department of State) as a Foreign Affairs Officer. 
At the time of the hearing, Glaudemans describes herself as an extremely 
busy woman, with two small children and pursuing a career in law. She felt 
that she was very much doing her duty by confirming a wrongdoing within 
her office.  
 
Although Glaudemans gave evidence at the same time as Goodman, she does 
not consider herself a whistleblower. Glaudemans considers a whistleblower 
to be an individual who comes forward with an example of wrongdoing. She 
distinguishes this from her own situation, because she was asked to verify 
information that had already been provided by others. She sees this as 
contrary to Goodman who took a lead and approached the Senate.  
 
Stage One: Summoned  
On the 12 September 1991, Glaudemans received a letter that read: 
‘Dear Ms Glaudemans: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will soon 
commence confirmation hearings regarding the nomination of Robert M 
Gates to be DCI. It is the Committee’s intent to conduct as thorough and fair 
an evaluation of the nomination as is possible’.54 The letter goes on to explain 
that the SSCI had encountered an issue that warranted further consideration. 
They explain that allegations had been made against Gates to suggest that he 
had ‘encouraged the tailoring of intelligence to support existing foreign policy 
or to fit the views of [then] DCI Casey and senior policymakers’.55  
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Murkowski’, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Personal Papers, 12 September 
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The committee asked for any evidence that could prove or disprove these 
allegations. The letter details that the hearing Glaudemans was invited to was 
intended to be a closed session to discuss classified information. This was also 
a request for Glaudemans to appear as a witness. The SSCI asks for the 
following points to be considered in addition to any general remarks on the 
topic: 1) ‘Specific instances where you believe intelligence analysis produces 
by SOVA and/or NESA was politicized during Robert Gates’ tenure as 
Chairman of the NIC, DDI and DDCI, or as a direct consequence of his 
management decisions.’ 2) ‘The impact, if any, of those instances on 
personnel decisions and staff morale and performance.’  
 
Unlike other individuals, and certainly in contrast to Goodman, Glaudemans 
is adamant that she did not have any intentions of going to the SSCI of her 
own volition. She explains that there had been an Inspectors General 
investigation going on internally, during which she and everyone else in her 
office was interviewed. Therefore, Glaudemans was aware of this concern 
regarding the manipulation of intelligence analysis or ‘politicization’.56  
 
Glaudemans explains that her biggest fear was that she would make a 
mistake. She describes putting together the majority of her testimony from 
memory, which she hoped would not let her down. The only time that 
Glaudemans gained access to any of her files was the day before she was due 
to give her testimony. She explains that she was worried about overreaching 
herself, as she did not have any PR or legal counsel to guide her through the 
process. The lack of support and the potential benefit of seeking it did not 
occur to her until someone asked her where her representative was on the 
day of the hearing. Glaudemans adds that she would not have been able to 
afford a legal counsel in any case. On the one hand, reflecting on the 
seriousness of the situation, she acknowledges that it could have been 
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beneficial in some way. On the other hand, not having any counsel also meant 
accusations of being coached could not be made and therefore it did not hurt 
her credibility.  
 
Stage Two: No Way Out  
When Glaudemans first gave evidence, it was in a closed session hearing. It 
was not until after this hearing that it was decided that the content should be 
made public. As a result, all the classified material that had been presented 
in the closed hearing was declassified over the weekend so that it could be 
used in the public hearing. This was the single largest declassification in 
history.57 Glaudemans explained that this was a shocking and somewhat 
unexpected development. Before presenting her testimony in the public 
hearing, Glaudemans recalls that she was advised by someone that turquoise 
was the best colour to wear on television.  
 
In her testimony, Glaudemans expresses concerns about the way in which 
Gates handled intelligence analysis on several cases. A memo for a meeting 
on 16th July 1991 with Marvin Ott and Zach Messitte, John Despres and Art 
Grant, clearly details Glaudemans’ views on how Gates handled any analysis 
that did not match his objectives. The memo reads, ‘In May of 1985 a major 
reorganization took place, including the ‘firing’ of Mel Goodman, who was 
repositioned into a research post. MacEachin told me that the reason 
Goodman was removed was because, “you can’t talk back to Robert Gates”.’ 
This stands somewhat in contrast to other reports that have been made 
about Goodman’s move to the War College.  
 
Of her testimony, Glaudemans says she feels that unlike the counter-
argument that was made, the evidence proves that this was not a ‘difference 
of opinion’. Glaudemans holds that Gates did not disagree with any of her 
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statement, but instead he tried to undermine and patronise her. She recalls 
that Gates made an off-the-cuff remark insinuating that Glaudemans was too 
junior to understand the system. Glaudemans denies that this was the case, 
as she had not been a junior analyst for some years.  
 
Glaudemans explained that she was not the only person in her former 
workplace who shared her opinion on Gates, but that many did not want to 
come forward and put themselves into the line of fire. Glaudemans gives the 
impression that she was fervently seeking to do what she considered to be 
her duty; nothing more and nothing less. It is clear that she felt lessons had 
not been learned from intelligence failures, such as Iran-Contra, when they 
should have been.  
 
Glaudemans was not comfortable engaging with the press. She explained 
that she made a conscious decision not to engage with the media, despite 
receiving invitations to appear on programs, such as Nightline and News 
Hour, as well as being approached by various newspapers. The reasons for 
her decision rested mainly on her conviction that this was not part of her 
duty. Glaudemans maintains that it was her duty to appear at the SSCI and 
present her views, experience and any evidence she had within that forum. 
Anything else, she says, fell outside the scope of her professional task. 
Additionally, Glaudemans was keen not to appear as though she did this for 
any other reason than to provide the information that she had been asked to 
give by the SSCI, remarking ‘I didn’t want to come across as if I was just trying 
to seek my 15 minutes of fame’.  
 
Stage Three: No Comment! 
As Glaudemans had moved away from the business of intelligence, there was 
no incentive for her to remain quiet about the information to which she was 
privy. Glaudemans did fear that the reach of those who she had spoken out 
against might catch up with her, but she feels that she has not suffered any 
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reprisal in this way. Nevertheless, at the time, she was told that Stan 
Moskowitz a senior official at the CIA reportedly said to the former boss of 
the State Department, ‘she [Glaudemans] will never work in Washington 
again’.  
 
Following the end of the hearings, Glaudemans received an anonymous letter 
of support that read, ‘Dear Ms Glaudemans, Many have seen Gates as the 
lesser of evils (by comparison to Casey) as an amoralist (going with the 
prevailing word) versus Casey as the immoralist. You have made Congress 
aware that both views are bad, and Gates’ confirmation would be a disservice 
to the CIA, congress, the nation, and yes even President Bush, who does not 
realise that a lack of objectivity and impartiality does great damage in many 
areas. Best regards from the “Hill”’. Attached to the letter was a Washington 
Post article by Benjamin Weiser about the hearing. The anonymous sender 
had circled the section that comments on Glaudemans testimony in red and 




Ultimately, Robert Gates was successful in his bid to become DCI, indeed the 
voting suggests a relatively untroubled confirmation. This perhaps reflects 
the overall texture of the times. As the Cold War was over and ‘won’, many 
on Capitol Hill and also within the CIA were content to continue with business 
as usual. Concluding perhaps that if the overall system was delivering victory, 
then some problematic issues could be tolerated. This might suggest in turn 
that both whistleblowers and leakers thrive best in periods of perceived 
failure? 
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There were clearly different attitudes to whistleblowing between Goodman 
and Glaudemans, differing not only on definitions, but also engagement with 
the press. What is clear is that both felt they were on a learning curve. It could 
possibly be deduced that a support network of former whistleblowers might 
have been helpful in giving advice. Pro bono legal support would certainly 
have been helpful in Glaudemans’ case. Although Goodman describes himself 
as a whistleblower and a leaker, under the circumstances, his actions of 
leaking to the press are arguably defensible. The power dynamic was clearly 
in not in favour of Goodman, thereby making his route to raise the 
wrongdoing and simultaneously defend his own character impossible within 
the system. Furthermore, the politicisation of intelligence can be construed 
as a public interest disclosure and the measures that Goodman took to raise 
awareness were minimal. Glaudemans decided not to make any public 
unauthorised disclosures and stressed during our interviews that she did not 
see herself as a whistleblower. However, it is clear that legally Glaudemans 
epitomises the term by giving evidence to the Senate regarding the abuse of 
power within the CIA.  
 
Were the 90s a period where change caught up with the agencies? Are 9/11 
and the WMD fiasco the result of continued bad decision-making and 
politicisation in the 1990s? Unfortunately, the debate over intelligence 
reform and the related decision of counter-terrorism in this decade are too 
complex to explore here and constitute an intriguing, relevant, but ultimately 
over-weighty and extremely tangled side issue. The thesis offered by Amy 
Zegart perhaps corresponds most closely to some of the findings in this 
chapter, but her explanation of the 1990s and its contribution to 9/11 jostles 
alongside a dozen or so competing arguments, some of them ad hominem 
attacks on Clinton and his foreign policy.59 
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Was this a sign of things to come? The 1990s was a period which celebrated 
transparency as a powerful weapon against autocracy. Security communities 
in the West found it a little awkward to be celebrating Glasnost in the east 
but shutting down critical voices in the West. Accordingly, there were plenty 
of other active figures in this decade. Other whistleblowers in the US during 
this time include: Mark Whiteacre (FBI), Gary Webb (CIA), Frederic 
Whitehurst (FBI) and Linda Tripp (Clinton Administration). In the UK, there 
was a wave of controversy as Paul Henderson and Matrix Churchill Affair filled 
the newspapers, David Shayler and Annie Machon (MI5) took classified 
information to the press before fleeing the country and Stella Rimington, a 
former head of MI5 published her book Open Secret. This pointed the way to 
further trouble for those who preferred workers in the secret world to be 
silent.
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Chapter 4         
 WikiLeaks and Chelsea Manning: ‘The Fog of 
War’ 
On 9/11, four coordinated, devastating and exceptionally large-scale terrorist 
attacks on civilians in the western world were executed by Al-Qaeda. The 
response from the Bush administration was fuelled by public anger, 
manifesting itself in the declaration of what he called ‘The War on Terror’. 
The words of President George W. Bush were controversial, since many 
officials were not convinced that a military response to terrorism was 
appropriate, but the administration, smarting at having been taken by 
surprise, wished to be observed as taking action and these words certainly 
resonated with middle America. 
 
On the surface, the US and its allies presented a united front against the 
enemy. Beneath the surface, however, there was disagreement from the 
outset about how to address an unfamiliar, unstructured and above all else, 
seemingly unpredictable enemy. The world-leading investigative journalist 
Bob Woodward has charted the complex internal politics of Washington DC 
at this time.1 Meanwhile, there is a plethora of academic literature on the 
failure of 9/11, not to mention the official enquiries. In 2001, US forces 
invaded Afghanistan. In 2002, a report ‘confirmed’ that Iraq harboured 
stockpiles of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In 2003, US forces 
invaded Iraq. Yet in 2004, it was publicly acknowledged that there were no 
WMD Destruction in Iraq. The revelations that followed uncovered disturbing 
secrets about the poor functionality of the intelligence community and its 
failure to prevent this large-scale surprise attack. 2 
                                                        
1 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004); Bob Woodward, 
State of Denial (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006). 
2 See for example: Richard Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in 
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In the aftermath of these events, several schools of literature emerged, 
regarding both the failure of preventing the 9/11 attacks and the intelligence 
failures associated with the WMD fiasco. Some argued that these failures 
reflected a long-term trend of over-expectation and too much faith being 
placed in intelligence, while others, like Amy Zegart, took the more optimistic 
line that reform and reorganisation might well have mitigated these failures. 
More importantly, for some years after 9/11, both the academic literature 
and serious press reporting were mostly focused on these twin failures, 
rather than the accelerating and ongoing ‘War on Terror’ in which the 
intelligence agencies formed the cutting edge. 
 
Broadly, there are six main schools of thought associated with the intelligence 
failure of 9/11:  
 
(1) Creating enemies – the idea that because of increased covert action and 
the pursuance of hegemony/imperialism in the 1980s, typically the support 
of the Mujahedeen, there had to be some blowback in terms of the growth 
of violent non-state groups. This is mostly argued by critical commentators.3  
 
(2) Early inaction – others have argued that the problem lay in the post-Cold 
War lethargy of the 1990s and that a reduction in US covert action or 
aggressive intelligence operations allowed the terrorists to get ahead. 
Though a majority proportion of the literature agrees on this, it is divided 
when attributing blame. Bill Gertz concludes that it is the failure of the Clinton 
administration.4 Timothy Naftali holds that despite the historical anxiety in 
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the White House regarding a terrorist attack, in particular during the Reagan 
administration, aggressive policies to prevent an attack were rarely actioned 
to affect any real change by either Republican or Democratic Presidents.5  
 
(3) A failure of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection - Described, by Robert 
Baer, as a result of the cautious bureaucracies in the CIA during the 1990s. 
Consequently, there were few active officers and agents placed in the 
appropriate locations in order to collect valuable intelligence.6 
 
(4) An adaptation and organisational failure - The intelligence community has 
been criticised for being set in its Cold War-ways. Despite many attempts to 
reform, indeed some ten reviews by various blue-ribbon panels, Zegart 
argues there was a failure to adapt and change with the times.7 
 
(5) The 9/11 report produced as a result of the official enquiry, determined 
that the failure was due to ‘a lack of imagination’, thus, exonerating any 
decision-makers or agencies directly.8  
 
(6) In direct contradiction with the 9/11 report, figures like the former 
Director of Counter-terrorism Richard Clarke claimed that the decision-
makers failed to respond to warning signs and down-graded terrorism in 
favour of focusing on Iraq.9 
 
Academics and specialist journalists were still examining the intelligence 
failures related to 9/11 when they were over-taken by the Iraqi WMD 
                                                        
5 Timothy Naftali, ‘Blind Spot’: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: 
Basic Books, 2005). 
6 Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism 
(New York: Crown Books, 2003). 
7 Zegart, Spying Blind. 
8 Richard Falkenrath, 'The 9/11 Commission Report a Review Essay’, International 
Security, 29: 3 (2004), pp. 170-190. 
9 Richard Clarke, Against all enemies: Inside America’s war on terror (New York: Free Press, 
2004). 
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intelligence fiasco. The literature that encompasses this failure can be divided 
into six schools of thought:  
 
(1) Collection failure - Specifically, HUMINT was not up to the task and not 
properly vetted. 
 
(2) An unfathomable omission concerning the employment of WMD 
specialists, especially in the UK. 
 
(3) Bureaucratic failure – The myriad intelligence agencies created an 
overabundance of intelligence that was unstructured and incongruent. 
Working in parallel with each other rather than harmoniously together, they 
then offered policy-makers a menu of different answers to the same 
question. 
 
(4) Psychological failure – many maintain this was an example of groupthink 
with analysts and WMD specialists working together too closely over many 
years to create an echo-chamber in which opinions were not challenged?  
 
(5) Producer-consumer relationship failure – Politicisation effected the 
quality and independence of intelligence produced. 
 
(6) Intelligence failure – The failure to ‘get it right’ demonstrates that there 
was a breakdown in all aspects of the intelligence cycle.10   
 
Broad parallels can be drawn between the failure to detect and the inability 
to prevent these incidents, all pointing towards the lack of a functioning 
collective intelligence community. Above all, the embarrassment of these 
                                                        
10 The literature is vast but see Mark Phythian, ‘The Perfect Intelligence Failure? US Pre-
War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Politics & Policy 34: 2 (2006), 
pp.400-424; Robert Jervis, ‘Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq,’ 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 29: 1 (2006), pp. 3-52. 
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failures sparked a long-overdue wave of reform within the community. There 
was an exponential increase in employment, frantic re-structuring, out-
sourcing but also active legislation. In 2002, Congress passed the Homeland 
Security Act and in 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act (IRTPA).11 IRTPA created the new role of DNI, reforming the National 
Security Act of 1947. The changes were intended to unify the scattered and 
divided intelligence agencies, who had been left crushed after the inability to 
prevent 9/11.12 The failure of the agencies also provided greater justification 
to employ more unscrupulous collection methods in order to detect crime 
and terrorism. Increased activity in the intelligence sector, combined with the 
need to service two expanding wars, led to hastened actions and corner 
cutting. This also led to a decline in the effectiveness of intelligence oversight 
bodies who did not wish to appear as impeding the surge again Al Qaeda. The 
intelligence oversight and accountability structure of the US and the UK, the 
two key state actors in what at times appeared like a catastrophe, are made 
up of both official and unofficial mechanisms. Therefore, the decline of 
official oversight led to more effort by a growing range of informal players 
who eagerly stepped into the vacuum.   
 
In addition to the respective congressional and parliamentary oversight 
committees in operation, there are several unofficial bodies that contribute 
to the accountability of the government. As a result of increasing media 
coverage of controversial foreign policy issues, growing levels of Internet 
usage and the advent of social media, the spread of information is more 
difficult to control. This was markedly felt in the post 9/11 environment. 
Critics of the current system learned much quicker than the intelligence 
strategists stuck in a Cold War mentality. Journalists, civil and human rights 
groups, leakers and whistleblowers, often with hacker links and certainly 
armed with specialist knowledge of all things technical, were quick to educate 
                                                        
11 Richard J. Harknett and James A. Stever, ‘The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11’, 
Public Administration Review, 71: 5 (2011), p. 700. 
12 Harknett, ‘The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11’, p. 702.  
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themselves. The media in particular has long been known as the fourth 
estate, a name that references its role as the government watchdog. 
Additionally, there has been an increase of individuals leaking potentially 
sensitive information to the press in order to effect change and draw 
attention to alleged misdemeanours or becoming journalists themselves by 
publishing directly onto the web in the form of blogs or other online activity.  
 
Not all leakers and whistleblowers worked with journalists or engaged in 
journalism. Some released their material in a direct and unmediated form 
through web platforms, such as, WikiLeaks and other websites like it. In 2013, 
the thriller The Fifth Estate was released.13 It told the story of Julian Assange 
and the creation of WikiLeaks. Although the film received a lot of criticism, 
predominantly from its subjects, it highlights some of the questions that 
should now be posed regarding such an organisation. The name of the film - 
The Fifth Estate - suggests that WikiLeaks is different to journalism, but 
nevertheless could constitute another facet of the accountability mechanism, 
by holding the state to account through its facilitation of leakers and 
whistleblowers. Indeed, WikiLeaks has been categorised by some as an 
‘internet-based watchdog organization’.14 Certainly it encourages leakers to 
dump their material directly and unmediated into the infosphere, rather than 
turning to journalist to mediate it, and in that respect, it may well constitute 
a new ‘Estate’. 
 
However, some hard-nosed questions have to be asked about its operations 
and its approach. The animated debates over WikiLeaks are embedded within 
its structure, the controversial stories which it has been involved with and 
some of the statements that it has (and still is) making. In particular, in 2010, 
WikiLeaks was catapulted onto the world stage through the (to date) largest 
leak of documents. Consisting mostly of State Department cables and some 
                                                        
13 The Fifth Estate [Film], dir. by Bill Condon (USA: Dreamworks, 2013). 
14 Moran, Classified, p.20. 
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controversial video footage concerning the US Army’s activities in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The source was later identified as Private Bradley Manning (now 
known as Chelsea Manning). Manning was reported to the FBI by a computer 
hacker called Adrian Lamo, whom Manning had confided in after leaking the 
information to WikiLeaks.  
 
In this chapter, the organisation WikiLeaks will be examined as a facilitator of 
leaks. Despite WikiLeaks being only one of a number of websites that 
provides this option for potential whistleblowers, it is certainly the most 
recognisable. In large part, its global reputation is thanks to the central role 
it played in the story of Chelsea Manning and vice versa, so reputationally, 
they are bound together. This chapter will first analyse the development of 
WikiLeaks and its founder. It will then analyse the story of Chelsea Manning. 
The two are inextricably linked and therefore, the three stages of 
whistleblowing will be studied in parallel in order to provide a more holistic 
view of the texture of events, as well as the different struggles and 
consequences faced by both.  
 
 
WikiLeaks (2006): Is it a journalist? Is it a lawyer? 
No, it’s WikiLeaks 
‘Mr Assange can say whatever he likes about the greater good he thinks he 
and his source are doing, but the truth is they might already have on their 
hands the blood of some young soldier or that of an Afghan family.’15 
 
The earlier years of WikiLeaks are shrouded in an air of mystery. This may be 
due to the vastly ‘intangible’ nature of the organisation. On its website, Julian 
                                                        
15 Quote from Admiral Mike Mullen, in Roy Greenslade, ‘Wikileaks: White House implores 
Assange to desist, but why should he?’, The Guardian, 30 July 2010, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2010/jul/30/wikileaks-barack-obama. 
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Assange is named as the founder of WikiLeaks. The site states that WikiLeaks 
was created in 2006 and it first published documents in 2007.16 Other 
individuals, who have been publicly acknowledged and have been named as 
integral parts of the organisation, are Sarah Harrison, Kristinn Hrafnsson and 
Joseph Farrell.17 Some sources have linked WikiLeaks to Chinese dissidents 
and several other well-known figures at its conception, such as Glenn 
Greenwald.18 Though details are scarce, WikiLeaks have confirmed this on 
their website.19  
 
US Government was quick to respond. According to a set of email 
correspondence and attached slides released by WikiLeaks in 2016 that were 
attributed to US based companies - Palantir Technologies, HBGary Federal 
and Berico Technologies, the WikiLeaks network was considered a ‘cyber and 
national security threat’.20 These three companies, which specialise in 
computer software and big data analytics, are all confirmed to be 
government contractors. It describes WikiLeaks as a congruent collective of 
individuals and organisations, whose singular objective is ‘untraceable mass 
document leaking’. This categorisation underlines that the slides are a pitch 
for the three companies to use non-traditional methods to fight WikiLeaks 
and other insider threats. The methods refer to mass data collection and 
triangulation of metadata in order to establish connections and online 
activities.21 The slides illustrate the companies’ capabilities and brief to 
specifically target WikiLeaks.  
 
                                                        
16 Wikileaks, ‘What Is Wikileaks?’, 3 November 2015, available at: 
https://wikileaks.org/What-is-Wikileaks.html. 
17 Risk [Documentary], dir. by Laura Poitras, (USA: Praxis Films, 2017). 
18 Wikileaks, Media/Chinese Wikileaks Aids Whistleblower, 11 January 2007, available at: 
https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Media/Chinese_WikiLeaks_Aids_Whistleblowers. 
19 Wikileaks, ‘Media/Chinese Wikileaks Aids Whistleblower’.  
20 Wikileaks, ‘The Wikileaks Threat: An Overview by Palantir Technologies, HBGary Federal, 
and Berico Technologies’, no date, available at:  
https://www.wikileaks.org/IMG/pdf/WikiLeaks_Response_v6.pdf. 
21 Wikileaks, ‘The Wikileaks Threat: An Overview by Palantir Technologies’. 
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In the dominant literature, Assange is frequently referred to as the editor, 
publisher, spokesperson and the face of the organisation. In terms of its 
agenda, it is quite evident that Assange and the organisation are symbiotic. 
According to their website, ‘WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and 
publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official 
materials involving war, spying and corruption’.22 Assange describes it as, ‘a 
giant library of the world’s most persecuted documents. We give asylum to 
these documents, we analyze them, we promote them and we obtain 
more’.23 The idea that information or data might be treated as a person that 
wants to be free is, in itself, fascinating. On its ‘media kit’ webpage, WikiLeaks 
specifies that it ‘should be described, depending on context, as the ‘open 
government group’, ‘anti-corruption group’, ‘transparency group’ or 
‘whistleblower's site’’.24 At a very broad level, WikiLeaks can be described as 
an organisation with an affiliated website that enables individuals from 
around the world to submit content. WikiLeaks provides the following 
instructions to sources25 prior to their submission of documents: ‘WikiLeaks 
publishes documents of political or historical importance that are censored 
or otherwise suppressed. We specialise in strategic global publishing and 
large archives’.26  
 
The organisation also describes itself as a library, which is a somewhat 
contradictory assessment of what they provide for a number of reasons. 
There is an issue of bias, something that is broadly defined and understood 
                                                        
22 WikiLeaks, ‘What is WikiLeaks?’. 
23 Michael Sontheimer, ‘Spiegel Interview with Julian Assange: “We are drowning in 
material”’, Spiegel Online, 20 July 2015, available at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-wikileaks-head-julian-
assange-a-1044399.html. 
24 WikiLeaks, ‘WikiLeaks: Media Kit’, no date, available at: 
https://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/WikiLeaks:Media_Kit 
25 To avoid confusion, when discussing a non-specific person who is submitting information 
to WikiLeaks, they will henceforth be referred to as the ‘source’. If a known source is 
referred to, they will be named. A source is not necessarily considered to be a 
whistleblower.  
26 WikiLeaks, ‘Submit Documents to WikiLeaks’, no date, available at: 
https://wikileaks.org/#submit. 
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to be, a ‘judgement unfairly influenced by subjective opinion when the 
situation calls for reliance on objective facts’.27 It is almost impossible to 
eliminate bias, even in reference books. WikiLeaks operations suggest that 
any assessment and analysis of documents prior to publishing could also 
result in ‘precensorship’.28 This is likely true for every organisation dealing 
with politically or otherwise sensitive material. However, the bold statements 
by Wikileaks suggest that it considers itself above reproach. On its website, it 
makes the following claim - ‘Although no organization can hope to have a 
perfect record forever, thus far WikiLeaks has a perfect in document 
authentication and resistance to all censorship attempts’.29 The vast 
academic debate about epistemology, bias and truth, drawing in theorists of 
the first rank such as those by Marx, Weber, Mills, Gramsci, Althusser, Becker 
and Gouldner, Haack and Lather suggest that objectivity is not an easy bar to 
reach and that Wikileaks have at best interpreted this term in a rather 
superficial way.30  
 
Alongside the US government’s furious response to WikiLeaks, the academic 
and journalistic literature on WikiLeaks have reflected at length, and in more 
measured terms, on the central concepts of radical transparency, anti-
secrecy and justice that are associated with the organisation. WikiLeaks has 
caused considerable controversy due to some of the content it has publicised 
through its online platform - and it is without doubt publicity-seeking. It is not 
unique in its function as an anonymous leaking platform, yet its fame affords 
it a privileged position from which to share information and opinions. The 
literature on WikiLeaks attempts to assess what effect WikiLeaks has on 
existing actors in the anti-secrecy arena. The literature can be divided into 
the following schools of thought:  
                                                        
27 Joan Reitz, Dictionary of Library and Information Science (Westport, Connecticut: 
Libraries Unlimited, 2004), p.67. 
28 Ibid. p.557. 
29 WikiLeaks, ‘What is WikiLeaks’. 
30 Please see Martyn Hammersley, Taking sides in social research: Essays on partisanship 
and bias (London: Routledge, 2005). 
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(1) Those works considering the impact of WikiLeaks on secrecy – a new, 
potentially dangerous, form of journalism. 
 
(2) Those conceiving of WikiLeaks as a facilitator of leakers – the legal 
implications.  
 
The secondary literature within the above school of thoughts will be analysed 
below and triangulated with primary research conducted for this dissertation. 
 
 
WikiLeaks and Secrecy 
Because one of the key functions of Wikileaks as an organisation is to release 
information into the public sphere, WikiLeaks is often compared to other 
media outlets. This comparison is quite problematic, as is demonstrated 
below. The media has long been described as the ‘fourth estate’, with the 
first recorded use of this term being in 1840.31 This usage implies, even 
indicates, that there is a certain ‘official’ power bestowed on the press that 
relates to a historical separation of powers (or estates) within a governing 
state.32 The strong implicit protection extended to journalists through the US 
constitution seems to confirm this. Also referred to as the government 
watchdog, the press is traditionally seen to hold governments to account 
through the threat of exposure.33  
 
                                                        
31 Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes and Hero Worship (London: Chapman and Hall, 1852), p.392. 
32 Georges Duby, The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1980). 
33 Douglass Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 
p.13.  
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In a speech in 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt Jr. (26th President of the 
US) called on investigative journalists to carry out their work responsibly.34 
The development of mass media and proliferation of the Internet many 
decades after Roosevelt’s plea reshaped the medium of reporting news. The 
fast-paced 21st Century, where most publications have moved online, user-
generated content has increased and the popularity of social media has 
replaced reading a newspaper, presents a further challenging shift for 
traditional journalism.35 Unsanctioned leaks and disclosures of classified 
material now form part of the oversight and accountability mechanisms 
within a democracy.36 The threat of a leak or exposure can in and of itself 
represent a sobering axe hovering above the decision-makers head, to the 
extent where it has been claimed that some decisionmakers might not even 
write stuff down, to avoid potential embarrassment from premature illicit 
public disclosure.37 However, a great responsibility comes with any of these 
roles. This has been recognised by traditional news sources through vetting 
and editing processes. Tabloid journalism aside, the reputation of a 
newspaper is still considered to be contingent on the quality and integrity of 
its research and its responsible approach to release.38 In comparison, 
WikiLeaks is a notably different animal that places a premium on a more 
direct and unfiltered release. The approach that the organisation takes to 
disclose the material, which is entrusted to it in raw form, stands in notable 
contrast to previous examples of discerning disclosures handled by 
journalists, involving both selection and interpretation.39  
                                                        
34 Yochai Benkler, ‘A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle Over the Soul of the 
Networked Fourth Estate’, Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review, 46: 2 (2011), pp. 
311-398.  
35 Brian McNair, ‘Journalism in the 21st Century – Evolution, Not Extinction’, Journalism, 10: 
3 (2009), pp. 347-349. 
36 Born, ‘Intelligence Accountability’, p. 317. 
37 Steven Aftergood, ‘WikiLeaks: Giving Leaks a Bad Name, Federation of American 
Scientists’, Federation of American Scientists, 16 August 2010, available at: 
https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2010/08/a_bad_name/.  
38 Bonnie Brennan, ‘The Future of Journalism’, Journalism, 10: 3 (2009), pp. 300-302. 
39 Steven Aftergood, ‘WikiLeaks: Giving Leaks a Bad Name’, Federation of American 
Scientists, 16 August 2010, available at:  
https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2010/08/a_bad_name/. 
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Stephen Aftergood, one of the world’s foremost experts on secrecy, explains 
that this description is misleading, as it does not reflect the true nature of the 
organisation.40 One example Aftergood lists, is the ambivalence towards 
WikiLeaks shown by some fellow civil rights and freedom of information 
activists.41 On 16 June 2010, the Knight Foundation announced the winners 
of its ‘News Challenge’.42 Amongst the applicants was WikiLeaks, asking for 
around half a million US dollars. The New York Times reported that the Knight 
Foundation’s spokesperson, Marc Fest, wouldn’t comment in any detail. 
However, he apparently indicated that WikiLeaks did not meet the three very 
broad criteria, which stipulate that they required that ‘the ideas involve 
technology, involve informing people and target people in a specific area’.43 
Looking at other 2010 winners and past projects that were funded, WikiLeaks 
certainly does not stand out at first glance. Other organisations that have 
spoken out against WikiLeaks are Amnesty International and Doctors Without 
Borders.44 Aftergood acknowledges that, ‘from one perspective, WikiLeaks is 
a creative response to a real problem afflicting the US and many other 
countries, namely the over-control of government information to the 
detriment of public policy’.45 It is only on closer inspection that the WikiLeaks’ 
purported philosophy of direct disclosure becomes questionable.  
 
Wikileaks constitutes a welter of contradictions. Unlike the slogan, ‘protect 
private data, use public data’, that Assange attributed to Dr Holland Wau, 
                                                        
40 Steven Aftergood, ‘Wikileaks Fails “Due Diligence” Review’, Federation of American 
Scientists, 28 June 2010, available at: 
https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2010/06/wikileaks_review/. 
41 Aftergood, ‘Wikileaks Fails “Due Diligence” Review’, 2010. 
42 Knight Foundation, ‘Knight Foundation Announces Winners of 2010 News Challenge’, 
Knight Foundation, 16 June 2010, available at: 
https://knightfoundation.org/press/releases/knight-foundation-announces-winners-of-
2010-news. 
43 Noam Cohen, ‘Knight Foundation Hands Out Grants to 12 Groups, but Not WikiLeaks’, 
The New York Times, 17 June 2010, available at: 
https://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/knight-foundation-hands-out-
grants-to-12-groups-but-not-wikileaks/. 
44 Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.224. 
45 Aftergood, ‘Wikileaks Fails “Due Diligence” Review’. 
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founder of the Chaos Computer Club, in a 2015 interview conducted by 
Michael Sontheimer for der Spiegel, WikiLeaks emphasised that it has no 
qualm about publicising private data without just cause.46 Aftergood explains 
that despite appearances, WikiLeaks poses a threat to that which it claims to 
protect. Specifically, his concern centres on the organisation not displaying 
any regard for the rule of law or ‘the rights of individuals’.47 WikiLeaks does 
not limit its publishing to over-classified documents, instead it appears to 
target any information (private or public) that is of marginal interest publicly 
and has been attempted (for any number of valid reasons) to be kept from 
public view. One example of this, is the unauthorised publishing of the novel 
It’s our turn to Eat by Michaela Wrong on the WikiLeaks website. The book 
exposes corruption in Kenya and, according to Wrong’s own admission, 
benefitted from documents published through WikiLeaks. The reply to a 
pleading letter from the author to take down the pdf of her book read, ‘It [the 
book] is your baby, and I’m sure it feels like that, but it is also its own adult - 
and Kenya's son’.48 The reply claimed that Wrong had leaked the pdf herself 
for publicity reasons, which seems farfetched and presumptuous at best.49 




WikiLeaks and Insider: A Legal Examination 
The concept of WikiLeaks relies on regular and relevant contributions of 
controversial material to their website. The relationship between sources and 
journalists has been established through time, but the potential duty of care 
between WikiLeaks and its sources has not yet been tested. In order to 
                                                        
46 Julian Assange, ‘Spiegel Interview with WikiLeaks Head Julian Assange’, Spiegel Online, 20 
July 2015, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-
wikileaks-head-julian-assange-a-1044399.html. 
47 Aftergood, ‘Wikileaks Fails “Due Diligence” Review’. 
48 Harding, Luke and David Leigh, WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy 
(London: Guardian Books, 2013), p. 59. 
49 Ibid. 
 - 186 - Dobson 
provide any content to WikiLeaks, the source has to complete a submission 
questionnaire. This and any further steps to submit content can only be taken 
through the Tor web browser.50 This is intended to provide strong privacy 
protection to the source as well as, presumably, to the organisation itself. 
Furthermore, it should mean that other organisations, programs and the 
Internet provider cannot access basic information about the source easily, 
such as, their IP address. WikiLeaks provides some operational guidelines to 
the originating source, which include warnings about using specific 
computers and sharing information with anyone else. They caution, ‘If you 
have any issues talk to WikiLeaks. We are the global experts in source 
protection – it is a complex field. Even those who mean well often do not 
have the experience or expertise to advise properly. This includes other 
media organisations’.51 It adds that although caution for a potential 
whistleblowers is key to avoiding potential reprisal, it should also be advised 
that the individual seeks legal advice as soon as possible.52 By limiting the 
advice that the source receives, they can be easily manipulated or deceived. 
It is unclear from these statements, whether WikiLeaks proposes to provide 
expert legal advice as part of its interaction with sources. If this is not the 
case, for example, the source is not protected under attorney-client privilege 
laws.  
 
In The New Whistleblower’s Handbook, Stephen Martin Kohn, a lawyer whose 
firm represents and advises whistleblowers, voices caution about sites such 
as WikiLeaks.53 Kohn distinguishes using these websites from seeking out 
partners in the media. He provides a list of six reasons, why a potential 
whistleblower should be cautious if wanting to approach a site such as 
WikiLeaks: 
                                                        
50 WikiLeaks, ‘WikiLeaks: Submissions’, WikiLeaks, no date, available at: 
https://wikileaks.org/wiki/WikiLeaks:Submissions#Submissions_via_secure_upload. 
51 WikiLeaks, ‘Submit Documents to WikiLeaks: Help Tips’, WikiLeaks, no date, available at:  
https://wikileaks.org/#submit_help_tips.  
52 Devine, The Corporate Whistleblower’s Survival Guide, pp. 46-60. 
53 Kohn, The New Whistleblower’s Handbook, pp. 186-187. 
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(1) There is no attorney-client privilege between the website and the 
whistleblower. 
 
(2) Kohn lists the case of Chelsea Manning as a deterrent. He attributes 
Manning’s treatment by the government and her jail sentence to her use of 
WikiLeaks. 
 
(3) A public document-dump could have unintended negative consequences, 
for example, it could hinder other legitimate investigations into that 
organisation or company. 
 
(4) There is a precedent that suggests whistleblowers who ‘steal’ records 
from their employer and use websites such as WikiLeaks, are likely to be more 
severely punished. 
 
(5) Depending on your employer, you could be foregoing the chance to file a 
reward case under the False Claims Act or other laws. 
 
(6) As far as a prosecution is concerned, the publisher of information is not 
the offender, instead the whistleblower who took the information is the 
offender. Therefore, whereas the whistleblower could be prosecuted and go 
to prison, the publisher is free to profit from the risks that the whistleblower 
has taken.54   
 
Once the information is uploaded by the source, it is then assessed and 
analysed by WikiLeaks specialists. Amongst other bold claims, WikiLeaks also 
suggests that, ‘submitting confidential material to WikiLeaks is safe, easy and 
protected by law’.55 This claim is problematic for a number of reasons. At first 
                                                        
54 Ibid. pp. 186-187. 
55 WikiLeaks, ‘WikiLeaks: Submissions’, WikiLeaks, no date, available at: 
https://wikileaks.org/wiki/WikiLeaks:Submissions#Submissions_via_secure_upload. 
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glance, the statement appears reasonably unambiguous as it promises 
potential whistleblowers that there is no risk involved in submitting content 
to WikiLeaks. However, on the whole, this claim is misleading. David 
Colapinto, a lawyer at Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP, explains that this requires 
more careful examination. Firstly, there is no US law that protects an 
individual who shares any classified material with WikiLeaks, a journalist or 
anyone else without the relevant security clearance. The source is at serious 
risk of prosecution if discovered. Secondly, the technology utilised and the 
safeguards put in place by WikiLeaks may be strong, but it is unwise to think 
of them as infallible.56 The relationship between the news media and 
whistleblowers has also been turbulent, as journalists pursue their own goals 
and are unwilling to take significant risks for their sources.57 In short, both 
disclosure sites and more traditional journalistic outlets sometimes prioritise 
Pulitzer prizes above source protection. 
 
In 2014, a year after the first Snowden leaks, the Guardian launched a 
platform called SecureDrop, which was designed to enable whistleblowers 
and leakers to share files with Guardian reporters securely.58 Despite the 
claims that the site has been vetted by ‘a team of cryptographers in July 2013, 
and updated in response to many concerns raised at the time’, it has openly 
admitted that SecureDrop is not 100% guaranteed and secure. On the 
SecureDrop webpage the following warning is given, ‘Use of the Guardian 
SecureDrop platform is at the user's own risk’. Other websites that provide 
such services are often country or area specific and linked to other agendas 
such as, BaltiLeaks, focusing on leaks pertaining to the city of Baltimore in 
Maryland and ExtremelLeaks.org, that ask for information on extremist 
                                                        
56 David Colapinto, Email Correspondence, Lawyer/Partner: Kohn, Kohn & Colaptino, 13-14 
September 2018, Washington, DC, USA. 
57 Personal Information.  
58 James Ball, ‘Guardian Launches SecureDrop System for Whistleblowers to Share Files’, 
The Guardian, 5 June 2014, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/05/guardian-launches-securedrop-
whistleblowers-documents. 
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activities in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. However, and rather 
alarmingly, what is distinctly absent from the Guardian website and 
WikiLeaks is any advice on consulting lawyers.  
 
It seems likely that this is missing because they do not wish to spook their 
sources. Lawyers in the US have an ethical obligation to avoid assisting or 
advising clients to engage in criminal, illegal or fraudulent conduct. However, 
any lawyer must provide advice as to the consequences or risks of engaging 
in particular conduct.59 Therefore, all lawyers licensed in the US are required 
to follow this rule or any specific variations. There is no legally binding code 
of professional ethics for journalists in the US, although the Society of 
Professional Journalists has a non-binding code.60 Lawyers are likely to be 
rather cautious in advising clients who are thinking of using one of these 
channels. 
 
Previously, journalists in the US have been protected by First Amendment 
rights. However, the Supreme Court has recently addressed the limits of First 
Amendment protections for journalists who rely on sources who engage in 
criminal conduct. In the landmark case of Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme 
Court distinguished anonymous sources who are ‘engaged in criminal 
conduct’, from sources who simply fear that speaking to the news media will 
‘threaten their job security or personal safety or that it will simply result in 
dishonor or embarrassment’. The Court held that it could not ‘seriously 
entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a newsman's 
agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source . . . on the theory 
that it is better to write about crime than to do something about it’. The Court 
also noted ‘crimes of news sources are no less reprehensible and threatening 
to the public interest when witnessed by a reporter than when they are not’. 
In Branzburg, the Court refused to find a heightened First Amendment 
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60 Society of Professional Journalists, ‘SPJ Code of Ethics’, SPJ, 6 September 2014, available 
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privilege for any reporter subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury. 
Therefore, if a court were to rule that a journalist must testify to a grand jury 
to reveal a source because the source engaged in criminal behaviour, then it 
also places the journalist at risk of criminal liability. In some situations, the 
journalist confronted with such an order might risk contempt of court for 
refusing to testify. In worsened situations, the journalist could face charges 
of assisting the source in criminal acts, depending on conversations with the 
source prior to the leak or if they had become involved in assisting the act of 
leaking. The same rules would apply to WikiLeaks.61  
 
 
Chelsea Manning (2010): A Soldier 
Chelsea Manning (formerly Bradley Manning) was a soldier in the US Army 
from 2007 to 2010. Now, following the biggest leak of classified material ever 
and a seven-year prison sentence, Manning is a budding politician - ready to 
take on the world. Manning grew up in Crescent, Oklahoma. Due to her 
parents’ alcoholism, she was predominantly cared for by her older sister, 
Casey.62 Consequently, Manning had a tumultuous childhood and challenging 
teenage years. Manning considered herself gay from her early teen years, as 
she realised that she was attracted to boys. It wasn’t until some years later 
that she explored the LGBTQ scene in Washington DC and started seeing a 
therapist. This is when she contemplated transitioning from male to female 
for the first time. When speaking of this period in her life she now says, ‘I got 
scared […] I really regret the fact that I didn’t know or realize I already had 
the love I needed, especially from my aunt and sister—just to seek support’.63 
Instead, Manning decided that joining the military could give her answers to 
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63 Nathan Heller, ‘Chelsea Manning Changed the Course of History. Now She’s Focusing on 
Herself’, Vogue, 10 August 2017, available at: https://www.vogue.com/article/chelsea-
manning-vogue-interview-september-issue-2017. 
 - 191 - Dobson 
her questions of self-doubt. Following in her father’s footsteps, Manning, 
who had been practiced at using computers and the Internet from a young 
age, trained as an intelligence analyst at Fort Huachuca.64 In 2009, at the age 
of 22, Specialist Manning joined her first tour on the outskirts of Baghdad.  
 
The government attitude towards whistleblowers and leakers in the US was 
never so openly hostile or aggressive as towards the end of the first decade 
of the 21st century. As the War on Terror lost some of its momentum, public 
questions over its legitimacy grew louder. In 2009, President Barack Hussein 
Obama took up office in the White House. With much promise, the first black 
President of the US generated much anticipation and, to quote his campaign 
slogan, ‘hope’. Yet Obama’s two terms as President of the US would be 
shrouded in controversy as he reversed numerous pledges, not least his 
commitment to reducing state secrecy. Starting with a lot of promise, 
Obama’s first move was to fight to close the military prison located in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In his first 100 days in office, Obama also relaxed the 
restrictions placed on Presidential records.65 Notably, Obama stated the 
following in a memo on 21 January 2009, the day after his inauguration, ‘The 
Government should not keep information confidential merely because public 
officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures 
might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears’.66 However, 
the Obama administration is more likely to be remembered for its eight 
prosecutions under the Espionage Act. This number is higher than for any 
previous administration. Furthermore, journalists, for example in the case of 
James Risen, were also targeted in the same vein, prompting fears of 
prosecution. Risen stated that Obama is ‘the greatest enemy to press 
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freedom in a generation’.67 Others have suggested that President Obama 
‘defriended’ Senator Obama by performing several U-turns, not least on his 





WikiLeaks and Manning: Stories Intertwined 
Stage One: Born this Way 
There is no doubt at all that the documents that Chelsea Manning brought to 
Julian Assange and the Guardian in 2010, put WikiLeaks on the map.68 Until 
this time, Assange had been ‘dribbling out leaks that nobody much noticed’, 
unless they were directly affected.69 Alan Rusbridger, the former editor in 
chief of the Guardian, speaks of emails he received from Assange on a regular 
basis, insisting that he had controversial material of interest to the Guardian. 
Most of the material published on WikiLeaks was of little significance to policy 
or information that was already in the public sphere, taken from other lowkey 
websites, such as the Federation of American Scientists.70  
 
In 2008, during her time at Fort Drum in New York, Manning started dating 
Tyler Watkins. Watkins was a student at Brandeis University, studying 
neuroscience and psychology. It was Watkins who introduced Manning to the 
hacker network. Manning started to associate with a number of different 
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people within the hacker community, including David House, an MIT 
researcher. Manning began displaying difficult behaviour and signs of 
depression. As a result, there was some hesitation about her deployment to 
Forward Operating Base Hammer in Iraq in 2009. However, the number of 
intelligence analyst personnel suitable for the trip was insufficient and so, 
Manning was deployed out of necessity. Manning’s demeanour did not 
improve and there were several incidents that suggested she should have 
been removed from active duty for her own safety. Manning contacted a 
gender counsellor in late 2009, who has since spoken out about the internal 
conflict that Manning felt at the time. The turmoil that Manning was dealing 
with primarily concerned her gender-dysphoria and the need to hide her true 
identity due to the military’s ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ (DADT) policy. She was 
isolated further by being stationed away from her family and friends in a 
remote location near the Iranian border.71 However, Manning was also 
emphatically against the nature of the ongoing conflict in Iraq which she had 
become a part of. This affected Manning’s mental health and well-being, 
resulting in her becoming isolated; ample evidence of this could be found on 
her Facebook page.72  
 
Notably, Manning has stated that she took the job as intelligence analyst in 
order to gain ‘real-world experience and earning benefits under the GI Bill for 
college opportunities’. She pursued a role as intelligence analyst in order to 
‘complement her interests outside the military’, to be mentally challenged by 
triangulating information from a number of sources and to utilise her 
                                                        
71 Nicole Puglise, ‘”Don’t ask, don’t tell”: Military ‘Out and Proud’ Five Years After Repeal’, 
The Guardian, 27 September 2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/sep/27/dont-ask-dont-tell-repeal-anniversary-us-military. 
72 PBS Frontline, Bradley Manning’s Facebook Page, 24 May 2011, available at: 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/wikileaks/manning-facebook-page/; Heidi 
Blake, John Bingham and Gordon Rayner, ‘Bradley Manning, Suspected Source of WikiLeaks 
Documents, Raged on his Facebook Page’, The Telegraph, 30 July 2010, available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7918632/Bradley-
Manning-suspected-source-of-Wikileaks-documents-raged-on-his-Facebook-page.html. 
 - 194 - Dobson 
computer skills.73 Although, Manning struggled to complete Basic Combat 
Training (BCT) and was in danger of being retired due to injuries she 
sustained, she persevered and completed BCT in April 2008. In her statement, 
Manning explained that she was glad to move onto Advances Individual 
Training (AIT), which completed her cycle of training to qualify as an all-
source analyst. During her first placement at Fort Drum starting in August 
2008, she worked mostly with Significant Activities (SIGACTs). These are 
described as ‘daily logs’ and not usually sensitive after a period of 48-72 
hours, as any locations would have been changed and the logs do not detail 
future plans.74 Manning states that she worked mostly with SIGACTs and 
intelligence derived from HUMINT reports. In her statement to the court, 
Manning remarks that she also had unlimited access to the central ‘CIDNE-I 
and CIDNE-A’ databases, for Iraq and Afghanistan records respectively. 
According to Manning, this was not an unusual level of access for someone 
in her position. Later on, in her statement Manning specifies that she mostly 
used these for ‘background’ information. Her interest in WikiLeaks was 
sparked when she started to use open source intelligence (OPINT) to compile 
her reports.75  
 
When Manning detailed her communication and involvement with 
WikiLeaks, she claims that she only became interested upon the release of, 
‘purported Short Messaging System (SMS) messages from 9/11 on 25 
November 2009. Manning was alerted to this release through her daily search 
of Google News. 76 Shortly after this, Manning consulted the WikiLeaks 
website regularly. As part of her work to triangulate intelligence, Manning 
found a 2008 US Army Counter Intelligence Centre (USACIC) report on 
WikiLeaks. Following repeated examination of the documents, Manning 
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noticed some anomalies when comparing it to her own OPINT research. 
Manning first contacted WikiLeaks in January 2010 through Internet Relay 
Chat (IRC) and Jabber, online chat rooms. It is clear that Manning explored 
WikiLeaks further through these chats out of curiosity about the structure of 
the organisation. Manning admits that she wanted to find out more about 
the means and reasons for the organisation gaining access to the SMS 
messages. Thus, Manning became involved in debates that she was 
passionate about.77 Using the online sphere as a means for escaping was 
something that Manning had already used extensively as a coping mechanism 
during her teens.78  
 
In the unclassified, yet redacted statement Manning provided to the court, 
she emphasised that making back-up copies of the SIGACTs and her work was 
routine due to unreliable systems that often crashed. Manning claims that 
she had never lost any material due to the meticulous system she employed 
to back-up her files. Therefore, she claims that making a copy of the CIDNE-I 
and CIDNE-A SIGACTs – which constitute the material she leaked – was a 
routine exercise and not originally intended to be leaked. Manning states, ‘I 
later decided to release this information publicly. At the time I believed, and 
still believe, that these tables are two of the most significant documents of 
our time’.79 Manning describes how she removed the files from her work 
without it being noticed: ‘On 8 January 2010, I collected the CD-RW I stored 
in the conference room of the T-SCIF and placed it into the cargo pocket of 
my Army Combat Uniform (ACU). At the end of my shift, I took the CD-RW 
out of the T-SCIF and brought it to my Containerized Housing Unit (CHU). I 
copied the data onto my personal laptop. Later, at the beginning of my shift, 
I returned the CD-RW to the conference room of the T-SCIF.’80 Manning says 
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that she then transferred the files to the SD card for her digital camera to 
move them. 
 
In January 2010, Manning was due to take her mid-tour leave and return to 
the US for a short time. Soon after Manning arrived, she went to stay with 
her then-boyfriend Tyler Watkins for a short time. However, the relationship 
was not going well, so Manning returned to her aunt’s house in Maryland. 
From Manning’s telling of the order of events, it appears that she had not 
made any definitive decisions to share her findings until she returned to her 
aunt’s house in Maryland and contemplated her options.81 Manning did not 
openly discuss her plans to share the files with anyone. She only mentioned 
the hypothetical scenario to Watkins but did not mention any specifics.82 In 
her court statement, Manning details how desperately unhappy she was 
starting to feel about US military activities in Iraq and Afghanistan at this time. 
She describes a very high-risk, low return situation, where the local 
population was uncooperative and obstructive. There was an inherent lack of 
trust between the two sides, which led to an obsession with long lists of 
human targets to capture and eliminate, something which fuelled the conflict 
further.83 Manning originally intended to give the material she downloaded 
to the Washington Post or the New York Times.84 However, despite providing 
her contact details, neither newspaper responded when she contacted them. 
Due to weather conditions at the time, Manning chose not to deliver a hard 
copy to the blog Politico at their offices in Arlington, VA.85 
 
Stage Two: Perfect Illusion 
Overall, Chelsea Manning provided information to WikiLeaks on several 
topics, I have grouped these into three and examined them below – (1) the 
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Iraq and Afghan War Logs; (2) The ‘10REYKJAVIK13’ disclosures and (3) the 
‘12 July 2007 – Air Weapons Team (AWT) video’ aka ‘Collateral Murder’.  
 
The Iraq and Afghan War Logs 
Manning describes her engagement with individuals in the IRC chat. She 
explained that she had some information that she wanted to ‘share with the 
world’. It is unclear if Manning shared any further information with anyone 
at this point and, if so, what that was. Nevertheless, she was directed to the 
WikiLeaks website. On 3 February 2010, Manning decided that she would 
upload just short of 500,000 documents from her personal computer to 
WikiLeaks using The Onion Router (Tor) web browser. Tor is designed to 
disguise the identity and location of its user by deploying a mixture of 
complex re-routing and encryption.86 Manning followed the instructions on 
the special submission page. Manning attached a message to her submission 
that suggested that there be a delay of 90-180 days prior to publication in 
order to protect her (the source) and to logistically manage a leak of such 
proportions.87 The documents consisted of 400,000 documents (SIGACTs) 
regarding US Army activity in Iraq that would become known as the ‘Iraq war 
logs’. A further 91,000 document reports concerned US army activities in 
Afghanistan. These would later shape a part of the ‘Afghan War logs’. 
Manning explains that she felt a sense of relief. This was despite the fact that 
WikiLeaks had not published any of the leaks when she returned to Iraq on 
11 February 2010. There was a sense of relief for Manning and she had a clear 
conscience.88   
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The ‘10REYKJAVIK13’ Disclosures 
It is evident from Manning’s narrative of this period of her placement in Iraq 
that she was enjoying some aspects of her work. As part of her role, Manning 
was responsible for compiling information on any given incident and, as part 
of this, she was responsible for reading as much information concerning Iraq 
as possible, including official cables. In January 2010, Manning found some 
diplomatic cables regarding Iceland. As a result of her online conversations 
on IRC, Manning had become interested in an issue that was referred to as 
‘Icesave’. As Manning’s interest was triggered, she started to research the 
issue. Icesave refers to a situation whereby the assets of the Icelandic bank 
Landsbanki held in the UK were frozen.  
 
The UK controversially used anti-terrorist legislation to affect this action. 
Meanwhile, 80,000 Icelandic people signed a petition against the actions of 
the UK.89 Manning found a state cable, called ‘10REYKJAVIK13’, which 
detailed that Iceland requested help from the US, as they feared economic 
collapse. Aid was not granted, and Manning took the view that this was 
unfairly decided in the light of such drastic action taken by the UK.90 
Memorably, it has been reported that Manning smuggled the material out of 
the base using a CD-RW ‘labelled something like Lady Gaga’.91 On 15 February 
2010, Manning submitted the cable to the WikiLeaks website. Manning notes 
that ‘10REYKJAVIK13’ was published ‘within hours’, proving to her that the 
website functioned. She concluded that although there had been no 
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movement regarding the SIGACT tables, she was confident that they had 
been received.92 
 
The ‘12 July 2007 – Air Weapons Team (AWT) video’ aka 
‘Collateral Murder’ 
This video first came to Manning’s attention during mid-February. Not paying 
much attention to it at first, Manning soon realised that this was no ordinary 
‘war-porn’.93 The disturbing images on the video documented the events of 
12 July 2007, where several non-combatants including two Reuters 
journalists and children were killed. The video, which is shot from gunsight, 
shows a military helicopter operated by US soldiers. As the scene unfolds, the 
soldiers cheer and congratulate each other for carrying out the attack. Most 
disturbingly, the soldiers continue to shoot at any that remain alive, if only 
injured after the first attack. The soldiers show no remorse, but enjoyment 
after learning of the death of the children and journalists.94 There was some 
discussion amongst analysts that the incident violated the Rules of 
Engagement (ROE). After conducting her own research, Manning discovered 
that Reuters had filed a FOIA request. It was evident from the request that 
the company wanted to prevent future incidents of a similar nature but gave 
no indication if they were aware of the true nature of the incident. However, 
the FOIA request was blocked and amongst other excuses, Reuters was told 
the video could have been destroyed.95  
 
Manning also links the incident with the book The Good Soldier by David 
Finkel. She comments that she was ‘aghast at [Finkel’s] portrayal of the 
incident’, alleging that it suggested the attack was justified and considered as 
‘payback’ for a previous confrontation leading to the death of a soldier.96 
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Originally, Manning had planned to keep the video until the summer 2010. 
Thereafter, she wanted to provide the Reuters office with a copy of the video. 
Therefore, she once again burned the data onto a CD-RW. However, following 
the release of ‘10REYKJAVIK13’, Manning changed her mind and uploaded 
the video to the WikiLeaks submission page on 21 February 2010. WikiLeaks 
did not release the video until 5 April 2010.  
 
In her statement to the court, Manning speaks about her continued 
communication with an individual at WikiLeaks who never revealed 
themselves by name. Manning gave them the name ‘Nathaniel Frank’ after 
an author. Manning’s communications with Nathaniel continued through 
protected platforms, such as The Onion Router (TOR) and Jabber. It is clear 
from Manning’s retelling of this time period that she built up a kind of 
friendship with the individual she perceived to be Nathaniel, but that she later 
realised her attachment was stronger than his. She speaks of being isolated 
in her unit and that she began to rely on Nathaniel more than she perhaps 
should have. Escaping the real world in this way was increasing the distance 
she felt from those around her.97 Manning provided information on several 
further incidents and research she had completed in Iraq. Manning has stated 
that at no point was she pressured by anyone on the WikiLeaks team to 
provide further information.98  
 
On 21 May 2010, Manning using the screenname ‘bradass87’, first contacted 
a hacker by the name of Adrian Lamo. Lamo had been featured in a story 
published by wired.com. Manning and Lamo chatted online for 5 days before 
Lamo tipped off the FBI and the Army about Manning leaking material to 
WikiLeaks.99 Lamo provided his chat history with Manning to the authorities 
and later these were also published online. It is evident from their 
conversation that Manning is distressed and possibly mentally unwell. On the 
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26 May 2010, Manning was arrested and placed into a pre-trial detention 
centre in Kuwait. 
 
Stage Three: Applause 
This case is unique, due to the severe consequences that Manning suffered, 
which were unlike any other previous conviction. Manning was charged in 
June 2010 with leaking classified information. Additional charges were added 
in March 2011 that alleged Manning was ‘aiding the enemy’ through making 
classified information accessible to Al-Qaeda, specifically the enemy. On 23 
February 2012, Chelsea Manning was charged on 22 counts. Nine of these 
counts were Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) violations and the 
remainder under the Espionage Act 1917. In February 2013, Manning 
entered a guilty plea for ‘storing and leaking military information’, as well as 
on other counts. Defending her actions, she claimed that her disclosures 
were not meant to harm, but to encourage informed debate. It is not until 30 
July 2013 that Manning was found guilty on 20 of these charges, including 
espionage, theft and computer fraud. The two charges that were dropped 
related to violations of UCMJ Art. 104 ,’without proper authority, knowingly 
giv[ing] intelligence to the enemy, through indirect means, between 1 
November 2009 and 27 May 2010’. Manning allegedly ‘wrongfully and 
wantonly’ causing classified intelligence owned by the US government to be 
published online and thereby accessible to the enemy. The accusations 
specifically referred to Manning acting contrary to armed forces etiquette 
and policy, and deliberately discrediting them. Sentencing commenced on 21 
August 2013 and Manning was ordered to serve 35 years in prison. 
Additionally, Manning’s rank was reduced to Private E-1 and she was 
dishonourably discharged from the army.  
 
On 22 August 2013 following her sentencing, Manning’s lawyer issued a 
statement to the Today show, which read:  
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‘As I transition into this next phase of my life, I want everyone to know the 
real me. I am Chelsea Manning. I am a female. Given the way that I feel, and 
have felt since childhood, I want to begin hormone therapy as soon as 
possible. I hope that you will support me in this transition. I also request that, 
starting today, you refer to me by my new name and use the feminine 
pronoun (except in official mail to the confinement facility). I look forward to 
receiving letters from supporters and having the opportunity to write 
back’.100  
 
The public response was mixed, but Manning only saw the support and the 
positive messages she received.101 In 2014, the Kansas Military Court granted 
Manning a change of name from Bradley to Chelsea and her hormone 
replacement therapy commenced almost a year later, following a federal 
lawsuit. Nevertheless, Manning’s imprisonment in a male prison was 
controversially continued. 
 
On 26 May 2016, Manning appealed to the US Military Criminal Court of 
Appeals to reduce her sentence to 10 years. On behalf of Manning, the Open 
Society Justice Initiative filed a brief, known as an amicus curiae or ‘friend of 
the court’. An amicus curiae brief is filed at the discretion of the court and 
constitutes a third party providing further significant information pertaining 
to a case. The Open Society sought to argue that compared to other 
countries, international treaties and resolutions, the sentence that Manning 
was given was ‘disproportionate and unreasonable’. Further arguments 
brought forward in vain highlighted the public interest aspect of the Manning 
leaks. A petition to President Obama counted 117,000 signatures asking for a 
commutation of her sentence. Julian Assange made a public statement 
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declaring that if Manning was pardoned, he would give himself up to US 
authorities.  
 
The mental and physical toll that her ordeal has cost Manning is easily 
recognisable. Despite the shocking length of Manning’s sentence, it is only 
second to the treatment that she was subsequently subjected to. The 
treatment described publicly is akin to that of CIA interrogation methods, aka 
torture. Throughout her prison sentence, Manning was kept in solitary 
confinement in a windowless cell. Following a diagnosis that deemed 
Manning at risk of committing suicide, she was watched over 24 hours a day. 
Additionally, Manning’s clothes, as well as her bedding, were also sometimes 
removed. After some time, Manning was no longer deemed suicidal by a 
psychiatrist, yet the conditions in which she was kept did not improve. In 
2013, it was ruled that Manning’s treatment had been ‘unduly harsh’ and she 
received sentencing credit that would remove time from her total period of 
imprisonment. Nevertheless, Manning attempted suicide twice in 2016, 
during her time in prison. As a result, she was punished through solitary 
confinement. Her second suicide attempt was on her first night in solitary 
confinement on 4 October 2016.  
 
On 17 January 2017, during the last few days of his administration, President 
Barak Obama publicly declared that he would commute Manning’s remaining 
prison sentence. She was to be released on 17 May 2017, following a period 
of adjustment to find housing and set up a release. In a public address, Obama 
stated, ‘[it is] that the sentence that she received was very disproportionate 
relative to what other leakers had received and that she had served a 
significant amount of time, that it made sense to commute and not pardon 
her sentence. … I feel very comfortable that justice has been served’. Overall, 
Manning has served seven years of her 35-year prison sentence.102  
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Following her release, Manning had hope to travel and to explore the world 
- faraway places that she thought she would not see again quite so soon. 
Although, there were reports that she was continuing to adapt and still 
struggled with her mental health, she announced that she was going to run 
for US Senate in early 2018. Manning is challenging two-term democratic 
Senator of Maryland Ben Cardin. Manning has lived in Maryland since she was 
released from prison and calls for a reduced police presence in the streets 




The case of Chelsea Manning and her involvement with the website 
WikiLeaks is one of the most fascinating cases in recent history, not least 
because it challenges a range of categories and definitions that had hitherto 
been well established. It illuminates an emerging idea of radical transparency 
espoused by Assange – a ‘philosophy of transparency’ that sought to overturn 
previous caveats and limitations. The direct and unmediated release of 
information raises issue of trust in both directions – to what extent can a 
leaker trust an anonymised web editor with a false name communicating 
through encryption?  
 
Manning also illuminated a massive government backlash – bordering on 
panic - against declining secrecy and experienced the consequences 
personally. Like so many whistleblowers,  Manning owned up to her actions 
and was a free woman after her sentence was commuted in 2017. WikiLeaks 
by contrast suffered no consequences and at all times endured low risk 
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overall. Meanwhile, WikiLeaks – took no responsibility for actions taken. By 
contrast, one might argue that Assange is suffering consequences related to 
his online activities, but not owning up to the actions taken – is this worsening 
his situation?  
 
According to the research conducted and the sources consulted, it is 
problematic to identify WikiLeaks or Assange’s actions as those of a 
whistleblower. There is little doubt that WikiLeaks must be considered within 
the broader accountability landscape. It has, in the past, facilitated the 
publication of information that exposed wrongdoing. However, the 
questionable agenda and inconsistent actions of this organisation make it the 
wild card of the group. WikiLeaks has repeatedly published classified material 
without redactions or any other consideration for the sensitivity of the 
material. The actions of WikiLeaks are therefore highly disproportionate to 
the severity of the alleged wrongdoing. The case of Manning is one of the 
most complicated cases considered in this thesis. Undoubtedly, Manning 
revealed serious cases of wrongdoing, putting pressure on the US 
government’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, Manning does 
reflect the principles of a whistleblower, despite the perhaps 
disproportionately extensive cache of disclosures. Manning’s experience 
whilst she was in the army and her personal difficulties go some way to 
explaining her drastic behaviour. Nevertheless, her decision to share 
classified information with an organisation such as WikiLeaks does indicate 
that she wanted to do damage the US army rather than expose wrongdoing, 
which becomes problematic for a whistleblower defence.  
 
Unintentionally, perhaps, Manning also illuminated a new cyberwar between 
the leaker, the website, the government and the free-lance online 
investigator. Governments have been increasingly zealous about shutting 
down truly secure communication for the private citizen insisting that ‘if you 
have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear’. To what extent does this 
reflect a determination to extinguish the possibility of private communication 
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of any kind for the anonymous leaker? Perhaps 2010 was the highest point 
of national security leaks of this kind. In the future we may see further leaks, 
most recently we have witnessed the Panama Papers and the voluminous 
FIFA papers (18 million documents), but it is less and less likely that websites 
like WikiLeaks will carry national security material without severe 










Chapter 5         
  ‘The Program’: The War Inside the 
Agency 
‘Well I know what's right 
I got just one life 
In a world that keeps on pushin' me around 
But I stand my ground 
And I won't back down’1 
 
In his forthright book Playing to the Edge,2 former Director of the NSA, 
General Michael Hayden, discusses the effects of the 9/11 terror attacks on 
NSA and other members of the US intelligence community. Hayden recounts 
anger and a resolved focus resulting in better team work, allies united in a 
common goal, fuelled by emotion and motivational quotes.3 He talks of Tom 
Petty’s song ‘I won’t back down’ being quickly adopted by NSA staff as their 
unofficial motto.4 Reflecting the poignant atmosphere within the agency at 
this critical moment, it spurred new developments and some restructuring.  
 
Rather paradoxically, the song, in many ways, also embodies the narrative of 
some whistleblowers, as those raising concerns and doing what they feel is 
right. The immediate aftermath of 9/11 was the trigger for many changes 
within NSA and other intelligence agencies of the US. The terror attacks were 
a catalyst for drastic adjustments in three major areas, (1) structure, (2) 
technology and (3) legislation. Legislation was designed to create structural 
changes, which would support the overall strategic developments, such as 
the exponential growth of technology in this field. However, there were some 
worrying issues. This was in part due to the constitutionally-enshrined 
                                                        
1 I won’t back down [Song] writ. by Jeff Lynne and Tom Petty (1987-88). 
2 Hayden, Playing to the Edge. 
3 Ibid. pp.28-47. 
4 Ibid. 2016, p.30. 
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separation of powers between executive, legislative and judiciary. 
Furthermore, the state of emergency and by all accounts sense of 
responsibility for the failure to prevent such a tragedy led to a situation 
wherein the intelligence community found itself confronted with rushed and 
under-developed decision-making, together with dubious legal arguments 
about right authority for some of its most sensitive programmes.5 
 
Suddenly, there was an acute awareness of the vulnerability of the US critical 
national infrastructure and how exposed American leaders where when 
attending international summits. Following 9/11, the main legislative changes 
were made through the Homeland Security Act (HSA) 2002 and the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) 2004.6 These 
shaped strategical changes and the structure of the US agencies. As a result, 
the HSA was responsible for the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security, led by the Head of Secretary for Homeland Security. The act also 
established new legislation on critical protection of infrastructure (Critical 
Infrastructure Information Act of 2002) and cyber security defences (Cyber 
Security Enhancement Act of 2002). In many ways, this underlines that there 
were a number of strong responses to 9/11 that resulted in elaborate 
defensive activity – some of it quite baroque - in order to prevent any further 
attacks. In particular, intelligence methods to detect security threats became 
more desperate in every way. 
 
From this moment on, we can witness a collision between national security 
imperatives and American core values. In more material terms, this was a 
conflict between the outcomes of the 1975-1976 Church Committee enquiry, 
chaired by Senator Frank Church, concerning domestic surveillance on the 
one hand, and the anxiety surrounding further possible attacks on the other. 
As the most extensive examination of the US intelligence apparatus, the 
                                                        
5 Richard J. Harknett and James A. Steve, ‘The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11’, 
Public Administration Review, 71: 5 (2011), pp. 700-6. 
6 Harknett, ‘The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11’, p. 701. 
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Church Committee is still referenced widely as the benchmark for a principled 
approach to the functions of oversight and accountability. The discovery of 
Operation SHAMROCK represented a crossroads in the way that ethical 
intelligence was conceived of in the US. SHAMROCK had operated 
domestically for over 20 years between 1945 and the early 1970s. Major 
telecommunication companies would surrender the data of traffic that they 
collected with NSA, at which point it would be correlated with their watch 
list. This list represented correspondence to or from persons of interest. The 
Committee report stipulated that domestic surveillance should not be 
routinely permissible. As a result, FISA was enacted. Under FISA the FISC and 
its court for review, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 
(FISCR), were formed. This ensured that any future domestic surveillance of 
this kind needed to be reviewed case by case and in detail by FISA. 
 
In the US, the intelligence community operates within the scope of some key 
legislation that has evolved and developed over time. The Constitution of the 
US, being the most crucial part of this regulation in terms of its structural 
system, conceives of three branches of the government: The two Houses of 
Congress, Executive and the Judicial branches. The Bill of Rights 
(Amendments I-X) on the other hand, contains the rights awarded to citizens, 
such as the right to free speech and the right to privacy. Some legislation, 
such as S. Res. 400 (1976) predominantly regulates the operation of the 
branches of government, in this case the Senate. The Espionage Act 1917 and 
the National Security Act 1947 are the original and probably most 
recognisable pieces of legislation covering intelligence and security. 
Purportedly, the Espionage Act is a tool to protect national security, its 
purpose is to guard the interests of the state and contain any classified 
material from theft by foreign powers. Originally intended to safeguard 
military secrets, the Espionage Act has become a controversial mechanism of 
information control.  
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This area of research is intrinsically interdisciplinary. Traditionally, there are 
two main schools of thought that characterise this field. Firstly, the legal 
school, predominantly focused on the issues concerning current intelligence 
oversight mechanisms, privacy and constitutional laws. The essential 
legislative mechanisms, most of which were not originally intended to deal 
with rapid technological developments, are problematic. It has therefore 
been held that particularly the Fourth Amendment in the US should be 
interpreted very broadly.7 Secondly, the crypto and technological school 
investigating the development of technology, cyberspace8 and its impact on 
how citizens perceive and behave in today’s world. More recently, these two 
schools have started to overlap, with cryptography specialists concerning 
themselves with the idea of privacy, together with its legislative frameworks.9 
Arguably, this development is enormously beneficial, as it illustrates the 
complexity of this field. As far back as 1928 in Olmsted vs. US, the dissenting 
judgement of Justice Brandeis held that ‘every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment’.10 In 
recent literature this view has been represented by Lawrence Lessig and 
Laurence H. Tribe.11 Broadly, they are arguing that privacy should be robustly 
protected by law. How this is to be achieved in operational terms is where 
this literature diverges.  
 
                                                        
7 Orin S. Kerr, ‘The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution’, Michigan Law Review, 102: 5 (2004) p. 804.  
8 L. Lessig, ‘Intellectual property and code,’ Journal of Civil Rights and Economic 
Development 11:3 (1996), p. 6. 
9 Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and 
Encryption (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010); Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The 
Hidden Battles to Collect your Data and Control your World (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2015). 
10 Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting, in Olmstead v. United States (1928) 277 U.S. 438, 478.  
11 Lawrence Lessig, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999), pp. 
222-23; Code: Version 2.0 (Basic Books: New York, 2008); Laurence H. Tribe, ‘The 
Constitution in Cyberspace, Keynote Address at the First Conference on Computers’, 
Freedom, & Privacy, 26 March 1991, available at www.sjgames.com/SS/tribe.html.  
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The basic premise of the literature on digital privacy is that it is more difficult 
to protect communications today than it has ever been. Only two centuries 
ago, all communications between people separated by distance were 
manual, manually written and manually transported by a ‘carrier’ from the 
sender to the receiver. The twentieth century saw the beginnings of 
communications using more advanced forms of exchanging messages, 
predominantly utilising signals-based technology, such as email. The first 
email was sent in the 1960s.12 This also has the added side-effect that 
communications can now be more easily traced and recorded by a third 
party, who is neither the sender, receiver nor the carrier. Digital 
communication leaves a trace and is easily copied and stored by third parties 
without the sender’s or the intended receiver’s knowledge. For example, this 
would be the case if Alice (sender) sends an email to Bob (receiver) through 
office outlook (carrier). The carrier is technically able to access the content of 
the email, unless the email is encrypted. However, even if the email is 
encrypted the carrier is still able to access the metadata or ‘envelope 
information’ of the email. This means that although the carrier may not be 
able to read the content, they are able to determine when the email was sent, 
by who, to whom and most importantly the physical location of the server 
from which it was sent. Intelligence practitioners deem this metadata to be 
the shape of the future since it offers pictures of networks of people over 
time and their patterns of behaviour.13  
 
Due to the relative simplicity of digitally collecting information, once the 
digital tools have been created, the carrier’s algorithm could also map how 
often Alice and Bob communicate. Therefore, it is relatively easy to establish 
if there is a pattern in their communication. Although, information held by 
the carrier on Bob and Alice’s communication is usually protected 
contractually, this may not be the case for third parties. Depending on the 
                                                        
12 Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0, 2008, pp. 1-3. 
13 John Leyden, ‘GCHQ bod tells privacy advocates: Most of our work is making sure we 
operate within the law’, Register, 29 May 2018. 
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carrier, they may be feeding this information to a third party. It is at this point 
that it becomes more difficult to determine rights of the original sender 
(Alice) and receiver (Bob). This is particularly problematic, as the public 
narrative thus far has suggested that metadata is less invasive than content-
data.14 It has been described as the envelope of a letter, rather than the 
written words inside, creating the impression that it is a somewhat passive 
and innocuous form of surveillance.15  
 
However, Bill Binney, former NSA surveillance expert, argues that metadata 
collection is much more astringent than content-data, as it allows analysis 
through communications patterns.16 It is often combined with other kinds of 
data, typically consumer purchase data to offer a remarkable 3-D picture of 
the subject and their movements. Alberto Gonzales, the Attorney General 
from 2005-2007, explained that in October 2001 authorisation was sought 
and granted for three types (‘baskets’) of collection, which was declassified 
following the Snowden leaks in 2013. Firstly, the collection of the content of 
international calls. These were directly related to the ‘reasonable belief’ of 
one person on the call being affiliated with Al Qaeda. Secondly, the telephone 
metadata and thirdly, the email metadata collection. According to Gonzales, 
the metadata specifically related to the sender, receiver and duration of the 
communication.17 Vast amounts of metadata was collected indiscriminately 
on the basis that it might be useful in the future.  
 
The divergent views concerning NSA surveillance programs broadly clash on 
three points. Primarily, it is a matter of executive power in wartime based on 
                                                        
14 George Packer, ‘Can You Keep a Secret? The Former C.I.A. Chief Mihcael Hayden on 
Torture and Transparency’, The New Yorker, 7 March 2016, available at: 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/07/michael-hayden-comes-out-of-the-
shadows. 
15 Alberto Gonzales, ‘Frontline Interview, U.S. Attorney General from 2005 to 2007’, PBS, 3 
March 2014, available at: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-
elections-politics/united-states-of-secrets/the-frontline-interview-alberto-gonzales/. 
16 William Binney, Personal Interview, Former NSA Analyst, 31 March 2016, Washington, 
DC, USA. 
17 Gonzales, ‘Frontline Interview’.  
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the 2nd Amendment. The central plank of justification for these programmes 
was that Capitol Hill had extended war powers to the President in pursuit of 
Al Qaeda after 9/11 and because AQ was a violent non-state actor that took 
no cognisance of borders or boundaries, these powers applied domestically 
as well as internationally. The problem with the war powers doctrine is that 
where two statutes are in conflict, the more specific trumps the more 
general. So, war powers should not have overruled the role of the FISA court, 
and the large-scale collection of metadata was simply illegal.18 
 
Additionally, the lawfulness of operational surveillance programs, the issues 
of privacy and privacy protection through encryption and the reality of less 
controversial alternative programs are important. Following 9/11, the feeling 
of responsibility was perhaps most keenly felt within the walls of Fort Meade 
at NSA. Reportedly, the SIGINT director, Maureen Baginski, slept in her office 
days after the tragedy and it is palpable from speaking to those who worked 
at NSA during this time that feelings of guilt are still very raw.19 ‘Everybody 
had the TV on, because the TV is where the news was. It wasn't coming out 
of NSA's computers. It was on the TV, because we had missed the entire 
event’.20 The months following created two separate schools within the 
agency. The dominant school of senior management was intent on doing 
whatever was possible to rectify the cataclysmic flaw that had missed the 
planning and execution of these terror attacks. Their approach was to 
maximise their systems within strictly specified legal parameters.21 A small 
                                                        
18 Jack Goldsmith, Power and constraint: the accountable presidency after 9/11 (New York: 
WW Norton & Company, 2012). 
19 Edward Loomis, ‘Frontline Interview, NSA Cryptologist’, PBS, 12 December 2013, 
available at: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-
politics/united-states-of-secrets/the-frontline-interview-edward-loomis/. 
20 Kirk Wiebe, ‘Frontline Interview, Senior Analyst at the NSA’, PBS, 13 December 2013, 
available at: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-
politics/united-states-of-secrets/the-frontline-interview-j-kirk-wiebe/. 
21 Michael Hayden, ‘Frontline Interview, Retired U.S. Air Force General, Director of the CIA 
from 2006 to 2008 and Director of the NSA from 1999 to 2005’, PBS, 2 January 2014, 
available at: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-
politics/united-states-of-secrets/the-frontline-interview-michael-hayden/; Hayden, Playing 
to the Edge.  
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group of highly experienced senior analysts saw this as their chance to pitch 
once again their highly sophisticated and fully automated program 
ThinThread as a solution.22 Working outside the parameters of previous 
programs and employing a very different mindset, this group struggled to 
convince management of the capabilities of their program.23 
 
 
The Story of SARC at NSA: Bill Binney, Kirk Wiebe, 
Ed Loomis and Diane Roark 
 
‘The most unreliable factor in this was the human beings. They were the 
most creative, but they were also the most unreliable, especially in terms of 
the massive amounts of data.’24 
 
In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, western intelligence agencies 
were playing catch-up. The world was expanding virtually, and the volume of 
available data was continuously growing. At NSA, analysts recognised that 
this amount of information harboured potential for counter-terrorist (CT) 
operations and the detection of other criminal activities. Therefore, the 
development of projects and programs in NSA enabling the mining of data 
was underway. Thus, in 1992, the SARC was formed at NSA. Former Research 
Chief Dr John Taggart (JT) and Technical Director Bill Binney led the research 
and development of the centre. Bill Binney is now a 36-year veteran of NSA 
from 1965 to 2001, where he was a cryptanalyst and mathematician.25 The 
centre represented a highly-qualified eclectic and interdisciplinary collective 
of individuals. Taggart brought researchers and physicists and Binney brought 
mostly crypto experts, analysts and programmers, such as Kirk Wiebe, a 
                                                        
22 Loomis, ‘Frontline Interview’. 
23 Wiebe, ‘Frontline interview’. 
24 Bill Binney, ‘Frontline interview’. 
25 Ibid. 
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Senior Analyst at NSA between 1975-2001. The team worked with rapid 
prototyping, a forerunner for 3D printing and spiral development, which 
looks at process models. Ed Loomis, a former NSA Cryptologist (1964-2001) 
joined the SARC team in around 1995, to replace Taggart who retired in 
1996.26 Binney, Wiebe and Loomis retired from NSA as a protest in 2001.27  
 
The focus of the SARC and other teams was to discover a way to sort the 
plethora of communications data that was increasing exponentially. The 
principle, legality and practicalities of this were problematic. Broadly 
speaking, there are two types of data surveillance.28 Targeted surveillance is 
employed when law enforcement or intelligence agencies have reason to 
suspect that one individual is partaking in illegal activity. In this scenario, the 
relevant agency requests a warrant from a judge in order to obtain 
information, including communications data, on that individual. Warrants can 
be obtained quite quickly if there is sufficient evidence.29 The principle of 
surveillance through the bulk collection of data is reversed. Data is collected 
and subsequently sorted or analysed for key information. There are a number 
of practical issues with this. Collecting large volumes of data takes up physical 
space. Although, the cost of storage is coming down and technological 
development for personal use has advanced rapidly throughout the past 
century, industrial memory projects continue to require vast space, cooling 
capacity and power.30  
 
                                                        
26 Ed Loomis, ‘Frontline interview’. 
27 Bill Binney, ‘Frontline interview’. 
28 Glenn Greenwald, ‘UN Report Finds Mass Surveillance Violates International Treaties and 
Privacy Rights’, The Intercept, 15 October 2014, available at:  
https://theintercept.com/2014/10/15/un-investigator-report-condemns-mass-
surveillance/. 
29 Thomas Tamm, ‘Frontline Interview, Former Department of Justice Attorney’, PBS, 11 
December 2013, available at: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-
elections-politics/united-states-of-secrets/the-frontline-interview-thomas-tamm/. 
30 Tim Watson, Telephone Interview, Professor at University of Warwick, 16 October 2018, 
Coventry, UK. 
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The following chapter will detail the experience of a group of people who 
advocated the use of a particular collection component known as 
ThinThread. The component is part of a project called Roadmap One 
developed to replace the myriad of favoured, pricier programs being 
developed by the NSA at the time, including Trailblazer.31 Michael Hayden 
dismissively refers to the group as being ‘messianic in their approach’.32 A 
number of different programs were being developed by different teams 
within NSA in the 1990s and early 2000s that would become the subject of 
controversy later on. ThinThread was one of these programs, forming a part 
of a larger project that was set to change data collection for NSA. There is 
relatively little official documentation on ThinThread in the public domain. 
The only available document is the original report filed by the Department of 
Defence (DoD) IG from 15 December 2004, which was heavily redacted and 
is therefore largely nonsensical.33 The program has been dismissed by former 
senior officials such as Hayden. The group of people who advocated 
ThinThread were its creators Bill Binney and Edward Loomis, along with their 
colleagues Kirk Wiebe and later on also Tom Drake. They were also supported 
by a senior DoD official and congressional staffer by the name of Diane Roark.  
 
ThinThread represented a component of a bigger project named Roadmap 
One. Bill Binney, Kirk Wiebe and Ed Loomis had been working on the 
development of this project to be rolled out over around a decade from the 
late 1990s. They claim that had the program been operational, it would have 
prevented 9/11.34 According to Binney, the plan was tested by around 150 
technicians at NSA. Initial plans for Roadmap One and the ThinThread 
component were well received, ‘they loved it, went nuts’ Wiebe states.35 Bill 
                                                        
31 Binney, Personal Interview; Kirk Wiebe, Personal Interview, Former NSA Analyst, 31 
March 2016, Washington, DC, USA. 
32 Hayden, Playing to the Edge, p.22. 
33 Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, ‘Requirements for the 
TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD Systems’, Federation of American Scientists, 15 December 
2004, available at: https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ig-thinthread.pdf. 
34 Binney, Personal Interview. 
35 Wiebe, Personal Interview. 
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Binney, the most senior developer of the programme, explains that 
ThinThread was much more sophisticated than other programs being 
developed at the time, as it had an inbuilt function that would encrypt data 
on collection. The SARC team also claim that it could distinguish between 
domestic and international data, prior to collection.36 The plan was to go from 
being unable to handle truly big data and understanding it, to being on top of 
collection and being able to anticipate future attacks. These were sizeable 
claims.37  
 
The team’s claims extend to the type of data that the program was collecting. 
Following the Snowden leaks, the intelligence community was forced to 
admit that they had been collecting both content data and metadata from 
domestic and international communications. This brought the metadata 
relevance argument to the forefront. Binney explains that metadata is much 
more valuable than content. Metadata allows for the triangulation of 
different types of ‘envelope data’. ThinThread purportedly was able to 
produce much more accurate results on metadata as the system was entirely 
automated, not involving the unreliable component of human error. ‘It is 
clear to me, taking what Hayden said in that chapter [referencing Michael 
Hayden’s book Playing to the Edge] and thinking back to my recollection of 
the chain of events prior to [and] just after 9/11, that […] nobody in authority, 
Hayden or otherwise understood what we had’.38 Described by Loomis, the 
Roadmap One project was ‘a series of different applications that could 
examine the Internet traffic and extract meaningful intelligence from it, and 
had a series of small applications, small meaning they were pretty much self-
sufficient’.39 The ThinThread component was designed to be flexible enough 
to be applied to any industry that worked with data collection. After leaving 
                                                        
36 Binney, Personal Interview. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Wiebe, Personal Interview. 
39 Loomis, ‘Frontline Interview’. 
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NSA, Wiebe and Binney worked on applying the component they had built to 
aid databases used in healthcare.40 
 
Hayden acknowledges that there was a finesse to ThinThread. However, he 
also maintains that ThinThread was an inferior program that was not scalable 
and therefore not capable of being a Trailblazer replacement. In his narration, 
he asserts that it is inconceivable ThinThread would ever be a viable 
‘alternative’. Instead, he explains how its creators became almost dogged in 
their approach to pitch a program that could not have lived up to 
expectations or have been fit for purpose.41 It is clear that Hayden was an 
admirer of Chinese bulk collection capabilities. Commenting on their capacity 
to store and analyse data, Hayden emphasised that the motivation of China 
was to profit financially, which he distinguishes from the honourable 
intentions of the US to want to protect its citizens.42  
Stage One: The Overpriced Competition 
The members of the SARC team started to develop the project Roadmap One 
and the ThinThread component in the late 1990s and the planning activity 
was midway when Michael Hayden arrived as the new NSA director in March 
1999. Diane Roark, who had been a congressional staffer to the NSA from 
1997 explained to Hayden that she felt the agency was ‘technologically adrift 
and that there was no sense of urgency to catch up to the digital age, which 
was coming on them like a freight train. […] So it was a huge concern to me, 
and they did not seem to realize what a huge problem this was’.43 Roark was 
a senior staffer from 1985 to 2002 at the HPSCI. She was responsible for 
certain oversight aspects of the NSA, including operational effectiveness and 
                                                        
40 Binney, Personal Interview. 
41 Hayden, Playing to the Edge, pp.22-23. 
42 Gordon Corera, Intercept: The Secret History of Computers and Spies (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson), pp. 219, 278. 
43 Diane Roark, ‘Frontline Interview, Top Staff Member on the House Intelligence 
Committee from 1985 to 2002’, PBS, 11 December 2013, available at: 
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legality, as well as budgetary accountability.44 Roark was seriously concerned 
about the lack of attention NSA paid to the Internet as an intelligence 
resource and conveyed these to Hayden. Reportedly Hayden did concede 
that changes had to be made, by launching two investigative teams. One 
team would be internal to the agency and upon Roark’s insistence, Hayden 
also appointed an external team. The verdict was that radical modernisation 
of the structure was essential to its survival.  
 
In July 2000, Loomis explains that SARC had begun to string together the 
various subsystem components of Roadmap One. It also started to look as 
though senior management were beginning to take note of what the SARC 
team had been working on. During this time, the ThinThread concept was 
visibly starting to achieve traction within NSA and Loomis was asked to 
support the Trailblazer project with the progress that the SARC team had 
made on the program. At this time, Loomis reports that the team received 
permission from the NSA General Counsel to run ThinThread. It was evident 
from the data produced that it was working. Disputes and concerns began to 
arise when the focus rested on the inbuilt double encryption safeguards – 
meaning that the program had to distinguish between domestic and 
international communications traffic. The counsel was sceptical and refused 
the fully automated component of the program. This resulted in some 
disappointment in the SARC team.45 
 
In January 2001, after some deliberation, Hayden chose the Trailblazer 
program as his flagship and requested financial backing to further its 
expansion. The development of Trailblazer would cost the NSA an estimated 
$1.2 billion, though full figures were never disclosed.46 The SARC team have 
                                                        
44 Roark, ‘Frontline Interview’. 
45 Loomis, ‘Frontline Interview’. 
46 Shioban Gorman, ‘Little-Known Contractor has Close Ties with Staff of NSA’, Baltimore 
Sun, 29 January 2006, available at: http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-01-
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compared this to the mere $3.2 million cost of ThinThread.47 Roark raised 
concerns about the workability of the Trailblazer project after she had been 
briefed on the program, which was based on an older analogue approach and 
converted to a digital format.48 When asked about Roark’s investigations into 
the programs, Hayden has denied that she had been briefed.49 In contrast, 
Roark claims that she had also been briefed on the ThinThread program, 
which has been confirmed by its creators.50 Described as ‘hidden programs’, 
it became apparent that there was merit in the ThinThread program. Roark 
describes the SARC project as ‘pretty impressive and forward-looking’. In 
early 2001, the ThinThread system was running and ready to be launched.51 
Binney liaised with the ‘terrorist shop’ (NSA CT unit) and asked for a list of 
target sites, which could be processed and analysed by the system.52 By 
August 2001, the SARC team had been marginalised and the SIGINT director, 
Maureen Baginski, shut the project down due to it being reportedly ‘not 
scalable’.53  
 
The day of 9/11 was a day of great sorrow for all who worked within NSA. 
Reports of all those individuals whose testimony is considered here describes 
a harrowing experience and, in most cases, all-encompassing feelings of guilt 
for their failings in preventing this tragedy. As a result, shortly following 9/11 
Binney and Wiebe made new attempts to propose ThinThread and its 
capabilities. However, when programs were being developed pre-2001, the 
agency had started to become preoccupied with the accumulation of bulk 
data. This shaped the approach that the intelligence agency took post-9/11. 
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Wiebe first noticed this when 40-50 servers turned up in the corridors outside 
his office in the SARC. This period of time marked a turning point for the SARC 
team. They started to feel ostracised within NSA. Wiebe tells of an incident 
where he was physically pushed out of a meeting room on trying to enter it.54 
The program that was being built was StellarWind, under the President’s 
Surveillance Program. Binney, Wiebe and Loomis later found out that 
StellarWind utilised some of the ThinThread code. The program, authorised 
by President George W. Bush, reportedly analysed both domestic and foreign 
data, but without the inbuilt ThinThread safeguards. Binney overheard the 
Trailblazer project manager boasting ‘we can milk this thing to 2015’.55  
 
Finally, in October 2001, Binney, Wiebe and Loomis decided that they no 
longer wished to be a part of NSA. The final straw for Binney and Wiebe were 
the whispers about PSP - the operation which they deemed unconstitutional. 
Loomis was more reluctant to question the program but retired because he 
felt that ‘NSA had made some very dumb decisions […] like killing 
ThinThread’.56 Wiebe and Binney continued to retain some of their security 
clearance and decided to start their own business in Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) developing the programs that they had 
been working on. Their work was centred mainly on utilising data analysis 
components for fields such as Medicare.57 Binney is adamant that bulk 
collection is not the answer and hinders counter terrorism operations more 
than it helps. He is of the opinion that there is a smarter solution.  
 
Stage Two: A Team Effort 
Uncovering the PSP and the StellarWind program was one step too far for 
Binney, Wiebe and Loomis. ‘You know, for us, this would have been a dream 
come true’, remarked former Stasi officer General Wolfgang Schmidt, when 
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speaking about NSA spying powers in an interview.58 This cut right to the core 
of why the SARC team eventually decided to take action. Binney, Wiebe and 
Loomis were then involved in the formal complaint sent to the DoD IG that 
highlighted the case of waste, fraud and abuse regarding the Trailblazer, 
StellarWind programs and proposing the ThinThread program as an 
alternative. The report was written with the help of Thomas Drake and Diane 
Roark. Though Drake did not lend his name to the report, as he was still an 
NSA employee. Drake started to get his first inkling about his precarious 
position within NSA when warned about the consequences of leaking by 
Baginski.59 In the end, the report was formally submitted by Kirk Wiebe in late 
2002. An audit of Trailblazer followed. In March 2004, the DoD produced a 
classified interim report. After almost two years, in December 2004, the final 
report was published. Wiebe and Binney claim that the report was highly 
critical of Trailblazer and quite complementary of ThinThread.60 However, 
this was heavily redacted, making the content almost incomprehensible.61  
 
Remarkably, running in parallel to the stories of the SARC team are those of 
Thomas Tamm and Russ Tice. Thomas Tamm is a former DoJ attorney at the 
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) from 2001 to 2003. Russ Tice 
is a former intelligence analyst, working in various branches of the US 
government, including the US Air Force, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the 
Defence Intelligence Agency and the NSA for around two decades. An article 
published by the New York Times would inextricably link them. Tamm and 
Tice provided information to the journalists James Risen and Eric Lichtblau on 
separate occasions. On the 16 December 2005, the NYT published an article 
                                                        
58 Matthew Schofield, ‘Memories of Stasi color Germans’ view of U.S. surveillance 
programs’, McClatchy DC Bureau, 10 July 2010, available at: 
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-
world/national/article24750439.html#storylink=cpy. 
59 Mayer, ‘The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an Enemy of the State?’. 
60 Binney, Personal Interview; Wiebe, Personal Interview. 
61 Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, ‘Requirements for the 
TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD Systems’, Federation of American Scientists, 15 December 
2004, available at: https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ig-thinthread.pdf. 
 - 223 - Dobson 
entitled ‘Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts’ on the PSP written by 
Risen and Lichtblau. Unlike the two Pulitzer prizewinning journalists, 
however, Tamm and Tice have talked about how they were subjected to 
threats, surveillance and intimidation by several US government bodies.62 
The Trailblazer project was cancelled in 2006, constituting both a waste of 
money, resources and time. In January 2006, Michael Hayden gave a Press 
Conference where he stated, ‘NSA has an existential problem. In order to 
protect American lives and liberties, it has to be two things: powerful in its 
capabilities, and secretive in its methods. And we exist in a political culture 
that distrusts two things most of all: power and secrecy’.63 In May 2006, 
Drake went to the press for the first time, driven by these dual concerns.  
 
Stage Three: Falsely Accused 
It was not until 2007 that Binney, Wiebe, Loomis, Roark and Tamm would find 
out quite how seriously the government would take leakers and 
whistleblowers. The act of seeking out the press was an indication that little 
loyalty remained to the agency and several individuals had gone rogue. At 
exactly 9am Eastern time (ET) on the 26 July 2007, Kirk Wiebe, Bill Binney, Ed 
Loomis and Diane Roark were simultaneously subjected to an intrusive FBI 
search of their homes. The raids followed a series of FBI interviews where the 
SARC team was asked to sign non-disclaimer forms. It would later on transpire 
that the purported objective of these raids was to find information that would 
link the above individuals to some troubling newspaper articles, including the 
2005 New York Times article, and to find the report that had been submitted 
to the DoD IG.64 As the report was said to have contained classified 
information, being in possession of this could have constituted a breach of 
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the Espionage Act.65 Each individual tells a different harrowing story of the 
day in question.  
 
Perhaps the most dramatic chain of events took place at the residence of Bill 
Binney. Binney recounts that the first he knew that the raid was taking place 
was when he had a gun placed to his head as he was exiting his shower.66 The 
account Binney gives shows hallmark signs of intimidation. Binney’s son 
answered the door to armed FBI men who, dispensed with niceties, made 
their way through his house. With the family held at gunpoint, the house was 
searched from top to bottom for around seven to eight hours. The FBI 
continued to pressurise Binney, despite his protests that he was not 
withholding information. Binney describes how he started to get angry, ‘I 
started to get mad. I said: ‘OK, you want to know what the crime is? Bush, 
Cheney, Hayden and Tenet were the central conspirators to subvert the 
Constitution and the laws of the US, and here is how they did it.’ So I told 
them all about Stellar Wind on my back porch, explained all the data they 
were taking in, what they were doing with it and how it was violating the 
rights of everybody in the country’.67 The FBI seized all the computer 
equipment in the house, ‘electronic hardware, discs […], any kind of 
electronic storage device’.68 Adding insult to injury, they took all the 
information relating to the business that the SARC team had been working 
on, which put a stop to any further developments. Binney explains that 
despite this, he felt it was imperative that the group remained within the 
government to try to influence change from within.69 Thereafter, Binney gave 
evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill in 
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2015 and warned of some of the issues this might have. Primarily, Binney’s 
message is clear, he states ‘Analysis Paralysis’.70  
 
This was not the preferred option for Wiebe, who proposed the ‘nuclear 
option’ of going to the press.71 On the 26 July at 9am, Kirk Wiebe was working 
on his computer when he spotted a number of distinctive blue uniformed 
officers with the golden ‘FBI’ lettering approaching his front door. Guessing 
that this was not a social visit, Wiebe remarked, ‘it sent a chill through me 
immediately’.72 Wiebe’s mother in law and one of his daughters were told to 
sit in the front room, whilst Wiebe himself was kept on the back porch. 
Wiebe’s wife and other daughter returned to their home after a shopping trip 
to find 12 unmarked vans and cars in their driveway. Wiebe recalls that he 
was only asked two questions during the seven hours that the FBI were rifling 
through his medicine cabinet. Wiebe cooperated fully with the officers. First, 
he was asked if he could identify a poorly scanned photo of Siobhan Gorman, 
a reporter for the Baltimore Sun. Though Wiebe knew who she was, he had 
only ever seen her once. Second, the officers wanted to know about a phone 
call Wiebe had made to Diane Roark the previous evening. Wiebe was 
discussing the business idea that the SARC members had been working on. 
Much like with Binney, the FBI took any digital devices, including six 
computers for business and personal mobile phones. Despite all of this and 
the lack of control in those moments, Wiebe explains that the worst part was 
the aftermath, seeing his family suffer and his daughters crying.  
 
The FBI questioning and subsequent raid hit hardest for Ed Loomis who was 
completely unaware that the same fate had befallen his colleagues. Loomis 
was at work when he was first called in for an interview with ‘the men in 
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black’. He recounts that he was interviewed at 12:30pm for around 50 
minutes. Loomis was questioned thoroughly on the 10-12 page long DoD IG 
report, although it was not referred to by name at any point. The only 
information given, says Loomis, was that it did not bear any security markings 
and that it could have been related to warrantless surveillance. When the 
interview was finished, Loomis was notified that he would lose his security 
clearance, asked to sign a debriefing statement and ordered to leave the 
building. Loomis recalls that this was acutely humiliating, as his daypack was 
searched like that of a criminal. At 3pm that day, Loomis was visited by the 
two FBI agents who had questioned him earlier in the day. Loomis describes 
how after gaining permission for the search, 14 more agents arrived in several 
vehicles. It took agents around five hours to search the home of Loomis and 
his wife, who were ‘held captive in the rec room’ throughout.73  
 
Loomis remembers how ‘they carted approximately 30 items out of the 
house and left. My life was in a shamble at that point. My wife was hysterical; 
she couldn't believe what had just occurred. I couldn't believe what just 
occurred. I had no insight into why it had’.74 Under the impression that he 
would somehow harm his colleagues or jeopardise his own position by 
communicating with them, he became a complete recluse. Whilst Wiebe, 
Binney, Roark and Drake were able to find some solace in their shared 
experiences and communicate, Loomis cut himself off. Loomis comments 
that the mental strain this experience caused him and his family ‘is still eating 
me’.75 Finally, in 2010, Loomis remerged and reconnected with Binney who 
had been suffering with serious health concerns. In fact, his belief in the 
government was so strong that Loomis did not believe the testimony of his 
colleagues that NSA was running a secret program to spy on Americans. It 
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was not until he saw the documents released by Edward Snowden years later 
that he began to believe in the scale of the surveillance programs.76  
 
Unlike the others, Diane Roark assumed that she would be questioned by the 
FBI in due course. Following the publication of both the New York Times and 
Baltimore Sun articles, she expected that the links might be drawn, and 
questions would be asked of her as an open critic of the programs. Especially, 
since she had read that the investigation team searching for the source of the 
leaks included 5 US attorneys and 20 FBI agents. Nevertheless, it was not until 
August 2006 – after 8 months – that Roark was asked to assist with the 
investigation. Roark first met with FBI agents and US attorneys in February 
2007, where she recalls the line of questioning was extremely antagonistic. 
Surprised by their hostile manner towards a congressional staffer, Roark 
suddenly felt that she could be suspected of being the source. However, 
towards the end of the three-hour interrogation, the tone had mellowed. The 
warrant presented at the raid of her house suggested that Roark was not only 
suspected of having connections with the NYT journalists Risen and 
Lichtenblau, but also that she had fed information to the Baltimore Sun. Roark 
admits that she did speak with Siobhan Gorman but denies providing any 
classified information. Roark, like Binney, Wiebe and Loomis took some 
comfort from the fact that they knew they had done nothing wrong.  
 
Nevertheless, in December 2009, Roark was contacted by the federal 
investigation team to request that she plead guilty to a felony perjury. Roark 
insists that their claims are based on falsehoods. They asserted that Roark 
had stated she had no knowledge of who leaked to the New York Times and 
the Baltimore Sun, which was not the case. Additionally, it was clear to Roark 
that there was another motive to frame Tom Drake and cajole her to state 
that he had broken the law. She refused to cooperate, responding that she 
had not perjured herself nor was she aware that Drake had done anything 
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illegal. Roark, Binney, Wiebe, Loomis and Drake brought a lawsuit in Maryland 
to recover their property that had been taken during the raids. On having her 
property returned, it transpired that Roark had been subject to surveillance 
before the raid. Finally, after suing the government for a violation of her civil 
liberties, Roark was told that the case against her had been dropped.  
 
The raid of Thomas Tamm’s house took place on 1 August 2007. As a lawyer 
and being familiar with the inner workings of the government, Tamm thought 
he knew what the consequences were likely to be, if he would be found to be 
the source of that fateful NYT article. After waiting to be discovered as the 
source for around two years, the FBI finally caught up with Tamm. Much like 
the previous descriptions, the raid of Tamm’s home lasted around seven 
hours. Shocked and confused, Tamm’s wife and children were kept at the 
house. His children, who had been woken by armed men wearing vests, had 
their phones and computers confiscated.77 Tamm states simply ‘the raid on 
my house was unquestionably one of the worst days of my life’.78 A couple of 
days after his ordeal, Tamm was told by his lawyer that he had been offered 
a plea bargain by the DoJ. The refusal to take the plea that constituted 
espionage charges, resulted in a kind of stalemate. It was not until 26 April 
2011 that Tamm appeared in front of the grand jury of the Eastern District of 
Virginia, in Alexandria. It is here that the topic of conversation relates to 
James Risen’s book and Tamm is asked to expand on every detail of his 
involvement. Conversely, following this development, Tamm is finally told 
that any attempts at charging him have been dropped. It is widely assumed 
that the authorities pursued Risen over his book rather than his newspaper 
articles to separate him from protection by the NYT.  
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Thomas Drake (2011) 
‘You don’t wake up one morning, nor do you aspire as a career choice […] to 
become a whistleblower’79 
 
To date, there have been twelve charges made under the Espionage Act 
against leakers of classified information, Thomas Drake is one of them. The 
others are Daniel Ellsberg, Samuel Morison, Lawrence Franklin, Shamai 
Leibowitz, Bradley Manning, Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, Jeffrey Sterling, John 
Kiriakou, James Hitselberger, Edward Snowden and Reality Winner. The first 
charge against Dan Ellsberg, made under the Nixon administration, was later 
dismissed. One pardon against Samuel Morison was given under the Reagan 
administration in 1984. During the Bush administration, the first guilty verdict 
was recorded for Lawrence Franklin in 2005. Franklin was sentenced to 13 
years in prison, but eventually only served 10 months house arrest. A total of 
eight of these charges were made during the Obama administration. There 
were various outcomes, but most severe of all was the treatment of Chelsea 
Manning with an original prison sentence of 35 years. The criticism levelled 
at the Obama administration for the use of the act extends to the opportunity 
given with this precedent, that has subsequently been passed to the Trump 
administration. Reality Winner is currently the only leaker who has been 
charged, convicted and sentenced under the Espionage Act during the Trump 
administration. Winner is sentenced to five years in prison for leaking a 
classified document to the Intercept.80 Lawyers have commented that this 
sentence has marked the longest period for a single ‘unauthorised disclosure 
to the media’.81 
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It is not difficult to accrue a solid picture of the events surrounding Drake’s 
case through information gathered online. Openly documented through the 
courts and the media, Drake’s circumstances were distinct for a number of 
reasons. (1) The Drake case – more than any other– incites empathy from 
those who are otherwise highly critical of whistleblower action. The response 
received most frequently when raising the issue of whistleblowers is that 
‘they’ – predominantly indicating Edward Snowden - are dangerous 
individuals who wilfully jeopardise national security when revealing classified 
information to the press. (2) However, Drake is considered to be different. 
Drake exhausted internal reporting channels within the NSA, prior to 
initiating communications with the press. This is the element which most 
clearly separates Drake from other ‘whistleblowers’. Similar to Snepp, Drake 
fought for a number of years to be heard by his superiors within the agency. 
Arguably, his protests came at a time that was politically sensitive for the 
Bush administration, which was intent on launching an aggressive response 
to the threat of terror following 9/11. (3) Drake, in his efforts to be heard, 
was publicly supported by three of his colleagues - Bill Binney, Kirk Wiebe and 
Ed Loomis.  
 
Stage One: The Patriot 
The mission statement of the US NSA is:  
‘The National Security Agency/Central Security Service leads the U.S. 
Government in cryptology that encompasses both SIGINT and Information 
Assurance products and services and enables Computer Network Operations 
in order to gain a decision advantage for the Nation and our allies under all 
circumstances.’82  
 
In some circles, the NSA is also known as ‘No Such Agency’ due to its secretive 
nature. Unlike the CIA, relatively little information regarding the operations 
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of the NSA is in the public domain. Recently, it has received predominantly 
negative reviews, mainly thanks to a former contractor to the NSA - Edward 
Snowden. Amongst other information, Snowden revealed that the NSA 
budget for 2013 was $10.8 billion.  
 
Thomas Drake started his employment as a Senior Executive at the NSA on 9 
September 2001. Drake describes the NSA as ‘a very secret organisation’ and 
his experience there as akin to staring into the abyss of Pandora’s box. Drake 
was previously employed in other areas of the US government, 
predominantly working with SIGINT and in cryptology. In fact, his career 
began when he volunteered for the Air Force in 1979 working on signals 
intelligence. From 1989 onwards, Drake was contracted to the NSA. The NSA 
was keen to acquire further knowledge and to expand their capacity to 
manage a growing influx of data and information from the Internet and other 
sources. This triggered an internal NSA debate concerning the production of 
two programs designed for this purpose – to collect and sort data on citizens. 
The two programs employed consequentially different approaches. The 
Trailblazer program involved much higher costs.83 The alternative ThinThread 
project would cost a fraction of this figure. Michael Hayden, head of NSA at 
the time, favoured the Trailblazer project, which employed huge private 
corporations such as IBM for its development. Thomas Drake, Bill Binney, Kirk 
Wiebe, Ed Loomis and Diane Roark filed a report to the IG of the Department 
of Defence (DoD). 
 
Drake explained that he has taken ‘the oath’ four times during his 
government career. ‘The oath’ refers to the commitment a civil servant 
swears to under the constitution of the US. Drake declares that it was his 
commitment to the oath that spurred him into action when he discovered 
wrongdoing at the agency. He took what he described as ‘moral agency’. 
Moral agency, when considering the philosophical connotation, is typically 
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understood to be the implication to ‘do a duty’, which is how Drake describes 
his actions. He clarified to me that he made a choice to take action when he 
recognised the waste, fraud and abuse done by the NSA.84  
 
Until Drake finally resigned under pressure in 2008, he proceeded doggedly 
to work his way through the legal processes that are prescribed for 
government employees who believe that questionable activities are taking 
place in their departments. In accordance with whistleblower protection laws 
such as the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act, Drake 
complained internally to the designated authorities: to his bosses, the NSA 
IG, the Defence Department IG, and both the House and Senate 
Congressional intelligence committees. It is worth noting at this stage that 
whistleblowers of intelligence agencies are not awarded the same protection 
that whistleblowers of other areas of federal government are afforded. 
Therefore, Drake was restricted in the actions that he could take. In order not 
to be in violation of the Espionage Act, Drake could only speak to those 
individuals with security clearance. This can include lawyers, senators or DoD 
staffers. Accordingly, Drake commenced communications with Diane Roark – 
expert on the NSA budget - who was a Republican staffer on the House 
Intelligence Committee of the US Congress.  
 
Stage Two: The End of a Tether 
Drake brought forward information on a few issues within the NSA. First and 
foremost, Drake was caught up in the complaint about ‘waste’ of funds in 
connection with the project called Trailblazer - a program that was supposed 
to help with the collection and analysis of personal data of US citizens. 
Another project – ThinThread – had been developed that was much more 
cost-efficient, not to mention included automatic encryption to protect 
personal data that it would collect. Michael Hayden – Director of NSA at the 
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time - chose Trailblazer, which cost around $1 billion. Drake and three of his 
colleagues (Kirk Wiebe, Bill Binney and Ed Loomis) made a formal complaint 
to the DoD in 2002. This action was supported by Diane Roark. In vain, Roark 
went to some lengths to bring the case to the attention of the DoD. Drake, 
still an employee of the NSA, did not put his name on the complaint. A 
conversation he had just prior to the filing of the report with Baginski 
indicated that he would not fare well. Shortly after the submission of the 
report, Drake was asked to leave his post and join another section. This was 
the first of many moves for Drake.  
 
Drake started communicating with the Baltimore Sun in 2005, though this 
was not made public until sometime later. Communicating with a reporter 
called Siobhan Gorman via Hushmail, Drake began to share information on 
topics that he felt were problematic. This eventually also included 
information regarding the Trailblazer project. Nevertheless, Drake maintains 
that he did not at any time discuss classified information. In his case, the 
ruling Judge Richard Bennett held that ‘there is no evidence that Reporter A 
[Gorman] relied upon any allegedly classified information found in Mr. 
Drake's house in her articles’. Mayer’s New Yorker article in 2011, illustrates 
that Drake’s case not only divided opinions, but also marked a change in the 
landscape of secrecy.85 Transparency had become a ‘buzz-word’ and the 
concept of classification was losing some of its traction due to a general 
perception of over-classification. The article also addresses the ‘reckless’ 
element of Drake’s actions. It was reported that Drake had estimated he 
would not suffer serious consequences from revealing this information.  
 
Stage Three: Marked 
In 2011, Drake received the Ridenhour Prize for Truth-Telling. He was also 
named as the co-recipient of the Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in 
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Intelligence (SAAII) award, an award named after CIA analysts Sam Adams 
who discovered that the Saigon US Military Assistance Command had 
drastically underestimated the number of North Vietnamese ‘under-arms’. 
Adams pursued internal reporting channels and like Drake, was 
unsuccessful.86 Drake now works at an Apple store in Bethesda, Washington 
DC. Drake explained that he was still being persecuted as a result of his 
actions and that his reprisal case was still ongoing.87 
 
Drake’s house, along with the houses of his SARC colleagues, was searched 
by the FBI in 2007. Due to his seniority, Drake was in the rare position that he 
knew of the raids on his colleagues’ houses, Binney, Wiebe, Loomis and Roark 
and thought it was only a matter of time before the gaze would turn on him. 
Finally, in late 2007 at 7am, he watched as around twelve FBI agents 
approached his house. In February 2008, Drake took the decision to clear his 
desk, as he had suspected his security clearance would be removed, meaning 
he would not be able to return.88 Drake cooperated fully during and following 
the raid. He was interviewed over three sessions in November and December 
of 2007, then in April 2008. In April, Drake was confronted with Steve Tyrrell, 
the original prosecutor on the case, who told him, ‘How would you like to 
spend the rest of your life in prison, Mr. Drake, unless you cooperate with our 
investigation? We have more than enough information to put you away for a 
long, long time. You'd better start talking. And you might get as little as 15 or 
17 years. Maybe. No guarantees, but that's better than life, isn't it?’89  
 
Drake disclosed being systematically ostracised and phased out of his role at 
the NSA, which in 2008 eventually resulted in his resignation. In 2010, as the 
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case was brought against Drake that alleged, he had mishandled documents. 
From a legal perspective, Drake’s case is significant in a number of ways. 
Uniquely, he, along with Daniel Ellsberg, is one of four people who were 
charged with 'wilful retention' of 'national defense' information under 18 
U.S.C. § 793(e). More common is the charge of ‘delivery’ of classified material 
to a third party – the sharing of classified information with an individual not 
cleared to receive this. Eventually, on 9 June 2011, the 10 charges against 
Drake were dropped. An attempt was made for several deals, but he 
maintained that he would not ‘plea bargain with the truth’. Nevertheless, he 
pleaded guilty to one misdemeanour count – which was described as a civil 
disobedience - for exceeding authorised use of a computer. Since then, Drake 
has stated publicly that he believes NSA needs to be dismantled and some 
reform in the form of the Church Committee should take place. Drake states 




The NSA is secretive, and its lack of transparency is perhaps not surprising. 
Because cryptography often requires the use of techniques that are long in 
their gestation, documents can remain secret for improbable lengths of time 
and can be subject to seemingly absurd redaction. But for any academic 
researcher it also makes it harder to establish the facts. What is clear in this 
case, is that there were some internal disputes over procurement long before 
they reached the public eye.  
 
At first glance Drake, Binney, Wiebe, Loomis are technically whistleblowers 
because they were concerned about waste and fraud, moreover they 
believed they were doing the right thing. Their immediate concerns were 
                                                        
90 SILENCED - Whistleblower Documentary [Documentary], dir. by Thomas Andrew Drake, 
Jesselyn Raddack and James Spione (USA: TheLipTV, 2014), available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78ZeqS49pkM. 
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with a doctrinal issue about how the NSA was addressing a shift from the era 
of copper wires and radio communications to a digital age characterised by 
fibre-optics and terabyte disks. They were advocating systems that were 
certainly cheaper but also more discriminating, lending a moral tone to their 
otherwise fiscal complaints. They were clearly very committed to the 
programme which they had been developing. 
 
They were perhaps unaware that their dispute touched on a higher-level 
schism within government. Over a period of decades, a range of figures had 
sought to push back against restraints placed on presidential authority by 
Congress in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam. These constraints were 
reaffirmed and increased in the wake of Iran-Contra in 1986, typically by the 
imposition of IGs on the CIA and the NSA. The push back was being led by 
Dick Cheney and after 9/11 this led to programmes of interception that were 
based on a controversial interpretation of war powers and ignored the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Key figures in the FISA system and 
within the DoJ that enjoyed daily interaction with the work of NSA suddenly 
found themselves shut out of meetings, as had Thomas Drake.  
 
Curiously, this important legal battle was invisible to all but perhaps a dozen 
people in the White House. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Drake, 
Loomis, Binney and Wiebe were victims of a titanic battle at a higher level 
over war powers that also addressed issues like torture and of whose 
stratospheric nature they were only dimly aware. In this respect, they were 
not only whistleblowers but also foot soldiers in a vast constitutional conflict 
during which everyone including George Bush, Condi Rice, Colin Powell and 
Dick Cheney leaked. However, while these elevated figures received six-figure 
sums for their memoirs that comment on these subjects, the workaday 
figures of the NSA received rather different treatment.91     
                                                        
91 Gellman, Angler; Goldsmith, Power and Constraint. 
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Chapter 6        
  A Catch-22: How do you solve a 
problem like Edward Snowden? 
‘Our world is opaque, we live in the shadows[...] 
And look around you - who do you fear? Can you see a face, a uniform, a 
flag? No, our world is not more transparent now, it's more opaque! It's in 
the shadows - that's where we must do battle. So, before you declare us 
irrelevant, ask yourselves - how safe do you feel?’1 
 
 
‘My name is Ed Snowden, I'm 29 years old. I worked for Booz Allen Hamilton 
as an infrastructure analyst for NSA in Hawaii.’2 On 9 June 2013 in a video 
released by the Guardian, Edward Snowden introduced himself to the world, 
claiming to have taken classified documents from the NSA base in Hawaii 
where he had been employed as a Booz Allen Hamilton contractor. Snowden 
voiced his ever-growing trepidations of the expanding surveillance 
capabilities of intelligence agencies and their focus on collecting domestic 
data along with just about everything else. The Snowden revelations brought 
old intra-agency debates on privacy and warrantless surveillance programs 
into the public domain. The government response was not dissimilar to that 
given by ‘M’, the fictional head of MI6, in the James Bond film Skyfall. 
President Barack Obama justified the use of surveillance systems that had 
been publicised by Snowden in a statement to the press given on June 7, 
2013. In this statement, the President of the US denied surveillance of US 
citizens. He also emphasised his overriding commitment to two causes, 
namely the safety of the American people and the responsibility to defending 
their privacy. Obama went on to claim that privacy and safety are two 
                                                        
1 Skyfall [Film] dir. by Sam Mendes (UK, US: Eon Productions, 2012). 
2 Edward Snowden, ‘I Don’t Want to Live in a Society that Does These Sort of Things’, The 
Guardian, 9 July 2013, available at:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0hLjuVyIIrs. 
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competing concepts that cannot be fully recognised at the same time.3 This 
is quite a deviation from some of the emotive pro-privacy promises Obama 
made as a Senator and on the electoral hustings.  
 
In 2005, in a statement to the Senate on, ‘Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism’ 
(PATRIOT) Act, Obama argued, ‘in Washington, this issue has tended to 
degenerate into the typical either/or debate: Either we protect our people 
from terror, or we protect our most cherished principles. I would suggest, Mr 
President, that this is a false choice. It asks too little of us and it assumes too 
little about America.4 The apparent change of heart after being elected as 
president triggered scepticism of the Obama administration and its capacity 
for honesty. Nevertheless, the much-disputed enactment of the PATRIOT Act 
2001 legislation, exemplifies the atmosphere during an uncertain time and 
highlights the fears of policy-makers in the face of global terrorism.  
 
Glenn Greenwald is a journalist and author, as well as former constitutional 
and civil rights lawyer.5 In October 2005, Greenwald started a blog called 
‘Unclaimed Territory’, as a response to what he felt was a worrying shift in 
the Bush administration’s use of power.6 The rule of law in America denotes 
that the Constitution remains the ultimate authority. Any President or 
employee of the state swears to uphold its values above their own 
                                                        
3 President Barack Obama, ‘President Obama Defends N.S.A. Surveillance Programs’, The 
New York Times, 7 June 2013, available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m8F99BT8QAA; Peter Baker and David E. Sanger, 
‘Obama Calls Surveillance Programs Legal and Limited’, The New York Times, 7 June 2013, 
available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/us/national-security-agency-
surveillance.html?smid=yt-nytimes. 
4Barack Obama Speech, ‘Barack Obama: Senate Floor Speech on the PATRIOT Act’, 
American Rhetoric Online Speech Bank, 15 December 2005, available at: 
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamasenatefloorspee
chpatriotact.htm. 
5 Glenn Greenwald, ‘About the Author’, no date, available at: 
http://glenngreenwald.net/#GlennGreenwald 
6 Glenn Greenwald, ‘Unclaimed Territory - By Glenn Greenwald’, Blogspot, 12 February 
2007, available at: 
http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/. 
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aspirations. In 2006, Greenwald publishes a book entitled How would a 
PATRIOT Act, in which he narrates his experience in a post-9/11 America 
under the Bush administration.7 Predominantly, Greenwald emphasised that 
the rule of law was so blatantly disregarded that it indicated an attitude 
suggesting a sense of entitlement to abusing the power of the administration 
in the name of national security.8 Greenwald was a columnist for the 
Guardian US (August 2012 – October 2013) for just over one year, before he 
became an editor for an online publication the Intercept.9  
 
The expectations for President Obama were high when he came into office in 
2009, with an election campaign that emphasised the need for ethical policy 
choices and a matching campaign slogan - ‘change we can believe in’.10 
Although change did come, it did not necessarily take the shape that was 
expected. One adjustment made quite early on, was a more focused attack 
on Al Qaeda. On the one hand, this involved an increased use of drone strikes 
and deployment of specialised forces, which would bear fruit swiftly, 
culminating in the killing of Osama Bin Laden.11 Another area where Obama 
sought to make his mark related to decisions concerning intelligence 
collection.12 The specific areas of concern are also known as the Bush 
administration’s ‘toxic legacies’. Firstly, the infamous US prison at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, also referred to as GTMO or Gitmo, established post-
9/11 by President George W. Bush. Following a report by the US Senate, 
                                                        
7 Glenn Greenwald, ‘How would a PATRIOT Act?’ (San Francisco: Working Assets Publishing, 
2006). 
8 Ibid. pp. 9-16. 




10 Andrew Hammond and Richard Aldrich, ‘Afterword: Securing Freedom, Obama, the NSA, 
and US Foreign Policy’, in Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidge, eds., 
Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2014), 
p.306. 
11 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, ‘Secret “Kill List” Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and 
Will’, New York Times, 29 May 2012. 
12 Trevor McCrisken, ‘Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice’, 
Foreign Affairs, 87: 4 (2011), pp.791-792. 
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partially declassified for release in late 2014, the full extent of unsavoury 
activities at Guantanamo Bay were admitted. The estimated 119 GTMO 
inmates were reportedly detained without trial and subjected to torture by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).13 Secondly, the continued operation of 
‘StellarWind’ a controversial NSA data collection program, addressed directly 
by the Snowden revelations due to its apparent privacy violations.14 The 
newly elected President would have to decide whether to continue these 
practices or bring them to an end.  
 
As Trevor McCrisken asserts, it is worth bearing in mind that ‘government is 
different from opposition’.15 This assertion illustrates a very practical 
difference between making well-worded speeches to sway voters and taking 
action when in office. Was the reality of a possible terror attack at his own 
inauguration enough to make Obama reconsider his staunch views on 
upholding privacy? Had the fear of a further attack gripped him, as it had 
others within the previous administration? As a constitutional lawyer, some 
of Obama’s decisions had been spectacularly disappointing. Instead of living 
up to his promises, Obama continued along a path not dissimilar to that of 
George Bush during later years in office. Bush started to implement changes 
to policies that Obama then completed.16 However, in early 2009, former NSA 
and CIA Director General Michael Hayden reportedly warned Obama’s 
security advisor about the potentially tenuous relationship between the 
administration and the CIA, if the latter would be reprimanded for past 
activities stating, ‘if these guys don’t think you have their back, they’re not 
going to be very adventurous’.17  
                                                        
13 US Senate Select Committee, ‘Report of the Senate Select Committee Study of the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program’, 9 December 2014, 
available at: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-
113srpt288.pdf, p.14. 
14 Hammond, ‘Afterword: Securing Freedom’, pp.306-307. 
15 McCrisken, ‘Ten Years On’, p.784. 
16 Peter Baker, ‘Obama’s War Over Terror’, The New York Times, 4 January 2010, available 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.html. 
17 Baker, ‘Obama’s War Over Terror’. 
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The main literature considering the Snowden case is divisible into two 
dominant schools of thought, one considering Snowden as a ‘hero’ and the 
other considering him to be a ‘traitor’. On the whole the literature that 
considers Snowden as a hero stems from a vast trove of journalistic and civil 
liberties literature. The relationship between Snowden, members of the press 
and civil rights activists are pivotal to the development of his story. This is 
evidenced in their successive products either in article, book or documentary 
format that have been published about his journey thus far. Journalists from 
the Guardian Luke Harding and Ewen MacAskill have penned many articles 
concerning the Snowden documents, as well as Snowden himself. Glenn 
Greenwald’s first-hand account of his experience with Snowden No Place to 
Hide and Luke Harding’s The Snowden Files were both released as books in 
2014.18 Some academic writing – chiefly from the critical security studies 
wing of IR – also considers Snowden as a heroic figure, such as Andregg, who 
states that ‘Edward Snowden revealed that, with the best of intentions to 
catch “terrorists” and shielded by excessive secrecy, the NSA had created a 
signals intelligence system that any police state would envy‘.19  
 
The literature that considers Snowden’s action to be that of a ‘traitor’ at 
worst and naïve dissident at best, includes that of Edward Lucas’ 2014, The 
Snowden Operation: Inside the West’s Greatest Intelligence Disaster and 
Epstein’s carefully researched How America Lost its Secrets: Edward 
Snowden, the Man and the Theft published in 2017 and the memoirs of 
numerous former intelligence practitioners.20 Acknowledging value in both 
these approaches, this chapter strives to demonstrate that by unpacking this 
event systematically shows the naïve actions of a young but highly intelligent 
man. The dichotomy between staying within the law and exploiting it and the 
                                                        
18 Greenwald, No Place to Hide; Harding, The Snowden Files. 
19 Michael Andregg, ‘Ethical Implications of the Snowden Revelations’, The International 
Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs, 18: 2 (2016), p. 123. 
20 Epstein, How America lost its Secrets; see also Hayden, Playing to the Edge. 
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issues associated with using the whistleblower narrative in this case. This 
chapter will set out the story and aftermath surrounding the revelations of 
the Snowden files. It will explore the decisions made and the path that 
Snowden took to revealing some of the most controversial information of the 
last few decades.  
 
The idiosyncrasies of the Edward Snowden case will be investigated further 
below, focusing in particular on Snowden’s background and the decisions 
that led him to work for NSA in Hawaii. Snowden took a plethora of files, 
evidencing the wrongdoing he felt was being done by NSA. It has been 
indicated that only 1% of the documentation that Snowden procured has 
been released so far.21 It is unknown whether Snowden has continued to 
retain these documents or a portion of them. Snowden had an exit strategy. 
In the time it took Snowden to decide whether or not he would release the 
stolen documents, he also decided that he would leave himself vulnerable to 
prosecution by the state if he would remain in the US. The Snowden story has 
breached mainstream news on a number of occasions. Snowden is still very 
active on social media and within hacker circles, examining the security and 
intelligence policy of the US. Snowden has remained in exile in Russia since 
2013. The policies of the US were highlighted as problematic due to their 
violation of human rights, yet Snowden has sought refuge in a country with 
an appalling human rights record. Furthermore, some speculate on 
Snowden’s possible involvement with Russian security services. Snowden did 
not seriously consider pursuing any formal internal routes to report waste, 
fraud and abuse within NSA. Stating that he did not believe in the internal 
oversight and accountability measures, Snowden says this was not an option. 
Was Snowden dismissed due to his age and apparent junior status within the 
intelligence agency? What are the gaps in this story and how have they been 
explored so far? 
 
                                                        
21 Personal Information. 
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Stage One: Potential Whistleblower 
Edward Snowden, the ‘International Man of Mystery’ was active as his alias 
TheTrueHOOHA online before he worked for the CIA or NSA.22 Described as 
highly intelligent, it is claimed that Snowden achieved a score of above 145 
in more than one IQ test. Before a love of technology, came a passion for 
books, in particular Greek mythology.23 Presumably, this was his inspiration 
for the name Cincinnatus, which was the name he gave himself when he first 
contacted Glenn Greenwald.24 The name taken from Lucius Quinctius 
Cincinnatus, a very powerful and influential figure during the times of the 
Roman Republic around 450 BC.25 Previously, Snowden also used the 
screennames Edowaado, Phish, EDitor and 7xGM.26 When communicating 
with journalists in 2013, he also used the name Verax, again Latin translating 
to ‘truth-teller’.27 It is evidence of our reliance on technology that so much 
information can be gleaned from looking through Snowden’s online 
footprint, still present for everyone to peruse. Snowden’s rich online history 
stands out amongst other leakers. Although mostly very cagey about his real 
identity and his jobs, he was a member and frequent contributor on online 
forums such as Ars Technica from around 2001 when he would have been 
around 17 years old.28  
 
According to its website, Ars Technica takes its name from Latin, meaning ‘art 
of technology’. Formed in 1998, in Cambridge Massachusetts by Ken Fisher, 
Jon Stokes and Eric Bangeman, Ars is a publication that specialises in, ‘news 
and reviews, analysis of technology trends, and expert advice on topics 
                                                        
22 Harding, The Snowden Files, pp. 15-16.  
23 Bamford, ‘Edward Snowden: The Untold Story’. 
24 Greenwald, No Place to Hide, p.7. 
25 Barthold Georg Niebuhr, History of Rome, Vol. II (Philadelphia: Thomas Wardle, 1835), 
pp. 291–92. 
26 Ryuhana Press, ‘Book of Ed’, 27 April 2002, available at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20020427212047/http://ryuhanapress.com/ed.html 
27 Greenwald, No Place to Hide, p.16. 
28 Joe Mullin, ‘NSA Leaker Ed Snowden’s Life on Ars Technica’, Ars Technica, 13 June 2013, 
available at:https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/06/nsa-leaker-ed-snowdens-life-on-
ars-technica/ 
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ranging from the most fundamental aspects of technology to the many ways 
technology is helping us discover our world’.29 Only days following Snowden’s 
dramatic unveiling through the Guardian, an Ars article was published on 13 
June 2013 by Joe Mullin, a tech policy editor at Ars Technica (also referred to 
as Ars).30 Mullin alongside others have spotted the link between Snowden 
and TheTrueHOOHA claiming they are one and the same. Mullin neatly 
compiles some of Snowden’s past activities on Ars.31 The article is signed off 
with the following statement, ‘Mr. Snowden, if you're reading this—we'd love 
to reconnect. Ars readers would have a special interest in hearing from you. 
Drop me a line’.32 The issue of Privacy permeates every part of Snowden’s 
story. On the 26 June 2013, Mullin publishes another article on Snowden. It 
disclosed various Internet Relay Chat (IRC) logs, which include comments by 
Snowden as TheTrueHooha. The comments were uninhibited outtakes from 
conversations with other users, whose identities were anonymised. The most 
surprising statements that Snowden makes during these chats are the angry 
and derogatory remarks regarding WikiLeaks and whistleblowers. Angrily he 
writes, ‘those people should be shot in the balls’. This shows an interesting 
development in a matter of only a few years, from 2008 to 2013.33   
 
On closer inspection of Snowden’s circa 800 posts on Ars as TheTrueHOOHA, 
he often comes across as abrasive, opinionated, occupied with privacy and 
civil liberty. It is clear that his knowledge of technology is mostly self-taught, 
                                                        
29 Ars Technica, ‘About Us’, 2019, available at: https://arstechnica.com/about-us/. 
30 Mullin, ‘NSA Leaker Ed Snowden’s Life on Ars Technica’. 
31 Ellie Hall and John Herrman, ‘Edward Snowden’s Online Past Revealed’, Buzzfeed, 12 June 
2013, available at: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ellievhall/edward-snowdens-
online-past-revealed; Anthony De Rosa, ‘Are These Edward Snowden’s Arstechnica Posts?’, 
12 June 2013, available at: http://www.antderosa.com/tag/edward-snowden/; Kristina 
Cooke and John Shiffman, ‘Exclusive: Snowden as a Teen Online: Anime and Cheeky 
Humor’, Reuters, 12 June 2013, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
security-snowden-anime/exclusive-snowden-as-a-teen-online-anime-and-cheeky-humor-
idUSBRE95B14B20130612. 
32 Mullin, ‘NSA Leaker Ed Snowden’s Life on Ars Technica’, 2013. 
33 Joe Mullin, ‘In 2009, Ed Snowden Said Leakers “Should be Shot” Then He Became One’, 
ArsTechnica, 26 June 2013, available at: https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/06/exclusive-in-2009-ed-snowden-said-leakers-should-be-shot-then-he-
became-one/. 
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not having gained a degree qualification.34 In his first Ars post in 2001, 
Snowden expresses a genuine eagerness to absorb information on building 
his own web server.35 It is evident from his communication with a number of 
other users that his knowledge is not extensive at this point and that he 
knows he has a lot to learn. In one of his posts, he describes himself as, ‘a 
belligerent, self-important, 18-year-old upstart with no respect for his 
elders’.36 In the early 2000s, Snowden starts to work for a friend’s company 
called Ryuhana Press in Maryland, which specialised in Japanese anime.37 In 
his profile, Snowden reveals his birthdate as the 21 June 1983, alongside his 
alternative online usernames and he also displays a satirical sense of humour, 
joking about how he was bullied into being an editor of the site.38 Further 
exploration of TheTrueHOOHA’s posts also reveal that Snowden’s pithy 
humour could be unguarded and immature.39 In 2006, a post reveals that he 
has a penchant for guns, owning a ‘Walther P22’ and stating that he ‘love[d] 
it to death’.40 Snowden also displays an ostensible arrogance, which he not 
only demonstrates through stories of his sexual encounters and tips about 
post-coital Krispy Kreme doughnuts, but also a series of photos from a 
professional photoshoot. Posting on an Ars forum, he boasts ‘I think I look 
pretty good in the shots’.41  
 
Snowden was undoubtedly an ambitious young individual. Between 2001 and 
2012 (the time Snowden was active on Ars Technica), his comments on the 
                                                        
34 Harding, The Snowden Files, pp. 15-16.  
35 Ars Technica, ‘Building a Web Server?’, Forum, 29 December 2001, available at: 
https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?f=10&t=886365&p=16404424&hilit=Ryuhana
+Press. 
36 Ars Technica, ‘Building a Web Server?’. 
37 Ryuhana Press, ‘Book of Ed’; Bamford, ‘Edward Snowden: The Untold Story’. 
38 Ryuhana Press, ‘Book of Ed’. 
39 Ars Technica, ‘YAFPT: So I Just Got The Proofs Back from a Photoshoot...56K = Warned’, 
Forum, 16 April 2006, available at: 
https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?p=6832481#p6832481. 
40 Ars Technica, ‘The Perpetual Firearms Thread’, Forum, 15 April 2006, available at: 
https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?p=971426#p971426. 
41 Ars Technica, ‘YAFPT’, 2006; Ars Technica, ‘Krispy Kreme...You Go To Hell...You Die and 
Go to  Hell’, Forum, 23 April 2006, available 
at:https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?p=6809970#p6809970. 
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Ars forum depict someone keen to learn, progress and wanting to pursue an 
ICT career with suitable benefits from very early on.42 Posts on Ars reveal that 
Snowden wanted to travel and work outside of the US, preferably in Japan or 
elsewhere in Asia.43 Mostly, however, Snowden posts on learning more about 
building computer networks, programming and gaming.44 It is evident that by 
2006, at the age of 22, Snowden already felt quite confident about his 
knowledge on career progression within the ICT industry. On a discussion 
about choosing which school to attend he offered advice about his own 
experience. First, Snowden delivers a disclaimer stating, ‘I'm going to come 
off sounding as an asshole, but I'm not. It's just the nature of the business. To 
succeed in a hostile environment, you need to be both confident and 
aggressive’.45 Snowden describes the two elements, aside from talent, he 
believes are critical to becoming successful in the business of ICT. One to 
show competency in a specialised area and, two to network extensively 
within the industry. Of his own achievements he discloses that he is 22 and 
on a salary of $70,000 without a degree, high school diploma or debt from 
student loans.46 Through his job, Snowden moved around Europe and in 2007 
to Geneva, Switzerland under diplomatic cover for the CIA.47  
 
Thanks to diligent researchers and information provided by Snowden himself, 
his resume leading up to his employment at NSA is quite well documented. 
Additionally, it has been documented that other members of his immediate 
                                                        
42 Ars Technica, ‘Has Anybody Considered Working as IT Security in Japan’, 18 February 
2002, available at: https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?p=16121410#p16121410; 
Ars Technica, ‘So Your Work Tells You You’re Going to be Assigned Overseas’, Forum, 28 
July 2006, available at: 
https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?p=6468049#p6468049. 
43 Ars Technica, ‘Has Anybody Considered Working as IT Security in Japan’, 2002. 
44 Ars Technica, ‘Search Result: “TheTrueHOOHA”’, no date, available at: 
https://arstechnica.com/civis/search.php?st=0&sk=t&sd=d&sr=posts&author_id=60591&st
art=600. 
45 Ars Technica, ‘State School vs. Expensive College’, Forum, 30 April 2006, available at: 
https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?p=6791072#p6791072; Ars Technica, ‘Tell Me 
About...A Career in the Military (Or Overseas)!’, Forum, 14 August 2006, available 
at:https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?p=6352598#p6352598. 
46 Ars Technica, ‘State School vs. Expensive College’. 
47 Joe Mullin, ‘Ed Snowden Said Leakers “Should be Shot”’. 
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family also work for the government in some capacity, including his parents 
and sister.48 In the spring of 2004, US Army recruitment campaigns had done 
their job and Snowden enlisted to join the special forces, primarily interested 
in this area due to the opportunities to study foreign languages.49 Snowden 
had already engaged in learning both Japanese and Mandarin to varying 
degrees.50  
 
It was confirmed by the US Army that Snowden was discharged in September 
the same year, four months after signing up, although he claims that this is 
due to breaking both his legs in a training accident.51 This turn of events has 
been contested by the HPSCI special report summary on Snowden, which 
claimed that Snowden merely suffered from shin splints.52 Following the 
report’s release, Snowden took to Twitter to deny this and other statements 
made in the report. He wrote, ‘Army held me for weeks in a special unit for 
convalescence before separation. I left on crutches. They don't do that for 
"shin splints”[sic]’.53 Thereafter, he reportedly took work as a security guard 
in a building at the Center for Advanced Study of Language affiliated with the 
University of Maryland.54 According to Snowden this position was 
                                                        
48 Jean Marbella, Shashank Bengali and David S. Cloud, ‘Details About Edward Snowden's 
Life in Maryland Emerge’, Baltimore Sun, 10 June 2013, available at: 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-06-10/news/bs-md-snowden-profile-
20130610_1_anne-arundel-county-arundel-high-the-guardian. 
49 Spencer Ackerman, ‘Edward Snowden Did Enlist For Special Forces, US Army Confirms’, 
The Guardian, 10 June 2013, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/edward-snowden-army-special-forces; 
Bamford, ‘Edward Snowden: The Untold Story’. 
50 Ars Technica, ‘So Your Work Tells You You’re Going to be Assigned Overseas’, Forum, 28 
July 2006, available at:https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?p=6468078#p6468078; 
Ars Technica, ‘Has Anybody Considered Working as IT Security in Japan’. 
51 Ackerman, ‘Edward Snowden Did Enlist For Special Forces’. 
52 US House of Representatives, ‘Executive Summary of Review of the Unauthorized 
Disclosures of Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward Snowden’, 15 
September 2016, available at: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3109535-Hpsci-
Snowden-Review-Unclass-Summary-Final.html. 
53 Edward Snowden, ‘Edward Snowden on Twitter’, Twitter, 15 September 2016, available 
at: https://twitter.com/snowden/status/776543206938906625?lang=en. 
54 Peter Finn, Greg Miller and Ellen Nakashima, ‘Investigators Looking at How Snowden 
Gained Access at NSA’, The Washington Post, 10 June 2013, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/investigators-looking-at-how-
snowden-gained-access-at-nsa/2013/06/10/83b4841a-d209-11e2-8cbe-
1bcbee06f8f8_story.html?utm_term=.9a5438c6312b; Oliver Darcy and Josiah Ryan, 
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prerequisite to rigorous background checks and subsequently he was granted 
top security clearance.55 Although, the security level of the facility has been 
denied by the University spokesperson, there have been reports since 
Snowden’s revelation of campus security acting on NSA instructions to 
prevent image-capture in the area.56  
 
In 2006, Snowden began his training for the CIA.57 On completion of his CIA 
training Snowden landed his first placement in the Global Communications 
division at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, located no more than 10 
miles from the US capitol. During this time, Snowden’s responsibilities were 
to tend to all manner of computer issues, as a systems administrator. 
Apparently, it was not long before he began to feel seriously disillusioned by 
the reality of the intelligence community. Snowden remarked on the 
frustratingly antiquated technology used by the CIA. In 2007, he took an 
undercover assignment as a computer engineer gathering information about 
banking activities for the CIA at the US mission to the United Nations. By all 
accounts, Snowden was living the good life under diplomatic cover, in a four-
bedroom flat by Lake Geneva in Switzerland. However, the honeymoon 
period was short lived as Snowden began to see ostensibly unethical 
practices all around.58 Particularly disturbing were his discoveries concerning 
the actions of the CIA covert operatives in Geneva.59 Frequently, he would 
hear reports of the different means by which spies would recruit foreign 
agents, in these cases, bank employees.60 Snowden learned that promotion 
within the agency was gained through the number of sources conscripted, 
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irrespective of whether they would be valuable. Therefore, once contact was 
established with a target, operatives would often construct a scenario that 
would result in the target being indebted to them. For example, ensuring they 
get inebriated and subsequently imprisoned.61 These practices are by no 
means unusual. There are examples throughout time suggesting that 
intelligence operatives used this technique to climb the ladder.62 
 
The stories that Snowden heard during his time in Geneva contributed to his 
continued dissatisfaction with the system. Following his leaks, Snowden told 
James Bamford, in an interview for Wired magazine in 2014, ‘This was the 
Bush period when the war on terror had gotten really dark’ and ‘we were 
torturing people; we had warrantless wiretapping’.63 Snowden claims that 
there were many spies in Geneva who vehemently disagreed with the US 
intervention in Iraq. He states that he seriously considered leaking some 
revealing documents at this point but continued to be hopeful in the face of 
Barack Obama’s imminent election in 2008.64 The long-awaited change of a 
new administration failed to bear any fruit.65 Remarkably, it has surfaced that 
Snowden was reportedly asked to leave his CIA station in 2009, as his 
superiors had found evidence to suggest that he was trying to hack into 
classified files that were not within his normal security clearance purview. 
This was confirmed to the New York Times by two senior officials, who added 
that Snowden’s supervisor had included an explanatory note in his personnel 
file, ‘noting a distinct change in the young man’s behaviour and work habits, 
as well as a troubling suspicion’. The suspicion referred to a fear that 
Snowden would procure and the possibility he would leak classified 
documents to the press.66 Undeterred, Snowden switched tracks to the NSA, 
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working as a contractor for Dell in Japan.67 Accounts indicate that the notes 
in his personnel file were not passed onto the NSA or Dell at this stage. When 
Snowden was later employed by Booz Allen Hamilton, though details are 
unconfirmed, concerns about his résumé were overlooked in favour of his 
technical expertise.68  
 
The election of the 44th President in 2008, felt like a new era. The election of 
Obama as the first black President in the White House stood for progression. 
During his election campaign, Obama had given many American people hope 
for the future of their country.69 By 2010, Snowden had developed a new 
layer of cynicism in the administration and the government mechanism.70 It 
was whilst Snowden was stationed outside Tokyo on the Yokota Air Base that 
he was confronted with the full scale of mass surveillance and targeted 
killings. This involved the extensive use of drones and monitoring individuals 
through the unique media access control (MAC) addresses of their electronic 
devices, such as mobile phones, tablets or laptop computers.71 At this point 
in time, Snowden’s job was to instruct top officials and military officers on 
cyber-defence tactics, particularly against attacks from China.72 Remaining a 
Dell contractor, Snowden moved onto a brief one year stint to Maryland and 
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then to the NSA base at Kunia, Hawaii in March 2012, which is situated in 
what is known as ‘the tunnel’.73 The tunnel is an underground facility, 
originally built as a military base intended to house aircrafts and torpedoes. 
For this reason, the space encompasses around 250,000 square feet.74 During 
this time, Snowden witnessed the extent of intelligence sharing with Israeli 
security services and the targeting of political radicals.75 He has claimed that 
he, ‘…was the top technologist for the information-sharing office in Hawaii 
[…] I had access to everything’.76 The last post that Snowden would take, prior 
to his big exposé in 2013, was an infrastructure analyst role for Booz Allen 
Hamilton.77 
 
Attaining this role was the last piece in Snowden’s carefully constructed 
house of cards. He had made up his mind to collect evidence of some of the 
issues that had troubled him during his time working for the services. Taking 
this post specialising in cyber warfare on both offence and defence, afforded 
him special access for programs handling both domestic and international 
communications data. Snowden describes two incidents that he says pushed 
him further towards taking that final step of leaking the documents he had 
been collecting.78 The first was NSA interference with a router that was due 
to be installed as a communication interception device in Syria. When the 
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router was ‘bricked’, meaning it had failed and was ‘as useless as a brick’, this 
failure subsequently resulted in a Syrian national Internet outage. 
Miraculously, no fault was ever attributed to US or other foreign intelligence 
services, at least publicly.  The second incident that Snowden lists as 
triggering for his actions occurred in March 2013, when he came across the 
report of James Clapper, then the US DNI (2010-2017) testimony to the 
Senate. Unusually, the Senate Select Committee on intelligence had met in 
an open session on 12 March. Shortly before the end of the session, Senator 
Ron Wyden for Oregon (since 1996) threw Clapper a curveball question, 
‘Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions, or hundreds of 
millions of Americans?’. Clapper, showing obvious signs of discomfort 
answered, ‘no, sir […] Not wittingly. There are cases where they could 
inadvertently, perhaps, collect, but not wittingly’.79 Snowden perceived this 
as a barefaced lie and was spurred on to take action.80  
 
Despite the excessive press coverage on Snowden, some questions remain, 
about the gaps in his story that invite doubt as to its integrity and 
controversies about his motives remain. Some of the questions that have 
been asked repeatedly include, queries concerning the method Snowden 
used to collect the files, if as he claims, he inspected the documents that 
would later be passed onto individuals outside of the intelligence community 
like candy at a party. Snowden has not confirmed exactly how he collected 
the documents, leading to speculations about the use of a ‘web crawler’. 
Using a web crawler, a program that automatically searches for particular 
keywords, copying any conforming documents.81 This claim undermines 
Snowden’s character and calls into question that he did not select each 
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document on merit, but at random without looking at it himself. Greenwald 
suspected that Snowden had retained some documents that were too 
sensitive to be released, which begs the questions why take these documents 
in the first place and where are these documents now?82 When Greenwald 
first looked at the large cachet of documents, on his flight to Hong Kong, he 
recalls that the file-keeping was impeccable, which brought him to the 
conclusion that Snowden had carefully considered where to store every 
page.83 Conversely, it is plausible that Snowden used another automated 
method to sort the documents. When asked the question, Snowden has 
claimed that he did inspect all documents.84 However, in an interview with 
John Oliver, this question was put to Snowden again and his reply appears 
inconclusive, ‘I’ve evaluated all the documents that are in the archive’ […] ‘I 
do understand what I turned over’.85  
 
There are also conflicting stories about the amount of documentation he 
took. Snowden himself states that he took far fewer than the reported 1.7 
million.86 In November 2013, Keith Alexander then Director of NSA (2004-
2014) stated that Snowden took approximately 200,000 documents. 
Greenwald and Poitras claim that Snowden initially passed ‘only’ 10,000 to 
them when they visited him in Hong Kong.  
 
Stage Two: The Leak 
On 01 December 2012, Glenn Greenwald received the first email from 
someone calling themselves Cincinnatus, ‘I have some stuff you might be 
interested in’. Greenwald talks openly about how he was quite apathetic 
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about the initial contact made by Snowden.87 Cincinnatus or ‘C’, didn’t 
provide any further details or even a name, so Greenwald filed the email 
under unimportant along with a number of other similar emails he would 
receive frequently. Delaying several requests to install encryption programs, 
which were beyond his technical capabilities Greenwald would ultimately 
forget about C until the next follow-up email. Though he did not realise it, 
Greenwald was in danger of losing Snowden. As he states in his book, ‘that’s 
how close I came to blowing off one of the largest and most consequential 
national security leaks in US history’.88 From C’s first email, it would take a 
further five months for Greenwald to find time for this mysterious individual. 
Not until the documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras became involved did 
Greenwald start to believe in the possible significance. Out of frustration with 
Greenwald, Snowden first contacted Poitras in January 2013. 
Communications between Poitras and Snowden were also less than 
straightforward.  
 
When Poitras was contacted by Snowden, who provided almost no details 
about himself, not his name, occupation, credentials nor where he was 
working or currently located, she was incredibly suspicious. Poitras had been 
targeted by the US government, stopped repeatedly at the border on re-
entering the US after she had been travelling. Since 9/11, Poitras has 
produced and directed documentaries that cut to the core of international 
issues. It was her documentary the Oath, the second part in a trilogy, telling 
untold stories of the War on Terror.89 This work had made her a target of the 
authorities. This treatment only ceased following the publishing of an article 
by Glenn Greenwald in 2012.90 Thereafter, Poitras had become extremely 
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distrustful, taking every precaution to secure any sensitive material on her 
person when travelling and communicating with anyone of interest.91 
Snowden used the name ‘Citizenfour’ when communicating with Poitras 
during this time.92 Poitras final instalment in the trilogy would, of course be 
Citizenfour, telling the story of Edward Snowden and the files he took from 
NSA.93 Snowden’s pièce de résistance and the information that persuaded 
Poitras to take a risk was his claim to be in possession of an 18-page classified 
document - the top secret Presidential Policy Directive 20, October 2012.94 
The document contains information on the US policy on offensive and 
defensive cyber strategies.95 Poitras was blown away. This triggered Poitras 
to seek advice from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the 
Washington Post’s Barton Gellman. Ultimately in April 2013, Poitras and 
Greenwald met up in New York, taking extra precautions to avoid tipping off 
the security services.96 It was quickly established that Greenwald’s 
Cincinnatus and Poitras’ Citizenfour were the same person.  
 
On 18 May 2013, Snowden travelled to Hong Kong, arriving with just one 
rucksack early on 20 May. For the following ten days, Snowden’s 
whereabouts are undocumented. Around the same time, Greenwald 
received a package that would enable him to finally download secure 
programs to communicate with Poitras and Snowden. The first secure online 
communication with Snowden, which lasted two hours was filled to a large 
degree by conversation about a common concern relating to the documents 
that Poitras had, with Snowden’s permission, shared with the Washington 
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Post journalist Barton Gellman.97 Snowden felt that not only had the Post 
involved too many individuals when reviewing the documents, including a 
large number of lawyers potentially compromising his security, but he was 
also distrustful that the stories would be handled in a critical way. Greenwald 
had proven his straight-talking, no-nonsense approach through previous 
publications that had impressed Snowden and convinced him that Greenwald 
should be the one to handle the most critical stories.98 Greenwald also 
expresses concern about the Washington Post working so closely with the 
government and unwilling to take risks, thus possibly minimizing the potential 
impact the documents could have publicly.99 Snowden commented that he 
was keen to hand the documents to someone relatively independent rather 
than an established media organization, which would feel obligated to be 
dictated to by the government. He had contemplated handing the documents 
to WikiLeaks but decided this would be too risky and impractical as Assange 
was being too closely monitored by security services.100 Snowden has also 
previously voiced criticism of WikiLeaks and their tendency to publish 
unredacted documents in full without considering the possible risks involved 
to individuals.101  
 
In the period prior to meeting Snowden there were also disagreements 
stemming from trust issues within the group of journalists involved. Snowden 
asked Greenwald, Poitras and Gellman to travel to Hong Kong to meet with 
him in person. The Washington Post advised Gellman not to travel to Hong 
Kong and refused to fund Poitras’ travel expenses, reasoning that there was 
too much uncertainty and risk involved by discussing US government secrets 
where they might be bugged by Chinese intelligence.102 Interestingly, their 
concerns were for potential ramifications from the US state if they would be 
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discovered, not necessarily about the material that they could inadvertently 
reveal to a foreign security service.103 Their fears were not unfounded, as the 
Obama administration had only weeks previously taken drastic court action 
to gain access to source-information from journalists from the Associated 
Press.104 This created some tension and a sense of rivalry between the 
Guardian and the Washington Post.105 After a discussion with the Guardian 
US editor Janine Gibson and the deputy director Stuart Miller, it was decided 
that a third person, Ewen MacAskill a seasoned veteran journalist who had 
worked for the Guardian since 1996 would also join the party. This was met 
with forceful objections by Greenwald and Poitras who considered that this 
could threaten the carefully established relationship with Snowden. 
Nevertheless, MacAskill would shortly join them on their flight to Hong Kong 
on 1 June 2013.106  
 
The initial meeting between Snowden, Greenwald and Poitras on 3 June 2013 
developed like a chapter in a John Le Carré novel.107 Snowden’s story has also 
been likened to a modern telling of the 1970s events surrounding the FBI 
informant ‘Deep Throat’.108 Their rendezvous point would be the Mira hotel 
in the Kowloon district of Hong Kong, which is highly commercialised. Poitras 
and Greenwald should wait for Snowden near a ‘giant alligator’ displayed in 
a room adjacent to the lobby, away from the busiest part of the hotel. The 
two journalists had received instructions to wait in this room at 10:00 but 
leave if Snowden did not show within two minutes. On their return at 10:20 
Snowden arrived, as planned, carrying a Rubik’s Cube for easy identification. 
The meeting was intended to look like it happened by chance, so all parties 
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had pre-agreed upon lines. Poitras would ask Snowden what the hotel food 
was like. Snowden’s reply, as planned, was that it was bad.109  
 
Greenwald’s shocked description of this first meeting reads, ‘Of all the 
surprising turns in this entire story, the moment of our meeting proved to be 
the biggest surprise of all’.110 He notes that Snowden’s young age of 29-years 
and generally youthful appearance was unexpected. Alongside this, 
Greenwald was sceptical that such a young individual had been given such 
privileged access in an organisation so notoriously secret.111 However, post-
9/11 there was an upsurge of employment in the intelligence community. 
This included a movement to outsource the maintenance of systems to 
private companies.112 The security sector also started to recruit from hacker 
conferences.113 So Snowden is no oddity in these parts and full access is 
usually routinely given to anyone who maintains a computer system or 
database, otherwise it would be difficult to determine any issues. 
Nevertheless, ‘Snowden was not entirely truthful when describing himself’ on 
his meeting with Greenwald and Poitras. Although, this can be chalked up to 
a perceived need to impress the journalists he was meeting.114 
 
Greenwald and Poitras followed Snowden to his hotel room on the tenth 
floor. Poitras starts to film straight away and continued to gather in excess of 
20-hours intimate footage of Snowden in his hotel room, including him 
washing, grooming his hair and talking privately with his girlfriend Lindsay 
Mills.115 Judging by Greenwald’s description Snowden was jumpy and 
paranoid, asking the journalists to remove the batteries from their mobile 
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phones or place them into the freezer, he would pile pillows along the bottom 
and sides of the hotel room’s door to prevent any passers-by listening. 
Greenwald even describes how Snowden would hide himself and his laptop 
underneath a red blanket when entering his password, in order to prevent 
any hidden cameras from capturing his password.116 It was evident that 
Snowden had only packed essentials and cash when travelling from Hawaii. 
The sum of his belongings, cash so he could not be traced via his credit card, 
four heavily encrypted laptops and some clothes were packed into one 
rucksack. Following his first conversation with Greenwald and Poitras, 
Snowden also allowed MacAskill into the cramped and airless space of his 
hotel room to join in the tense dialogue, concerning the classified 
documentation he had removed from NSA.117 Despite initial reservations, 
MacAskill wrote to Gibson stating ‘the Guinness is good’, which was a pre-
agreed phrase to indicate he believed Snowden was genuine.118 
 
Whilst continuing to film more footage, on Thursday 6 June 2013 at 
11:05am British Summer Time, Glenn Greenwald published the first article 
arising out of the Snowden papers. Attached to the article was a top-secret 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) court order that stipulated for 
the telephone company Verizon to hand over all the domestic and foreign 
call data of their customers on an ‘ongoing, daily basis’. There was a brief 
delay before this publication, as Gibson followed Guardian etiquette and 
contacted Caitlin Hayden the chief spokesperson for the National Security 
Council (NSC) at the White House about the forthcoming article.119 The NSC 
is the body that advises and assists the President of the US on matters of 
national security and foreign policy.120 The Guardian gave the White House 
four hours to respond with any concerns regarding the Verizon story. A 
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frantically arranged conference call would follow between FBI deputy 
director Sean M. Joyce, Chris Inglis, the NSA’s deputy director, Robert Litt 
general counsel to the Office of the DNI, Spencer Ackerman the Guardian’s 
national security editor, Gibson and Millar.121 What ensued was remarkable. 
Despite serious trepidations being raised about a top-secret document being 
published, the government side could provide no real context or concrete 
justification for the document that the Guardian would accept. Gibson stood 
her ground, ‘We seem to have reached an impasse we can’t get past’ she 
stated.122 The decision had been reached, the Guardian would go ahead with 
their publication.  
 
The revelations concerning domestic surveillance activities were the first of 
their kind under the Obama administration.123 The article provided some 
analysis, which explained that the order only pertained to metadata and not 
the content of the call. Metadata refers to the ‘envelope data’, which tells 
you who is making/receiving the call, the call duration, the location of those 
on the call and the time that the call was made.124 Experts in signals 
intelligence have explained that metadata is often much more valuable than 
the content of a call when trying to analyse intelligence.125 Following the 
revelation about Verizon, it very quickly followed that the same was true for 
a number of other telephone companies in the US, such as AT&T Inc. and 
Sprint Nextel Corp. Other sources then went further to state that the same 
arrangement was also held with Internet service providers and credit-card 
companies. It was further revealed that the program had to be renewed on a 
three-monthly basis by congress, but it is deemed ‘lawful’ said the then 
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Chairman of the Senate Select Committee Senator Dianne Feinstein.126 This 
revelation sparked some public debate about measures that had been taken 
to expand the surveillance powers of the intelligence community. A number 
of courts would also consider the legality of these activities throughout the 
next few years.127 
 
Greenwald, Poitras and Snowden discussed that they should publish stories 
aggressively and in quick succession in order to achieve maximum impact and 
traction.128 Thus, on 07 June 2013 Gellman and Poitras published the next 
story out of the Snowden papers.129 Attached to the article were slides that 
introduced the Planning tool for Resource, Intelligence, Integration, 
Synchronization, and Management (PRISM) program that the Washington 
Post had obtained through Poitras prior to the meeting with Snowden.130 The 
PRISM slides appeared to evidence claims that NSA had direct access to 
service providers such as Google, Facebook, AOL, Skype, YouTube and 
Apple.131 PRISM was authorised by section 702 of FISA.132 The slides depict 
that PRISM works in conjunction with a program called ‘Upstream’ that 
collects communications on fibre-optic cables. One slide appears to show 
that the program has the capability to collect real-time chat notifications, 
emails, messages and videos from their providers.133 Companies were very 
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quick to deny that they had allowed any government agency direct access to 
this kind of data, had never heard of PRISM and only responded to legal 
warrants concerning individuals.134 Then DNI James R. Clapper commented 
in defence of these activities, ‘information collected under this program is 
among the most important and valuable foreign intelligence information we 
collect, and is used to protect our nation from a wide variety of threats. The 
unauthorized disclosure of information about this important and entirely 
legal program is reprehensible and risks important protections for the 
security of Americans’.135  
 
On the 7 June 2013, President Barack Obama was visiting the Fairmont Hotel, 
San Jose, California to talk about the Affordable Care Act. During the Q&A he 
is asked, ‘Mr. President, could you please react to the reports of secret 
government surveillance of phones and Internet?  And can you also assure 
Americans that the government - your government doesn't have some 
massive secret database of all their personal online information and 
activities?’ Obama replies, tactful and calm as always that he considered that 
he had made the following commitments when he took up office in the White 
House. Firstly, to ensure the safety of American citizens and secondly, to 
safeguard the privacy and civil liberties of Americans by observing the 
Constitution.136 Obama then notes that the programs are overseen by the US 
courts, as well as by Congress. He insisted that ‘the right balance’ was struck 
between security and privacy, ‘You can't have 100 percent security, and also 
then have 100 percent privacy and zero inconvenience’.137 This is quite a 
contrast to the challenge Obama put to President George W. Bush, whilst the 
former was still a Senator making speeches during his election campaign. 
                                                        
134 Gellman, ‘U.S. British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in 
Broad Secret Program’. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Statement by the President’, The White House, 7 June 
2013, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/07/statement-president. 
137 Ibid. 
 - 264 - Dobson 
Eight years later, Obama changed his mind about the false choice between 
upholding privacy principles and fighting terrorism.138 
 
Over the next few days, weeks and even months there would be further 
revelations about other secret programs through which NSA were collecting 
information on individuals. Most alarmingly the trend that NSA were 
collecting data on both foreign and domestic communications. As part of the 
Snowden revelations, attention was brought to a number of legislative tools 
that allow US intelligence agencies to track data in myriad ways with the help 
of specifically designed programs. The PATRIOT Act was signed into law in 
October 2001, by President George W. Bush as a response to the terrorist 
attacks on 9/11.139 It was intended to ensure that extraordinary measures 
could be taken to detect, protect from and act upon potential terrorist 
threats. This Act amended aspects of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) 1978 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 1986. In 
particular, it focused on alleviating the measures for oversight and 
requirements for warranted surveillance. The Act permitted secret searches 
to take place and subjects only had to be informed in retrospect. It also 
granted the right for the American government to legally incarcerate a non-
US citizen indefinitely, provided that person was considered a potential 
danger to the nation’s security, otherwise the detainment was limited to a 
week without a warrant.140 Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, also known as 
the ‘library records provision’, due to the objection to this section by 
librarians that their records could be used against their visitors.141 The 
Snowden revelations made public that the agencies had used this section as 
a carte blanche to collect various communications data and content through 
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numerous programs. This section also authorised and therefore lent its name 
to the ‘215 program’, analysing the telephony data acquired from US 
telephone providers.142 Nevertheless, section 215 did operate on a ‘sunset 
clause’, meaning that it would automatically expire in 2005.143  
 
Alongside the PRISM program, others that were counted amongst the most 
concerning have been ‘Boundless Informant’ (released 8 June 2013, via the 
Guardian), ‘Stellar Wind’ (released 27 June 2013, via the Guardian) and 
‘XKeyscore’ (released 31 July 2013, via the Guardian).144 Boundless 
Informant, is a ‘datamining tool’. It collects metadata from both PCs as well 
as telephone networks in connection with their location and analyses this 
information. The program displays information in a format not dissimilar to a 
colour-coded heat map, which displays the amount of data that is collated in 
each country around the world. Congress had previously posed questions to 
General Keith Alexander and other senior figures in the intelligence 
community about capabilities that would allow an overview of intelligence 
collected. These capabilities had been previously denied.145 The Snowden 
revelations were not the first time that the program Stellar Wind was 
discussed in a public forum. In March 2012, lacking documentary evidence as 
to its existence, former NSA senior analyst Bill Binney had spoken to journalist 
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James Bamford about Stellar Wind.146 Snowden provided the proof that had 
been lacking in the shape of the IG draft report, which was dated March 2009. 
This was incidentally also the carrot that Snowden used to entice Poitras into 
trusting and working with him.147 
 
Snowden releasing details on these programs has caused fierce criticism, as 
it is claimed that revealing these capabilities has had a detrimental effect on 
national security and the way in which terrorists operate. Details released 
about XKeyscore have reportedly had particularly detrimental effects, as the 
program has been effective in detecting terrorists online. Furthermore, 
Snowden also revealed information about how to evade detection by this 
program.148 XKeyscore is a program NSA used to monitor an individual’s 
internet activity. It was this program that Snowden alluded to in his first video 
interview to Greenwald, Poitras and MacAskill from his Hong Kong hotel 
room. Snowden stated, ‘I, sitting at my desk, certainly had the authorities to 
wiretap anyone, from you, or your accountant, to a federal judge, to even the 
President if I had a personal email’. This was vehemently denied by the then 
chairman of the HPSCI Mike Rogers who insisted that Snowden was lying.149  
 
The program training slides that Snowden shared with the Guardian validated 
some of his claim. XKeyscore is described as a Digital Network Intelligence 
‘Exploitation System/Analytical Framework’, which can be used to perform 
searches with what are described as ‘strong’ and ‘soft’ selectors. An example 
of a strong selector is emails and an example of a soft selector is content. The 
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program uses mined metadata to answer queries. One of the slides explains 
that the program ‘extracts and stores authoring information [and that it] can 
perform a retrospective survey trace [as] metadata is typically kept for up to 
30 days’. However, it can also show the online movements of a target in real 
time. Essentially, XKeyscore targets a number of terrorist group sites and 
their servers, from which it collects information. This metadata is sorted into 
a database according to specific ‘plug-ins’, such as email addresses, extracted 
files, phone numbers, log-ins, IP addresses or other user activity information. 
This data creates a ‘fingerprint’ for each user, by which they can be identified. 
The user is then tagged, which means the system recognises them through 
their activity-pattern even if they log in with a different username or from a 
different server. When an analyst submits a query to the system that asks a 
question about a particular target the system produces a search-result that 
can be likened to that which you would get from a google search. If the 
selectors that are used to search for information are not strong then it could 
return a high data volume, which will not be actionable. 150  
 
Much like the PRISM program, it appears that XKeyscore’s capabilities are 
quite shocking at first glance. Nevertheless, in his book How America Lost its 
Secrets Epstein provides some explanation as to why Snowden did not act in 
America’s best interest.151 Epstein conducted a number of interviews with FBI 
and NSA officers who claim that between 2007-2013, 45 terror attacks were 
prevented due to the utility of these programs. Their effectivity dropped 
dramatically following the Snowden revelations. Leading Epstein to the 
conclusion that Snowden delivered a fatal blow to these programs, which 
were functional with their objectives. Terrorists suddenly had an insight into 
how intelligence was being collected on them and started to alter their 
activities accordingly by refraining from using social media sites and masking 
their internet activities.152 Although Hayden acknowledges that the Snowden 
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revelations potentially accelerated a necessary debate on the insufficient 
legislation and outdated methods of the intelligence community, it also did 
considerable damage to existing systems and processes.153 One of the biggest 
concerns has been that these programs represent the potential for the 
collection of US citizen data and furthermore, the opportunity to use this 
information against an individual at a later time. Hayden insists that the 
reasons NSA capacities were expanded related to the possibility that online 
traffic from terrorist cells could be re-routed through a US Internet host, 
without the target necessarily being in the US or a US citizen. Existing 
capacities were expanded in order to catch this type of communication.154 
 
Following the main stories of mass surveillance and bulk collection of data, it 
was time for the world to meet Edward Snowden. Thus, on 9 June 2013, 
Edward Snowden introduces himself;  
‘My name is Ed Snowden, I'm 29 years old. I worked for Booz Allen Hamilton 
as an infrastructure analyst for NSA in Hawaii. […] I've been a system engineer, 
systems administrator, senior adviser for the Central Intelligence Agency, 
solutions consultant, and a telecommunication information’s system officer. 
[…]  
When you're in positions of privileged access like a systems administrator for 
the sort of intelligence community agencies, you're exposed to a lot more 
information on a broader scale than the average employee and because of 
that you see things that may be disturbing but over the course of a normal 
person's career you'd only see one or two of these instances. When you see 
everything, you see them on a more frequent basis, and you recognize that 
some of these things are actually abuses. And when you talk to people about 
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them in a place like this where this is the normal state of business people tend 
not to take them very seriously and move on from them. 
But over time that awareness of wrongdoing sort of builds up and you feel 
compelled to talk about. And the more you talk about the more you're 
ignored. The more you're told it’s not a problem until eventually you realize 
that these things need to be determined by the public and not by somebody 
who was simply hired by the government.’155  
Snowden comes across as self-assured, measured and eloquent as if 
rehearsed, certainly like he has thought carefully about what to say in this 
moment. The fundamental issue that Snowden highlights here is that he 
wants to raise the awareness of the American people to these abuses.  
The Snowden revelations also extended to the activities of the British security 
services. He told Guardian reporters, ‘It's not just a US problem. The UK has 
a huge dog in this fight. […] They [GCHQ] are worse than the US’. In June 2013, 
the Guardian reported that GCHQ programs not only boasted similar 
capabilities to those of NSA due to information sharing, but also that they had 
their own ethically questionable operation called Tempora.156 On 13 
September 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled, despite 
the fact that the British authorities have not acknowledged that operations 
such as Tempora exist, their regime of information procurement breaches 
privacy rights. Particular concerns were raised about the original section 8 (4) 
of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, which did not 
contain enough safeguards for acquiring a warrant. Following the Snowden 
                                                        
155 Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald, ‘NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden: “I Don’t 
Want to Live in a Society That Does These Sort of Things”’, [Video], The Guardian, 9 June 
2013, available at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edward-
snowden-interview-video. 
156 Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, et al., ‘GCHQ Taps Fibre-Optic Cables for 
Secret Access to World’s Communications’, The Guardian, 21 June 2013, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-
nsa. 
 - 270 - Dobson 
leaks, there was much debate in the UK about the inadequate legislation in 
place for both data collection and citizens privacy.157 The Investigatory 
Powers Act (IPA) 2016, which is RIPA’s successor does employ a ‘double-lock’ 
system, which stipulates that any warrant requires prior approval by both a 
secretary of state and a judge.158 These changes show that Snowden’s actions 
had international impact.  
 
On 17 June 2013, GCHQ also came under fire for tapping the communications 
of the foreign decision-makers who attended the G20 summit in 2009. It was 
reported by the Guardian that the London delegation was subjected to 
surveillance of their computers and phones. It was even revealed that 
security services erected fake internet cafés that would enable the 
monitoring of their email communications and internet activities. 
Furthermore, 45 analysts were also tasked to keep track of everyone’s 
communications. Revelations showed that Turkey’s finance minister and 
Russia’s leader were particularly interesting to the services. This suggested 
that rather than a security driven motive, security services had been 
entangled in trying to ensure a strategic advantage in the discussions. Briefs 
of the findings were compiled and shared with the then British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown.159 This story was coupled with news that the NSA and GCHQ 
had been tapping the German leader Angela Merkel’s phone prior to her 
assuming her leadership role.160 These revelations caused some international 
tensions on a superficial level, which was noticed by the international press.  
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The Snowden papers would continue to dominate the news. More stories 
continued to emerge, and multiple online databases have been established 
by different organisations to make these large number of released 
documents more accessible and searchable.161 Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
maintain a complete overview of all the different publications. Luke Harding 
also suggests that some of the documents themselves are difficult to 
decipher.162 Furthermore, there have been speculations that some of the 
documents attributed to Snowden did not in fact stem from his cachet, but 
instead mask documents acquired from elsewhere. This would strongly 
suggest that there is at least one other source leaking information from 
within NSA.163  
 
Stage Three: The Aftermath 
Snowden’s movement following his public declaration are difficult to piece 
together. Paparazzi quickly track him to the Mira hotel where they swarm the 
lobby. On 10 June 2013, Snowden takes the decision to check out of the hotel 
room in Hong Kong. It is unclear where he travels next, though he remains in 
touch with his Hong Kong lawyers. On 12 June 2013, Snowden gives the first 
interview since he has been revealed as the NSA source to the Hong Kong's 
South China Morning Post. Taking this opportunity to raise yet more issues 
about NSA hacking of computer networks in Hong Kong and China, Snowden 
explains that his intentions are to remain in Hong Kong for as long as he can. 
The UK Home Office prevent Snowden from boarding any UK-destined flights 
                                                        
161 ACLU, ‘NSA Documents’, available at:https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search;  
Snowden Archive, ‘Snowden Surveillance Archive’, CJFE, available at: 
https://snowdenarchive.cjfe.org/greenstone/cgi-bin/library.cgi; Snowden Documents, 
‘Snowden Doc Search’, available at: https://search.edwardsnowden.com/; Cryptome, ‘42 
Years for Snowden Docs Release’, Free All Now, available at: 
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm. 
162 Harding, The Snowden Files, p. 124. 
163 James Bamford, ‘Commentary: Evidence Points to Another Snowden at the NSA’, 
Reuters, 22 August 2016, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-intelligence-nsa-
commentary-idUSKCN10X01P.  
 - 272 - Dobson 
on the 14 June. It is not until the 23 June that Snowden boards his flight to 
Moscow. It later transpires that Snowden was staying privately at a family’s 
home in Hong Kong, who sheltered him until he was able to travel safely. The 
Hong Kong government publicly stated that there were no legal grounds on 
which they could have prevented Snowden from leaving, due to insufficient 
legal documentation supplied by the US. WikiLeaks claimed that they assisted 
Snowden with his travel to Moscow.164 On his journey, Snowden was 
accompanied by Sarah Harrison, a lawyer affiliated with WikiLeaks. However, 
there have also been speculations that Assange exerted a lot of pressure on 
Snowden to pass the NSA documents that were in his possession to 
WikiLeaks. These claims prove to be a curious development considering 
Snowden’s previous dislike of the organisation.165 Despite speculations, 
Snowden denies that his intended destination was Russia, but that he was 
prevented from reaching the planned target country, thought to be Cuba or 
Ecuador.166 Russian authorities have confirmed that when Snowden arrived 
at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo International Airport, his US passport had been 
revoked. Consequently, Snowden was forced to spend a month trapped in 
the airport. 
 
For Snowden, the consequences of his actions have been significant. 
Changing his address from sunny Hawaii to the comparatively sullen and 
potentially dangerous Russian capital Moscow only represents the tip of the 
iceberg. It is unlikely that Snowden will return to the US unless he is willing to 
face the rest of his life in an American prison. Conversations have been 
ongoing since he left the US and his lawyers have attempted to negotiate 
terms of return with the American government. However, after more than 
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five years and a new American administration, it looks unlikely that such a 
compromise will ever be reached.167 Snowden has been charged with three 
felonies, one for theft of government property and two counts for violations 
of the Espionage Act 1917.168 Under the Obama administration, he is one of 
seven individuals charged under the Espionage Act, indicating a worrying 
trend. Snowden has been quoted to say, ‘I have no intention of hiding who I 
am because I know I have done nothing wrong’.169 It appears that the US 
government disagrees. 
 
Angering the American administration considerably, Snowden reportedly 
camped in Sheremetyevo airport for approximately four weeks. Unclear 
statements were made by the Russian government. On 25 June President 
Obama makes a statement that focuses heavily on the US doing everything 
that is legally within their power to retrieve Snowden from Russia. Jay Carney, 
the White House spokesperson, adds that the US considered China’s actions 
to be deliberately obstructive by not observing the arrest warrant for 
Snowden. His statement also makes it clear that the relationship with Russia 
will be terse should they not assist the Obama administration by facilitating 
Snowden’s extradition.170 Then Secretary of State John Kerry called upon his 
‘friends’ to be ‘calm and reasonable’, whilst urging them not to create levels 
                                                        
167 Ben Wizner, Personal Interview, Constitutional Lawyer: American Civil Liberties Union, 
30 June 2016, New York City, USA; Tom McCarthy, ‘Edward Snowden’s Lawyers “Working” 
to Bring NSA Whistleblower Back to US’, The Guardian, 4 March 2015, available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/04/edward-snowden-lawyer-return-
back-us.  
168 Glenn Greenwald, ‘On the Espionage Act Charges Against Edward Snowden’, The 
Guardian, 22 June 2013, available 
at:https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/22/snowden-espionage-
charges. 
169 Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill and Laura Poitras, ‘Edward Snowden: the 




170 Reuters, Barack Obama Says US Will Pursue Edward Snowden - Video, The Guardian, 25 
June 2013, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/25/barack-
obama-edward-snowden-video; Spencer Ackerman and Miriam Elder, ‘US Warns Moscow 
Not to Let Edward Snowden Escape Russia’, The Guardian, 24 June 2013, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/24/edward-snowden-us-russia-ecuador. 
 - 274 - Dobson 
of hostility over something as ‘basic and normal as this [Snowden’s 
extradition]’. Kerry does acknowledge that there is no extradition treaty 
between Russia and the US, but it is clear that he feels this would just be a 
formality in the current situation.171 The Foreign Minister for Russia, Sergei 
Lavrov, denies any involvement with or knowledge of Snowden’s travel plans. 
Nevertheless, Lavrov also does not openly deny Snowden has landed in 
Moscow.172 On 26 June, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin makes a press 
statement that leaves no room for doubt, Snowden has arrived in Russia. 
Russia will not be dictated to by the US, especially about an individual who 
has not committed any crimes on Russian soil. Putin is unambiguous, Russia 
and the US do not have an extradition treaty agreement, therefore Snowden 
will not be extradited. 
 
The already historically problematic relationship between Russia and the US 
had now been exacerbated. Putin, perhaps unsurprisingly, denied that 
Snowden has communicated with Russian security services.173 Snowden has 
also rejected that he is working with Russian intelligence, reasoning that his 
current living situation does not alter his beliefs and values. Snowden iterates 
that he risked his freedom to expose the surveillance abuses of the US and 
would therefore not support it elsewhere.174 In April 2014, when Snowden 
was criticised for the way in which he failed to confront Putin in a phone 
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interview.175 In an article for the Guardian, Snowden later explains that his 
questions were intended to mirror the questions of Ron Wyden to James 
Clapper in early 2013. The question came in two parts, firstly, asking about 
the capabilities of mass surveillance and secondly, asking about the moral 
justifications. Snowden said of Putin’s response that he, ‘Putin denied the first 
part of the question and dodged on the latter’.176 Was this just a ruse? Epstein 
notes that there are few benefits to protecting a ‘walk-in’ fugitive from 
another country, unless the individual was willing to share some of their 
inside knowledge and intelligence. In Epstein’s view, it doesn’t matter when 
Snowden was first in contact with Russian intelligence services, but that 
counter-surveillance measure taken following Snowden’s arrival in Moscow 
indicate that he had been sharing intelligence.177  
 
Several allegations have been made by official sources, not least by HPSCI. On 
15 September 2016, HPSCI published a scathing and emotionally charged 
four-page summary of their otherwise classified report (the entire report is 
allegedly 36-pages long) on Edward Snowden in which it made some strong 
claims about the former intelligence contractor. Claims include that (1) 
Snowden did cause considerable damage to national security; (2) Snowden is 
not a whistleblower, but a traitor; (3) Snowden began downloading of files in 
August 2012, after a disagreement with management not in March 2013 as 
he has claimed; (4) Snowden is a liar; (5) The intelligence community has not 
done enough to prevent a reoccurrence.178 The Washington Post journalist, 
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Barton Gellman, who has been deeply involved with the revelations, comes 
to Snowden’s defence.179 Gellman firstly points out that it had taken 22 
members of the committee a staggering 25 months to produce a report that 
was barely longer than the dissertation of an undergraduate student. 
Gellman then moves on to refute some of the other claims made within the 
report. For example, on point four that Snowden is a liar, the committee 
alleges that Snowden suffered from shin-splints and not, as he claims, that he 
broke his legs. Gellman asserts that he has been privy to Snowden’s army 
records and that he can confirm Snowden suffered from bilateral tibial stress 
fractures, which are much more serious than shin-splints but often 
misdiagnosed as such.180 Snowden takes to Twitter to comment, 
‘Unsurprising that HPSCI's report is rifled with obvious falsehoods. The only 
surprise is how accidentally exonerating it is’.181 Furthermore, Gellman 
refutes the claim in the report that Snowden does not have a high school 
diploma, declaring that he saw the records of the Maryland State Department 
of Education himself. Gellman’s conclusion asks the reader to consider the 
problematic dichotomy between privacy and secrecy, pointing out that the 
committee has recommended NSA improve their secret-keeping 
capabilities.182   
 
The Snowden revelations have had a knock-on effect on others directly 
involved with his story. On 20 July, the Guardian was ordered to destroy a 
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number of computers that contained a portion of the Snowden files.183 The 
newspaper was threatened by the British government that if computers were 
not destroyed, the paper would not financially survive the strain of legal 
action that would be taken.184 Highly publicised was the detainment of David 
Miranda, Glenn Greenwald’s husband, at Heathrow airport. In August 2013, 
Miranda was traveling home to Rio De Janeiro from Berlin, via Heathrow. 
Miranda was also most certainly under surveillance by the British security 
services and incidentally carrying around 58,000 Snowden files, amounting to 
around 60gb of data with a passphrase for the encrypted index. It has 
subsequently been reported that authorities were able to decrypt the index 
spanning around 75-pages.185 It is clear that surveillance of the journalists 
involved tipped off the services and they arrested Miranda on arrival at 
Heathrow under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The justification given 
was that Miranda was believed to be in possession of highly classified 
documents that had been stolen and could be potentially detrimental to the 
UKs national security.186 Miranda was detained for nine hours and his 
property was seized and searched, which he has subsequently challenged in 
court.187 Snowden’s family and girlfriend have also been affected by the strain 
of uncertainty and his exile in Russia.188  
 
Through the Snowden revelations, arguably like no other, the issues of 
intelligence oversight and accountability have been dragged into the 
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spotlight. International and European courts have heavily scrutinised and 
been very critical of surveillance capabilities of both the US and the UK, as 
they were exposed by the Snowden documents. For example, on 16 
December 2013, a federal judge ruled that the US NSA bulk data collection 
program was likely not compliant with the fourth amendment.189 Most 
recently, the ECHR has ruled that the bulk collection of online 
communications do not contain sufficient safeguards. The ruling also 
demonstrates that, in a digital format at least, information could be 
considered intelligence at the point of collection.190 
 
Remarkably, there has also been repeated debate in congress that can be 
attributed directly to the Snowden revelations. Between 2013 and 2016, 
congress deliberated the topic of domestic surveillance frequently in order to 
construct improved legislative measures to govern data collection.191 Despite 
the criticism levelled at Snowden and his actions, there was marked concern 
regarding NSA collection of data belonging to US citizens. In August 2013, as 
a direct result of the Snowden leak, President Obama instructed James 
Clapper (then Director of National Intelligence) to form a ‘Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technology’. The group published their 
report, which made 46 recommendations for reform of the US information 
collection practices, in December 2013.192  
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One of the suggested reforms subsequently adopted into law in 2015 was the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective 
Discipline Over Monitoring Act (USA Freedom Act). The act specifically 
revised and restored sections of the PATRIOT Act, which was due to expire in 
2015. The review group reserved any explicit judgement that the collection 
programs of NSA were unconstitutional.193 However, the reforms were 
welcomed by many, including the ACLU, as they recommended placing limits 
and safeguards on the NSA surveillance programs that Snowden exposed.194 
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act allowed the application from FISC for 
unrestricted access to records and carried a gag order preventing the 
disclosure of any access granted.195 The US Freedom Act effectively ended 
this practice by placing significant restraints on how data is collected, as well 
as including new transparency measures.196 
 
It is clear that Snowden feels that there are some parallels between his leaks 
and the abuses inspected by the Church Committee in the 1970s. In a number 
of interviews and statements, Snowden repeatedly expresses the need for 
the public to make choices about the surveillance programs, which the 
Intelligence Communities are running. However, the technological advances 
in the years since the Church Committee have been astounding. Unlike 
wiretaps and human surveillance, the Internet functions in a specific way that 
is not instinctively understood by a layperson. In an interview with John 
Oliver, Snowden is confronted with the issue that there is a knowledge gap in 
the public body concerning the capabilities of such programs. A gap, which as 
John Oliver highlights, would make it very difficult for the general public to 
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make any informed decisions on this issue. Snowden acknowledges this with 




Snowden remains an unfolding case. Snowden took a plethora of files, 
evidencing the wrongdoing he felt was being done by NSA. How much data 
he took and how much has been revealed remains a matter of dispute. It has 
been suggested that only 1% of the documentation that Snowden procured 
has been released so far. Although he has denied that he still possesses any 
material, it is undeterminable whether Snowden has continued to retain 
these documents or a portion of them. Although this is hard to verify, some 
journalists claim that they now have access to Snowden’s entire archive. If 
there is truth in these claims, it is likely that, in a world of secondary 
collection, other undisclosed parties will also have acquired access.198 
  
In the literature on intelligence ethics, indeed the ethics on security more 
generally, proportionality is widely held to be important. It has to be 
concluded that Snowden probably appropriated more documents than he 
needed to achieve his ultimate aim. Ironically, in doing so, he mirrored the 
offense that he accuses the US government of committing. As explored in this 
chapter, Snowden has exposed wrongdoing on the part of NSA. While 
Snowden should be commended for his whistleblower actions, there should 
be scrutiny over the decision to abstract those documents unrelated to NSA 
wrongdoing. In 2013, Snowden was viewed by some as the most damaging 
security leak of all time and extraordinary measures were taken to punish 
him. The US had despatched a secret renditions aircraft to Denmark, where 
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it stood on a runway, in the forlorn hope that Snowden might be snatched as 
he made his journey onward from Russia to Latin American via Europe. This 
perhaps underlines the impact that Snowdon had achieved on the 
consciousness of those at the centre of the US National Security state.199  
 
Another question worth asking is, could Snowden have stayed? Ellsberg 
calmly walked into court and was acquitted. If Snowden had only leaked 
material relevant to the mass surveillance of US citizen’s meta-data, could he 
have achieved the same outcome? Firstly, this is unlikely, given the intense 
work that the Obama administration had devoted to shutting down/deterring 
whistleblowers/leakers. Secondly, Snowden was clearly also concerned about 
the citizens of the world and wished to expose a wider range of practices, 
including the monitoring of loyal allies such as Angela Merkel. Does this 
suggest a sense of global duty on the part of the insider? Should the UN pass 
some sort of universal whistleblower protection human rights law that 
extends a framework beyond the national state?  Snowden is still very active 
on social media and within hacker circles, examining the security and 
intelligence policy of the US in a global context, but what safety or security 
can the global community extend to Snowden?200  
 
Snowden has remained in exile in Russia since 2013. Some commentators 
have continued to speculate on Snowden’s involvement with Russian security 
services. It is evident that Snowden’s intentions were not to remain in Russia, 
but that the withdrawal of his US passport forced his decision to stay when 
the opportunity presented itself. However, having spent a long period of time 
in Moscow with a cache of highly sensitive material; some have asked 
whether he is now working for the Russian government or security services? 
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One whistleblower or leaker learns from another. Snowden stated that he did 
not consider that pursuing any formal internal routes to report waste, fraud 
and abuse within NSA was a viable option. He stated that he did not believe 
in the internal oversight and accountability measures. Having reviewed the 
unhappy experiences of people like Binney and Drake it is hardly surprising 
that Snowden chose not to have a gun held to his head while exiting the 
shower. Long-term exile in Ecuador perhaps seemed attractive to Snowden, 
but what are the consequences of long-term exile in Moscow? Perhaps these 
are questions, options and alternatives that only Snowden can interpret for 
us.  
 
Intriguingly, Snowdon is a throwback to more traditional leakers, such as 
Ellsberg. Despite his high-grade technical skills, he did not choose 21-st 
century style direct dissemination onto the web, but instead opted for 20th 
century co-operation with old-school journalists. Snowden’s reasons for 
giving the documents he collected to journalists was that he wanted 
experienced individuals to handle the delicate matter of deciding what would 
be safe to publish. Parallels can be drawn with the cases of Thomas Tamm 
and Russ Tice who provided New York Times journalists James Risen and Eric 
Lichtblau with crucial information concerning operational NSA data collection 
programmes. Tamm and Tice claimed that these programmes infringed the 
privacy rights of US citizens. Despite this old-fashioned co-operation, the 
lingering charge of whistleblowers and leakers remains. Conversely, their co-
operators in the media go on to win Pulitzer prizes or to author best-selling 
books, while whistleblowers suffer, at best, the termination of promising 
careers. It has to be conceded that Obama did also jail a journalist, Jennifer 
Miller, but overall the whistleblower is regarded as expendable while the 






In 1971, Dan Ellsberg, a former US Military analyst and employee of RAND 
became one of the most notorious ‘insiders’ to leak classified information in 
modern US history. It took Ellsberg no less than eighteen months to 
photocopy around 7,000 pages that not only cost him sleepless nights, but 
also ten cents per page. If Ellsberg had been caught sneaking around making 
photocopies of classified files in the middle of the night, our understanding 
of the Nixon administration era might have been quite different. However, 
Ellsberg was not found out and the photocopied files he eventually handed 
to the New York Times and the Washington Post became known as the 
Pentagon Papers.1  
In 2013, almost half a century later, Edward Snowden would walk out of his 
office in ‘the tunnel’, a base for the NSA in Hawaii, with a speculated 1.7 
million documents saved onto USB sticks.2 It would have taken Snowden a 
fraction of the time it took Ellsberg to procure these files. Nevertheless, both 
Snowden and Ellsberg were charged under the highly controversial Espionage 
Act, a statute primarily designed for enemy spies. Intriguingly a measure used 
widely by Roosevelt – a Democratic President in wartime who executed 
German saboteurs after placing them in front of military tribunals.3 
Although all charges against Ellsberg were dismissed, this has not been the 
case with Snowden. These two cases represent the chronological parameters 
of this thesis. Juxtaposing the two cases most prominently illustrate, the 
progression in technology that has taken place during the intermitting four 
decades. Today, records are rarely kept as hard-copies or in filing cabinets, 
but digitally on computers, devices and clouds. Although this has a positive 
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effect on the general efficiency of government and allows for the mass 
collection  Snowden has also demonstrated that this can make records more 
vulnerable than in the 1970s. Secrecy, something that many commentators 
see as essential to areas of government such as strategy and diplomacy, is on 
the wane. 
To illustrate this, emails have also posed a consisted issue for senior 
government figures. In 1995, Thomas Blanton of the National Security 
Archive published a book entitled, White House E-mail: The Top Secret 
Computer Messages the Reagan/Bush White House Tried to Destroy.4 In the 
book and a separate floppy disk, he provides analysis of White House email 
correspondence through three administrations. Ronald Reagan, George H. 
W. Bush and Bill Clinton all participated in furtive activities that should have 
resulted in their email correspondence never being accessible in the public 
domain. Reagan attempted to delete his emails, Bush tried to make a special 
deal with the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) archivists 
and Clinton made attempts to underhandedly change the legislation to 
exclude White House emails from FOIA requests.5 A law suit brought against 
the White House by the National Security Archive would ensure that around 
4,000 emails were recovered from all three former Presidents.6 This number 
should be contrasted with a more recent scandal involving emails and then 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In 2016, emails from Clinton’s private email 
server involving a total of 62,320 emails – spanning from 30 June 2010 to 12 
August 2014 - were the subject of much controversy. Clinton had unwittingly 
bypassed security protocol by having her BlackBerry connected to her family 
home server in Chappaqua, New York.7 Now just over 30,000 of these emails, 
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are accessible and searchable on the WikiLeaks website.8 This illustrates the 
magnitude of technology and its possible impact on the disclosure of 
information. 
 
These stories are enough to give any White House chief of staff nightmares. 
Perhaps it is not surprising then that government attitudes towards national 
security leaks continue to be unyielding. Reviewing ten cases of 
whistleblowing and leaking, this thesis has told the story of individuals who 
have all at one time been described as whistleblowers. These stories 
demonstrate how the process of leaking has necessarily evolved and call for 
a new approach for analysis. In the final few pages of this thesis, I will evaluate 
what conclusions I have drawn from my analysis in three sections. Firstly, I 
will make my primary assertions, which are directly ascertainable from the 
material that I have collected. Secondly, I will identify some secondary 
assertions, from which further inferences can be made, but that nonetheless 
continue to be contestable. Thirdly, I will make some tentative points that I 
feel warrant further exploration, and which I would endeavour to address 
more thoroughly in future research. 
 
Implications and Contributions 
At the heart of this thesis is the underlying question of the impact of potential 
whistleblowers and leakers. The research that has been carried out and 
analysed has predominantly provided a contribution empirically and 
conceptually. Empirically, the thesis is based on a number of different 
interviews which were predominantly carried out in the US. They have 
provided the basis of an ethnographic approach to research, exploring the 
cultural peculiarities of the relationship between intelligence agencies and its 
employees. The knowledge gathered through the insider story shows a 
unique perspective of the moral and practical dilemmas of the whistleblower. 
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Other interviews with legal professionals such as David Colapinto, supported 
the difficult legal position that a potential whistleblower finds himself in if he 
wants to raise a case of wrongdoing. Through these interviews, I identified 
three ‘stages’ of whistleblowing in my case studies: the insider, the disclosure 
and the aftermath. 
 
In order to put further emphasis on some of the main ‘crossroads’ a potential 
whistleblower will necessarily navigate, I constructed a conceptual model 
that draws the focus to those three stages: the before, during and after of 
any unauthorised disclosure (see page 35). In addition to these observational 
categories, I have identified a number of different types of impact on the 
agency of the insider and the structure of the intelligence agency. The impact 
potential perceived or evidenced is discussed in the chapters relating to each 
case study. It is evident from my research and analysis that the biggest impact 
is that felt by the individual themselves at various stages. This has become 
clearly visible when considering the case of Binney, Wiebe and Drake, for 
instance. Their houses were raided by the FBI, as they had previously raised 
a case of wrongdoing by NSA. Lawyers MacClellan and Radack have previously 
termed the treatment and portrayal of whistleblowers as criminalisation.9 
However, the potential for impact on the state should not be dismissed. The 
arguably often disproportionately severe response to a national security 
whistleblower should demonstrate that a state fears their potential impact.  
 
Methodologically, my thesis draws predominantly on research gathered 
through interviews, archival, secondary literature and open source material. 
This method of triangulation has given me unique perspective often from the 
insider themselves, to media reports or the views of lawyers who deal with 
these cases daily. In the first instance, it has helped me to construct a timeline 
of the insiders journey, which has allowed for my conceptual approach of the 
three stages of whistleblowing. Additionally, I was able to come to some 
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conclusions that have not previously been made or asserted due to the lack 
of information. For example, it has given me a unique insight into the 
complexity of Goodman’s motivations for leaving the CIA.  
 
Primary Assertions 
Owing to the special nature of national security information, a duty of care 
and responsibility should be at the heart of any conversation about national 
security whistleblowers. The duty of care should be present in three ways: (1) 
A moral duty of care exists between the employer and their employees. This 
should prevent any abuses of power; (2) A responsibility exists for the 
employee to carry out their employers wishes, to the standard that the 
employer requires according to any agreed contractual obligations. This also 
includes the employee’s relationship with their colleagues, as this forms part 
of the fulfilment of their role; (3) This is a duty of care specific to any individual 
who works in a public service environment, where public safety and care 
forms a part of their work, e.g. fireman, police or medical professional. This 
includes any individual who works for or is contracted to the intelligence 
services, whose role it is to maintain the safety of the population.  
Furthermore, it must be argued that the nature of such an environment lends 
special privileges and potentially bestows advanced knowledge of certain 
areas, systems or populations on an individual. This advanced knowledge can 
constitute an understanding of a particular study, as in Dan Ellsberg’s case or 
the subtle changes in the atmosphere within a particular geographical region 
as in Frank Snepp’s case. It can also indicate a particular skill, such as that of 
creating and maintaining computer systems, as was the case with William 
Binney, Kirk Wiebe and Edward Snowden. This is not only a responsibility, but 
it can also constitute a burden. Therefore, it must be recognised that 
functioning mechanisms should be in place to acknowledge when such a 
burden arises. This three-way relationship thus requires an element of trust 
in all parties to carry out their role to the best of their abilities.  
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In the case of a potential whistleblower of national security it follows then 
that every precaution should be taken, and every opportunity given that 
allows such an individual to feel they can raise a concern within the approved 
channels. For example, Snowden represents an individual who felt unable to 
raise concerns legitimately through the internal channels of the agency, as he 
had knowledge of colleagues attempting this action in the past. Instead, the 
resulting leak contained both genuine concerns of wrongdoing and tactically 
sensitive information. Moreover, it was disproportionately large and 
unnecessarily sensational. Regardless of the specificities of the case or any 
attribution of judgement, it has to be acknowledged that Snowden 
demonstrated powerful agency. Therefore, a rational acknowledgement and 
subsequent analysis has to be made by the agency. The summary of the 
report on Snowden, for instance, does not illustrate an independent unbiased 
review of the incident.10 The case shows that there are a number of issues in 
the insider-agency relationship that require further analysis.   
Firstly, it highlights the issues of internal reporting channels for 
whistleblowers. In order to fulfil the duty of care, the agency should provide 
a number of genuine options to report wrongdoing and debate these. 
Reprisal for reporting wrongdoing can only be described as 
counterproductive. The employee has a duty to explore all internal reporting 
channels prior to considering other options. Nevertheless, Bok’s exceptions 
for following the internal reporting structure hold: the insider is not obliged 
to follow the internal reporting pathway if there is imminent threat to life or 
extensive corruption within the system that would result in reprisal for the 
insider.11 Of the cases that have been examined in this thesis, those insiders 
that sought to follow internal reporting channels on the whole released much 
less (if any) classified information. Examples include Frank Snepp and Thomas 
Drake. These cases also constitute the most severely punished. For Snepp, 
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the experience of becoming a whistleblower ended in lengthy court cases, 
bankruptcy, and a lifelong embargo on any publications. For Drake, much the 
same applied, but the process was much more drawn out.  
Secondly, it is imperative that only necessary information is revealed as part 
of a leak and (if possible) that this information is not classified but that public 
interest can be evidenced in some way. Public interest constitutes some harm 
that is done to the public that the public is either not aware of or the extent 
of it is not known. An argument can be made that Snowden was forced to 
make such a big noise in order to keep himself safe from harm, to gain the 
support from the press and prominent figures globally. However, due to the 
responsibility and duty of care that any agency employee has, a defendable 
leak should not constitute information that could compromise this duty.  
This thesis has demonstrated that the activities of whistleblowers and leakers 
have the potential to have an impact on the intelligence community, 
international relations, legislation and also themselves. This has been 
acknowledged in most cases where information has been leaked into the 
public domain. The US government in particular has repeatedly drawn 
attention to the security risk that potential whistleblowers and leakers 
constitute. It should follow then that the intelligence community should 
perhaps acknowledge that they have reached a crossroads, which requires 
them to either continue on their current path or explore the possibility that 
there can be value in change. 
 
Secondary Assertions  
One area, which should be explored and changed are current whistleblower 
laws that govern those within the intelligence community. Legislation in this 
area is vague at best. Therefore, it is paramount for a potential whistleblower 
to seek guidance from those who understand this area of law. From speaking 
to legal professionals, it is apparent that even in practice there are disparate 
views on what constitutes a whistleblower and who ‘deserves’ the protection 
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that this label could possibly provide. For this reason, the relationship 
between lawyers and whistleblowers continues to be central to this debate. 
Whistleblowers should be afforded the right to speak with a lawyer whether 
they are considering making an internal complaint or whether they decide to 
leak.   
A further relationship that is of central importance is that of the 
whistleblower with a member of the press or similarly with a book publisher. 
The media have long been known as the government watchdog. However, 
members of the press are granted special dispensation of free speech, which 
often protects journalists when the whistleblower is left to fend of legal 
action for breaching their contract or worse criminal charges under the 
Espionage Act.  
It is imperative to consider the role that a whistleblower or leaker can play 
within the broader landscape of oversight and accountability. The potential 
for whistleblowers to hold governments to account for wrongdoing should 
be acknowledged. As insiders with special knowledge about the operations 
within government systems, it follows that they could constitute a great asset 
within the oversight structure. Unlike, the formal mechanisms such as the 
Senate Select Committee that are populated by outsiders, the insider already 
has knowledge of any given operation. The argument that the insider cannot 
see the bigger picture is frankly quite absurd in today’s world, where at the 
push of a button anyone can find the answer to pretty much any question 
that is public knowledge.  
It appears that there is a fear in the intelligence community, to acknowledge 
whistleblowers as serving a purpose within the wider government structure. 
To securitise or criminalise the whistleblower, constitute an attempt to 
remove its agency or make it less potent. This is incredibly problematic, as 
agency should be central to any democratic structure. It can be argued that 
to rely on a whistleblower would be to rely on the integrity of any individual. 
However, the insider has already passed through a selection process in order 
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to find employment within the agency. It follows therefore that they have 
been selected on their merits, which if they are good enough to perform the 
function of an intelligence officer should, it follows, be good enough to make 
a decision as to whether an action is ethically right or wrong.  
 
Tentative Assertions and Thoughts for Future Research 
There are three areas that I would like to touch upon in this section that have 
arisen during the course of my research, which require further analysis and 
perhaps additional primary research. Firstly, this thesis has employed a 
bottom-up approach and most interviews have been with whistleblowers and 
whistleblower-lawyers. In order to construct a holistic understanding of the 
impact of whistleblowers, a top-down approach should also be employed in 
the future. Secondly, Bok states that more leaks will constitute more secrecy. 
This is disputable in today’s technologically advanced world. Thirdly, the term 
whistleblower can be used as a ruse, to hide an action that is motivated by a 
grudge or even money.  
The thesis has benefitted from a bottom-up focus, in order to focus on the 
issues of morality and ethics from the whistleblower’s perspective. However, 
in order to demonstrate a holistic approach, the top-down analysis cannot be 
discounted. Future research should, access permitting explore the internal 
structures of the intelligence community. In particular, the managerial issues 
that may be of concern when dealing with whistleblowers and leakers of 
national security information.  
Bok states that secrecy and leaks have a symbiotic relationship, meaning with 
an increased number of leaks we will find an increasing amount of state 
secrecy. However, as has been demonstrated through several case studies, 
technology has ensured that there are very few dark corners left in which to 
hide. The Internet connects devices and permits access to extensive technical 
knowledge at anyone’s fingertips. The ability to track and monitor through 
the medium of the internet is no longer an art form reserved for government 
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agents, but an activity that can be performed by a teenager from their 
bedroom. Without insiders, the intelligence community would not exist. 
From an abstract perspective then, every insider is a potential whistleblower. 
Manning and Snowden have demonstrated the ease of removing large 
amounts of data from a secure facility, even for an individual who is fairly low 
within the hierarchy of the agency. Therefore, the danger that an 
unauthorised disclosure constitutes tomorrow will continue to increase 
exponentially. In turn this will affect an agency’s ability to maintain secrecy. 
Due to its legal provisions and historical significance, the term whistleblower 
still carries with it a legitimacy that other term such as leaker, do not. 
Therefore, it is a reasonable question to ask – Have individuals like Agee or 
Snowden, whose status as whistleblowers have been called into question - 
been hiding behind this label in the public eye in order to foster the image of 
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